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SEVENTY YEARS have passed since the end 
of the Asia-Pacific War, yet Japan remains 
embroiled in controversy with its neighbors 
over the war’s commemoration. Among the 
many points of contention between Japan, 
China, and South Korea are interpretations 
of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, apologies and 
compensation for foreign victims of Japanese 
aggression, prime ministerial visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, and the war’s portrayal in 
textbooks. Collectively, these controversies 
have come to be called the “history problem.” 
But why has the problem become so intracta-
ble? Can it ever be resolved, and if so, how? 
To answer these questions author Hiro 
Saito mobilizes the sociology of collective 
memory and social movement, political theo-
ries of apology and reconciliation, psycholog-
ical research on intergroup conflict, and phil-
osophical reflections on memory and history. 
The history problem, he argues, is essentially 
a relational phenomenon caused when nations 
publicly showcase self- serving versions of the 
past at key ceremonies and events: Japan, 
South Korea, and China all focus on what hap-
pened to their own citizens with little regard 
for foreign others. Saito goes on to explore  
the emergence of a cosmopolitan form of 
commemoration taking humanity, rather than 
nationality, as its primary frame of reference, 
an approach increasingly used by a transna-
tional network of advocacy NGOs, victims of 
Japan’s past wrongdoings, historians, and edu-
cators. When cosmopolitan commemoration 
is practiced as a collective endeavor by both 
perpetrators and victims, Saito argues, a res-
olution of the history problem—and eventual 
reconciliation—will finally become possible.
The History Problem examines a vast  
corpus of historical material in both English 
and Japanese, offering provocative findings 
that challenge orthodox explanations. Written 
in clear and accessible prose, this uniquely 
interdisciplinary book will appeal to sociol-
ogists, political scientists, and historians 
researching collective memory, nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism, and international rela-
tions—and to anyone interested in the com-
memoration of historical wrongs.
H I R O  S A I T O  is assistant professor of soci-
ology at Singapore Management University.
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“Hiro Saito offers a timely and well-researched analysis of 
East Asia’s never-ending cycle of blame and denial, distortion 
and obfuscation concerning the region’s shared history of 
violence and destruction during the first half of the twentieth 
century. In The History Problem Saito smartly introduces the 
central ‘us-versus-them’ issues and confronts readers with the 
multiple layers that bind the East Asian countries involved 
to show how these problems are mutually constituted across 
borders and generations. He argues that the inextricable 
knots that constrain these problems could be less like a hang-
man’s noose and more of a supportive web if there were the 
political will to determine the virtues of peaceful coexistence. 
Anything less, he explains, follows an increasingly perilous 
path forward on which nationalist impulses are encouraged 
to derail cosmopolitan efforts at engagement. Readers of all 
levels of these issues will benefit from Saito’s lucid command 
of the post-1945 terrain as well as his thoughtful suggestions 
for cooperation and coexistence.” 
— ALEXIS DUDDEN, Univers i ty  of  Connect icut 
“The History Problem is a powerful analysis of how com-
memoration and the controversies that arise from it overflow 
the so-called container of the nation-state. Memory, Saito, 
demonstrates, is a transnational, even cosmopolitan issue. 
As a result, only the kind of multidirectional analysis Saito 
provides is adequate to memory’s complexities, which are  
of glaring importance in world politics. This book thus makes 
a crucial and nuanced contribution to the fields of memory 
studies, international politics, and the historiography of 
Northeast Asia.” 
—JEFFREY K. OLICK, Univers i ty  of  Vi rginia
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Preface
Th e Asia- Pacifi c War ended more than seventy years ago. Yet, to this day, 
the war continues to haunt Japan’s relations with its two most impor tant 
neighbors, South  Korea and China. Can the three countries ever resolve the 
dispute over how to commemorate the war, and if so, how? Th is question 
motivated me to write this book.
I have no experience of the war, and I did not hear about it fi rsthand 
when I was growing up. My  father was born  after the war, and my  mother 
was still a small child when the war ended. Th ey have no memory of it. But 
they once told me that my paternal grand father, a carpenter, had been con-
scripted as a technician to support Japa nese troops in Manchuria, while my 
maternal grand father, an elementary school teacher, had been spared from 
military ser vice. Th is second hand story about my grand fathers was my only 
point of personal, albeit indirect, connection with the war.
Growing up in Japan, however, I was exposed to many illustrated books 
and movies about the war at both home and school. I still remember learn-
ing about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki through Th e 
Angry Bodhisattva (Okorijizō) and Barefoot Gen (Hadashi no Gen), the bomb-
ings of Tokyo and other major cities through Th e Glass Rabbit (Garasu no 
usage) and Grave of the Firefl ies (Hotaru no haka), and the  Battle of Okinawa 
through Th e Tower of Lilies (Himeyuri no tō) and Tsushima Maru.  Th ese 
books and movies made deep impressions on me  because many of them de-
picted the suff ering of  children of my age. And yet, the war felt like a remote 
past, for I was sheltered in postwar Japan’s economic prosperity.
I developed a strong interest in the war or, more precisely, its commem-
oration, only in fall 2001. I had just entered the doctoral program in sociol-
ogy at the University of Michigan when the 9/11 terrorist attacks happened. 
I was shocked by the inhumane nature of the attacks, as well as by the US 
government’s aggressive response. Th e US government did not appear to care 
about collateral damage to civilians in Af ghan i stan and Iraq. I saw a parallel 
between  those civilians and the ones in Hiroshima and Nagasaki— all vic-
tims of a strain of American nationalism that did not recognize the human-
ity of  people in “ enemy countries.” So, I deci ded to write a historical critique 
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of American nationalism, examining how  people in Japan had coped with the 
atomic bombings.
But I soon realized my naïveté. Many Japa nese citizens commemorated 
the atomic bombings to articulate Japan’s victim identity in nationalist terms, 
discounting the suff erings that the Japa nese military had infl icted on  people 
in the Asia- Pacifi c. Indeed, while the US government waged war in Af ghan i-
stan and Iraq in the early 2000s, Japa nese prime minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō 
repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine, the sacred site for Japa nese nation-
alism, causing an uproar in South  Korea and China. Th e controversy was 
further intensifi ed by the nationalist history textbook promoted by the Japa-
nese Society for History Textbook Reform that glorifi ed Japan’s past aggres-
sion as a heroic act of self- defense against the Western imperial powers. I was 
therefore disappointed with both Japa nese and American nationalism.
As I researched more, however, I found that A- bomb victims had cri-
tiqued nationalism in the Japa nese commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War, 
and they had spearheaded the eff ort to commemorate victims of Japan’s war-
time atrocities. Th ey  were able to do so  because their sense of victimhood 
was fundamentally cosmopolitan, recognizing the suff ering of war victims 
irrespective of nationality. Th is led me to delve deeply into how other actors 
in Japan, including but not limited to activists, politicians, historians, and 
history teachers, tried to commemorate foreign war victims. Specifi cally, 
 these investigations enabled me to discern the history of transnational in-
teractions between Japan, South  Korea, and China that had injected cos-
mopolitanism into Japan’s offi  cial commemoration at vari ous times. Th is 
transnational perspective also helped me probe how nationalist commemo-
ration in Japan was connected with its counter parts in South  Korea, China, 
and even the United States.
Th us, I began to understand how multiple entangled  factors had ren-
dered Japan’s dispute with South  Korea and China seemingly unresolvable: 
the contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the tension 
between commemoration and historiography, Japan’s dual identity as perpe-
trator and victim, negative feedback loops of nationalism in the region, and 
so on. I was aware, of course, that numerous books had already been writ-
ten about Japan’s dispute with South  Korea and China, but I deci ded to write 
this book  because I felt the itinerary of my personal and intellectual bi-
ography could provide a unique perspective. Above all, I felt the urge to 
share the results of my research and refl ections with  people in East Asia 
and beyond— scholars, educators, students, and concerned citizens—to 
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reexamine the  causes of the dispute and explore the possibilities for resolu-
tion from the vantage point of the seventieth anniversary of the war’s end.
I was able to complete this book only  because I received generous sup-
port from vari ous mentors, colleagues, and institutions along the way. To 
begin with, I would like to thank Azumi Kōya and Mark Gould, my advisers 
at International Christian University and Haverford College, respectively. 
With Kōya’s encouragement, I deci ded to go to the United States for gradu ate 
school. Mark also provided me with excellent foundations in social theory 
when I attended Haverford as an exchange student, and  these theoretical 
foundations continue to help me analyze the complex realities of the con-
temporary world.
At the University of Michigan, I started thinking and writing about 
the politics of war commemoration  under the guidance of three historical 
and po liti cal sociologists, Julia Adams, Michael Kennedy, and Howard 
Kimeldorf. Th ey decisively infl uenced my theoretical, methodological, and 
professional orientations. Th e University of Michigan indeed off ered the 
right gradu ate education for me— interdisciplinary and international. John 
Campbell, a po liti cal scientist, shared with me his detailed knowledge of 
Japa nese politics, while Ram Mahalingam introduced me to cultural psy-
chol ogy, a key to understanding commemoration that is si mul ta neously col-
lective and individual. I would like to thank Julia, Michael, Howard, John, 
and Ram for supervising my research. I am also grateful to the university 
and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation/American Council for Learned 
Socie ties for providing me with fellowships and other resources to complete 
my gradu ate studies.
While an assistant professor at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, I 
was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship from the Social Science Research 
Council and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science in 2011–2012. 
Th is fellowship allowed me to spend a year at the Institute of Social Science 
at the University of Tokyo, collect primary and secondary materials for the 
book proj ect, and produce the fi rst draft of the manuscript. I am grateful to 
Suehiro Akira and Ishida Hiroshi, then directors of the institute, as well as 
Th omas Blackwood and Tanabe Shunsuke, for hosting me as a visiting 
research fellow. I also would like to thank Aoki Yoshiyuki, who was a doc-
toral student at the university, for translating Korean newspaper articles into 
Japa nese.
In addition, I was fortunate to receive a postdoctoral fellowship from 
the Program on U.S.- Japan Relations at Harvard University in 2013–2014. 
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Th e fellowship gave me the time and resources that I needed to prepare the 
manuscript for submission. At Harvard, I was fortunate to befriend two 
young historians, Mimaki Seiko and Tim Yang. I am grateful to them for 
reading the entire manuscript and helping me clarify my argument. I would 
also like to thank Th omas Berger, Alexis Dudden, Fujihira Shinju, and Susan 
Pharr for their generosity in spending an after noon participating in intense 
discussion of the manuscript and off ering me many insightful comments.
While a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard, I also had the chance to par-
ticipate in the Next Generation Japan Leadership Program or ga nized by the 
Maureen and Mike Mansfi eld Foundation. Participation in the program 
helped me carefully consider policy implications of my argument. Discus-
sion sessions including Victor Cha, Chris Nelson, Sheila Smith, and Scott 
Snyder particularly broadened my perspective on the history prob lem vis- à- vis 
other issues and dimensions of international relations in East Asia.
Moreover, at vari ous stages of writing this book, I received comments 
from David Johnson, David Leheny, Ivo Plsek, and Franziska Seraphim. 
Th eir comments  were demanding but tremendously useful in refi ning my 
argument. I am particularly grateful to David Johnson for being such a won-
derful mentor and colleague, along with Hagen Koo, at the University of 
Hawai‘i at Mānoa. I would also like to acknowledge generous support from 
my editors: Susan Campbell and Kim Greenwell; Pamela Kelley at the Uni-
versity of Hawai‘i Press; Michael Bohrer- Clancy at Westchester Publishing 
Ser vices; as well as helpful feedback from the two anonymous reviewers of 
the University of Hawai‘i Press. Th eir comments and editorial guidance 
made a big diff erence.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, Saito Hideo and 
Fumiyo, and my wife, Miki. My parents not only exposed me to many illus-
trated books and movies about the Asia- Pacifi c War when I was a child, but 
also supported my decision to study abroad. My wife also taught me an 
impor tant lesson while I was completing the fi nal version of the manu-
script—we can hope for a peaceful world only if we are peaceful ourselves, 
and the practice of peace begins with our daily life.
So, I dedicate this book to  people in East Asia and elsewhere who wish 
to make the world a more peaceful place.
THE HISTORY PROB LEM

1Introduction
In March 1976, Kurihara Sadako, a poet who had survived the atomic bomb-
ing of Hiroshima, published “When We Say ‘Hiroshima’ ” (Hiroshima to 
iutoki).1 Th e poem asked A- bomb victims, as well as the Japa nese  people as a 
 whole, the following: “When we say ‘Hiroshima,’ / do  people answer,  gently, / 
‘Ah, Hiroshima’?” Instead of such gentle expression of understanding, Kuri-
hara heard “echoes of blood and fi re” and angry voices against Japan for its 
past wrongdoings: “In chorus, Asia’s dead and her voiceless masses / spit out 
the anger / of all  those we made victims.” But why was the anger of  those out-
side Japan still so resonant thirty years  after the Asia- Pacifi c War had ended? 
Kurihara’s answer was that it was  because the Japa nese had failed to adequately 
remember and atone for the atrocities that they had committed in the Asia- 
Pacifi c, while dwelling on their own victimhood. She pleaded, “We fi rst must / 
wash the blood / off  our own hands,” so that  others might eventually extend 
solidarity to Japan’s A- bomb victims in their common pursuit of world peace.
In spite of Kurihara’s plea, “echoes of blood and fi re” continue to haunt 
Japan’s relations with its neighboring countries. Especially with South  Korea 
and China, Japan has been embroiled in intense controversies over the com-
memoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War. To name but a few points of contention: 
interpretations of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, apologies and compensation 
for foreign victims of Japan’s past aggression, prime ministers’ visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, and Japa nese history textbooks. Collectively,  these contro-
versies have become known as the “history prob lem” (rekishi ninshiki mon-
dai) in East Asia.
Th e history prob lem escalated to an unpre ce dented scale in 2005, the 
sixtieth anniversary of the Asia- Pacifi c War’s end, when Prime Minister 
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Koizumi Jun’ichirō visited the Yasukuni Shrine that honors war dead as well 
as war time leaders who  were prosecuted as war criminals. In the same year, 
the Japa nese government approved a highly nationalistic history textbook 
produced by the Japa nese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii 
Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukurukai) for use in ju nior high schools. Respond-
ing to  these events, the governments of South  Korea and China strongly criti-
cized the Japa nese government, and dislike of Japan among South Koreans 
and Chinese spiked.2 Th e Chinese reaction was particularly intense, as large- 
scale anti- Japanese demonstrations caused damage to the Japa nese Consul-
ate in Shanghai and Japanese- owned stores in major Chinese cities.
Although the history prob lem temporarily calmed down  after succes-
sors of Koizumi refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, it remains a 
formidable obstacle in Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China. Opin-
ion polls in 2014 showed that about 70   percent of South Koreans and 
more than 80   percent of Chinese viewed Japan negatively.3 In August 
2015, the media and citizens in the two countries also made critical re-
marks on the statement that Prime Minister Abe Shinzō issued on the eve 
of the seventieth anniversary of the war’s end.4 In turn, the percentage of 
Japa nese who did not feel friendly  toward South  Korea and China exceeded 
60   percent and 80   percent, respectively, according to the 2014 govern-
ment opinion survey.5
In fact, the history prob lem has become potentially more explosive 
thanks to its intersection with the growing territorial disputes over Dokdo/
Takeshima and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, amid the changing balance 
of power in the region.6 In August 2012, for example, South Korean presi-
dent Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo/Takeshima  after the Japa nese govern-
ment refused to discuss compensation for South Korean victims of Japan’s 
past wrongdoings. Lee’s government also launched a campaign to publi-
cize the territorial dispute as part of the history prob lem— Dokdo symboliz-
ing the Korean nation victimized by Japan’s past aggression.7 Moreover, 
when the Japa nese government proceeded to offi  cially own the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands in September 2012, the Chinese government cancelled events 
to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of normalization between the two coun-
tries. Chinese citizens, too, staged anti- Japanese demonstrations in major 
Chinese cities in mid- September, marking the anniversary of the Mukden 
Incident, Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, which had taken place in Septem-
ber 1931.8
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As evinced by  these events, the territorial disputes are inextricably tied 
with memories of Japan’s past aggression for many South Koreans and Chi-
nese. Th e disputes have also been stimulated by the rising stature of South 
 Korea and China in international society. No longer weak, as they once  were 
in the aftermath of the Asia- Pacifi c War, the two countries have become 
more confi dent and assertive  toward Japan, and national pride has increased 
among their citizens.9 Th e Japa nese government, in turn, has emphasized 
the importance of patriotism to its citizens to compensate for the economic 
and po liti cal stagnation since the 1990s. Most recently, Abe Shinzō’s gov-
ernment reinterpreted Article 9 of the constitution to expand Japan’s mili-
tary capability in September 2015, stirring anxiety among  people in South 
 Korea and China who still remember Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th us, 
 whether and how the governments and citizens of the three countries 
can resolve the history prob lem has crucial ramifi cations for the  future 
of East Asia.
But how did the history prob lem become such a point of contention in 
Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China? Can the three countries re-
solve the history prob lem and, if so, how? Th is book aims to answer  these 
questions, crucial for the governments and citizens in East Asia whose activi-
ties are increasingly intertwined at the beginning of the twenty- fi rst  century.
The History Prob lem as a Collision of 
Nationalist Commemorations
In essence, East Asia’s history prob lem is a set of complexly entangled 
controversies over how to commemorate the Asia- Pacifi c War. But “the Asia- 
Pacifi c War” is itself a complicated term. Historians who adopt the term dis-
agree  whether it should refer only to the Asia- Pacifi c theater of World War II 
(1941–1945) or include the Second Sino- Japanese War (1937–1945).10 Some 
Japa nese historians also advocate “the Fifteen- Year War” (1931–1945) as an 
alternative term to capture the connection between the Mukden Incident in 
Manchuria (1931–1933), the Second Sino- Japanese War, and the Asia- Pacifi c 
war theater.  Others think that “the Greater East Asia War” (1941–1945) is 
historically most accurate  because the term was used by Japan’s war time 
government. Above all,  people outside Japan understand the historical pe-
riod diff erently in terms of their own sense of temporality based on histo-
ries of re sis tance against imperial aggression and fi ghts for in de pen dence 
that preceded and followed “the Asia- Pacifi c War.”11
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In this book, I use “the Asia- Pacifi c War” in a broad sense, to refer to 
the Mukden Incident, the Second Sino- Japanese War, and the Asia- Pacifi c 
war theater. Th is is  because when  people both inside and outside Japan speak 
of Japan’s “past wrongdoings” (kako no ayamachi), they often refer to events 
that happened between 1931 and 1945, such as the invasion of Manchuria, 
the Nanjing Massacre, and the military “comfort  women” system. Th us, us-
ing  either “the Asia- Pacifi c War,” in the narrow sense, or “the Greater East 
Asia War” would leave out impor tant points of contention from my analy-
sis of the history prob lem. I also prefer the broad version of “the Asia- Pacifi c 
War” to “the Fifteen- Year War”  because the former better captures the geo-
graph i cal scope of the history prob lem. Of course, “the Asia- Pacifi c War,” 
even in the broad sense, risks downplaying the South Korean perspective 
on the history prob lem that includes Japan’s colonial rule (1910–1945), but 
I believe that this risk is minimal so long as Japan’s war time atrocities against 
Koreans are fully understood as coterminous with its colonial rule.
Just as “the Asia- Pacifi c War” is a complicated term, the “history prob-
lem” is a complex phenomenon and hard to pin down  because it consists of 
multiple controversies dealing with diverse issues, ranging from the Yasukuni 
Shrine to history textbooks, that have po liti cal dynamics and historical tra-
jectories of their own. In this sense, it may be more appropriate to translate 
rekishi ninshiki mondai as “history prob lems” in the plural. Nevertheless, 
 these multiple controversies are historically homologous— tracing back to 
Japan’s actions during the Asia- Pacifi c War— and inextricably entangled to 
form a more or less bounded domain of public debates and policy prob lems.
Moreover, the controversies are structurally homologous in the sense 
that they pertain to commemoration, an act of remembering the past to con-
struct what sociologist Maurice Halbwachs called “collective memory.”12 
On the one hand, collective memory is internal and psychological, consist-
ing of mnemonic schemas or tacit understandings of what to remember 
about the past and how to remember it. On the other hand, collective mem-
ory is external and material, encoded in mnemonic objects that include, 
but are not limited to, archives, memorials, museum exhibits, and history 
textbooks.13 A variety of commemorations, such as anniversary cele brations 
and memorial ceremonies, aim to align participants’ mnemonic schemas 
with mnemonic objects surrounding them in order to institutionalize a cer-
tain form of collective memory of their purportedly shared past.
In this pro cess of constructing a collective autobiography, however, 
commemoration eliminates ambiguities from historical facts. As phi los o pher 
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Tzvetan Todorov observed, “While history makes the past more compli-
cated, commemoration makes it simpler, since it seeks most often to supply 
us with heroes to worship or with enemies to detest.”14 Even though com-
memoration oversimplifi es and even distorts, it is indispensable to social life 
 because only through it can  people appropriate something as vast and com-
plex as history in order to articulate their collective identity. As a result, when 
diff er ent groups come into contact with each other, they are likely to notice 
disjunctions in how they commemorate the past.  Th ese disjunctive com-
memorations can then become sources of controversy and even confl ict 
between the groups precisely  because the foundations of their collective 
identities are at stake. In this sense, a history prob lem is not unique to East 
Asia but commonplace around the world.
But controversy and confl ict over commemoration of the past become 
intractable when they intersect with nationalism, a po liti cal doctrine and cul-
tural idiom that divides the world into discrete national communities.15 
When  people commemorate the past according to the logic of nationalism, 
they focus on their conationals,  whether heroes or victims, without suffi  -
cient regard for foreign  others. Th is exclusive focus on conationals manifests 
most clearly in nationalist commemoration of an armed confl ict, which of-
ten elevates fallen soldiers to immortal heroes of the nation while disregard-
ing what  these soldiers might have done to foreign  others— the moment 
when one’s own nation becomes sacred above all  else, as po liti cal scientist 
Benedict Anderson pointed out.16 Moreover, nationalism excludes foreign 
 others from commemoration in another sense: the princi ple of national sov-
ereignty prohibits foreign  others from participating in the pro cess of shap-
ing the content of commemoration. When a government plans a memorial 
ceremony for war dead at a national cemetery, for example, it typically does 
not allow foreign governments to infl uence the content of the ceremony. His-
tory education is another example wherein national sovereignty over com-
memoration continues to be asserted, authorizing only historians who are 
citizens of a given country to write “national history.” Indeed, nationalism 
was the most dominant logic of commemoration during the twentieth 
 century—to the extent that Max Weber once defi ned the nation as a “com-
munity of memories”— and much of the historical and so cio log i cal research 
on collective memory assumed the nation as a unit of analy sis.17
By doubly excluding foreign  others from the content and pro cess of 
commemoration, the nationalist logic prompts  people to embrace a certain 
version of the past as a foundation of their national identity. Not surprisingly 
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then, if nationalist commemorations confront one another, intense contro-
versy can result. A collision of contradictory versions of the past, each pred-
icated on the negation of the foreign other, is a  recipe for escalating mutual 
distrust and denunciation. Th is is how a historical prob lem, which is rather 
commonplace in itself, becomes an intractable point of contention in inter-
group relations. Put another way, East Asia’s history prob lem is not primar-
ily about scholarly, historiographical disagreement among historians in 
Japan, South  Korea, and China over the evidential validity of historical ma-
terials and the plausibility of historical interpretations; rather, it is about 
emotionally charged disagreement between the governments and citizens in 
the three countries over how to construct autobiographical narratives as 
foundations of their national identities.
Th is fundamentally relational nature of a history prob lem calls into 
question the orthodox explanation of East Asia’s history prob lem, popu lar 
outside Japan as well as among left- leaning Japa nese. Th is orthodox expla-
nation attributes the history prob lem squarely to Japan— the seeming in-
ability of its government and citizens to acknowledge their country’s past 
wrongdoings—by showing how the Japa nese government was dominated 
by the conservative Liberal Demo cratic Party (LDP) during much of the 
postwar period.18 As the result of this nationalist domination, the orthodox 
explanation goes, the Japa nese government not only refused to commemo-
rate foreign victims but also justifi ed the war as a heroic act of self- defense 
against Western imperial powers. While I agree that the orthodox explana-
tion has much merit, I also argue that it fails to fully explain the dynamic 
and trajectory of East Asia’s history prob lem. For example, when Japan 
normalized its relations with South  Korea and China in 1965 and 1972, 
respectively, government leaders on both sides in each instance deci ded to 
prioritize po liti cal and economic interests over issues of apology and com-
pensation. Similarly, a downward spiral of mutually reinforcing criticisms 
between Japan and its two neighbors intensifi ed the history prob lem in the 
early 2000s.
Th us, I argue that the cause of the history prob lem cannot be attrib-
uted to Japan alone and that it needs to be carefully examined in terms of 
Japan’s interactions with South  Korea and China, as po liti cal scientists 
Th omas Berger, Yinan He, and Jennifer Lind have each demonstrated in re-
cent work.19 To understand the evolution of the history prob lem, then, it is 
crucial to trace how nationalist commemorations in Japan as well as in South 
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 Korea and China have interacted with one another to produce mutual an-
tipathy rather than affi  nity.
Cosmopolitanism as a New Logic of Commemoration
By itself, the interaction of nationalist commemorations does not adequately 
explain the dynamic and trajectory of East Asia’s history prob lem, especially 
in recent de cades. Th is is  because nationalism is no longer the only logic of 
commemoration available  today. As sociologist Ulrich Beck and his col-
leagues have argued, cosmopolitanism, an orientation of openness to foreign 
 others, is increasingly institutionalized in a variety of  human practices in 
the con temporary world, thanks to the globalization of  human- rights dis-
course and the growing sociocultural interactions across national borders.20 
Cosmopolitanism pres ents a new logic of feeling, thinking, and acting that 
takes humanity, rather than nationality, as a primary frame of reference. 
Drawing on the logic of cosmopolitanism,  people can doubly include 
foreign  others in commemoration: they remember what happened to for-
eign  others as members of humanity, but they also invite  those  others to 
contribute to shaping the content of commemoration. As Beck put it, cos-
mopolitan commemoration involves “acknowledging the history (and the 
memories) of the ‘other’ and integrating them into one’s own history, . . . 
where the national monologues of victimization that are celebrated as na-
tional memory are systematically replaced by transnational forms and 
forums of memory and dialogue, which also enable the innermost aspects 
of the national realm— the founding of myths—to be opened up to and for 
one another.”21 Cosmopolitan commemoration thus allows  people to ex-
tend identifi cation beyond national borders and engage in transformative 
dialogues with foreign  others that critically refl ect on the nationalist biases 
in their version of history.22
Cosmopolitan commemoration has been promoted most systemati-
cally by United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organ ization 
(UNESCO). Currently, UNESCO runs the World Heritage site program. 
Launched in 1972, the program aims to preserve natu ral and cultural sites 
around the world as shared heritage for humanity as a  whole. While cul-
tural sites consist mostly of ancient  castles,  temples, and monuments, they 
also include sites related to slavery, the Holocaust, the atomic bombing, and 
other forms of extreme  human suff ering. UNESCO also established the 
Memory of the World Programme in 1992 to protect historic documents, 
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relics, and works of art as focal points for remembering world history. Th is 
program also includes proj ects to preserve historical documents related to 
negative aspects of world history, such as the Holocaust.  Th ese two UNESCO 
programs encourage  people around the world to commemorate events that 
happened to foreign  others as fellow  human beings. Along with UNESCO, 
other United Nations (UN) organ izations have promoted cosmopolitanism 
for more than half a  century,  because po liti cal leaders espoused it as a new 
princi ple for creating a more peaceful world in the aftermath of World 
War II, which had brought so much suff ering to millions of  people. Since 
cosmopolitanism, embodied by  human rights and other UN conventions, 
has been  adopted by national governments and nongovernmental organ-
izations (NGOs) around the world, the horizon of commemoration appears 
to be extending beyond national borders.
Consistent with the worldwide trend, the Japa nese government began 
to incorporate cosmopolitanism in its offi  cial commemoration in the early 
1990s. When the LDP, a defender of nationalist commemoration, was tem-
porarily ousted from power, non- LDP prime ministers such as Hosokawa 
Morihito of the Japan New Party and Murayama Tomiichi of the Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP) offi  cially apologized for Japan’s past wrongdoings. 
Concurrently, Japan’s Ministry of Education approved history textbooks that 
expanded descriptions of Japan’s colonial rule of  Korea, “comfort  women,” 
and the Nanjing Massacre, among other negative aspects of Japan’s past. 
 Th ese gestures of contrition expressed the cosmopolitan logic of commem-
oration and, during the last few de cades, Japan’s offi  cial commemoration has 
come to exhibit a complex mixture of nationalist defi ance and cosmopoli-
tan contrition. Even Koizumi Jun’ichirō, whose visit to the Yasukuni Shrine 
sparked so much controversy in the early 2000s, followed Murayama’s pre-
ce dent and offi  cially off ered “sincere apologies” for victims of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings.23
Cosmopolitan commemoration, however, is not replacing nationalist 
commemoration in a zero- sum manner. Instead, the relationship between 
the two is open- ended  because nationalism continues to operate as a central 
organ izing princi ple in the con temporary world. As Ulrich Beck and Natan 
Sznaider put it, “Cosmopolitanism does not only negate nationalism but also 
presupposes it.”24 While UN organ izations promote  human rights, national 
governments are still responsible for implementing them in education sys-
tems and other societal institutions. Similarly, even though membership in 
humanity is emphasized, national citizenship continues to structure access 
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to socioeconomic resources and po liti cal rights.25 Since both nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism are legitimated, this creates what sociologists call an “in-
stitutional contradiction,” wherein contradictory but equally legitimate log-
ics clash with each other.26 Th is institutional contradiction serves as a focal 
point of po liti cal strug gles for the legitimate commemoration, and  these 
strug gles are likely to be intense and protracted  because all sides, subscrib-
ing to nationalism and cosmopolitanism diff erently, have reasonable claims 
to legitimacy.27
Put another way, the dynamic and trajectory of the history prob lem 
cannot be attributed simply to par tic u lar groups, such as the LDP, that pro-
mote nationalist commemorations, for the prob lem is built into the very 
“institutional environment” in which  these groups operate.28 Th e crucial 
questions, therefore, are how diff er ent groups or ga nize and justify their own 
commemorations by drawing on nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and why 
some commemorations achieve dominance over  others. In short, how does 
the politics of commemoration play out?
 Toward a Field Theory of the History Prob lem
Politics has been a central concern in the sociology of collective memory 
since Barry Schwartz, Robin Wagner- Pacifi ci, and Vered Vinitzky- Seroussi, 
among  others, pioneered research on “diffi  cult pasts.”29  Th ese sociologists 
focused on “morally ambiguous” events that divided members of society, 
ranging from the Vietnam War to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and 
examined how diff er ent groups mobilized to legitimate their versions of the 
past. Although much of the research on diffi  cult pasts took the nation as the 
unit of analy sis, a growing number of sociologists, historians, and cultural 
theorists have recently  adopted transnational perspectives. Th ey have argued 
that commemorations of diffi  cult pasts, most notably the Holocaust, now 
travel across national borders through multiple media of communication and 
infl uence each other in vari ous directions.30 In this regard, East Asia’s his-
tory prob lem exemplifi es the politics of commemoration at the transna-
tional scale, where disjunctive commemorations of the Asia- Pacifi c War— 
the diffi  cult past—in Japan, South  Korea, and China interact with one 
another, competing for legitimacy.31
To analytically disentangle the politics of East Asia’s history prob lem, 
I propose to use fi eld theory. Originally developed by French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu, fi eld theory was imported into collective memory stud-
ies by American sociologist Jeff rey Olick, who sought to emphasize the 
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heterogeneous and dynamic nature of collective memory.32 According to 
Olick, constructing collective memory occurs in multiple fi elds— artistic, 
social, po liti cal, and so on— each with its own distinct rules of engagement. 
Actors compete to legitimate their own commemorative positions by de-
ploying diff er ent strategies and mobilizing diff er ent amounts of resources at 
their disposal. While diff er ent fi elds produce diff er ent collective memories, 
they are also interdependent: dynamics and trajectories of fi elds are  shaped 
both internally and externally. Moreover, relations among fi elds are struc-
tured hierarchically: the po liti cal fi eld tends to dominate other fi elds 
 because its strug gles revolve around the government, which has the power 
to defi ne an offi  cial commemoration as a pa ram e ter for strug gles in other 
fi elds. To put it in Bourdieu’s own words, the government is able to “exer-
cise power over the diff er ent fi elds”  because it “establishes and inculcates . . . 
social frameworks of perceptions, of understanding or of memory” among 
citizens.33 Th e po liti cal fi eld is therefore “a sort of metafi eld” in relation to 
other fi elds of collective memory.34
By building on fi eld theory, I conceptualize East Asia’s history prob-
lem as a po liti cal fi eld wherein relevant actors compete over the legitimate 
commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War.  Here, I limit “relevant actors” to 
 those who consciously try to infl uence Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, that 
is,  those who participate in politics in the conventional sense that their ac-
tions are explic itly oriented  toward the government. Th e Japa nese govern-
ment is the most impor tant actor in this fi eld  because it has the power to 
defi ne Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, the focal point of po liti cal strug gles. 
In international contexts, the commemorative position of the Japa nese gov-
ernment has been the target of criticism from the governments and citizens 
in South  Korea and China. In domestic contexts, too, vari ous NGOs and 
po liti cal parties have pressed the Japa nese government to accommodate and 
sanction their commemorative positions. Although artists, writers, and or-
dinary citizens commemorate the Asia- Pacifi c War in fi elds other than poli-
tics, they remain outside the scope of this book,  unless they participate in 
po liti cal strug gles over the history prob lem.
In addition, commemorative positions of the Japa nese government and 
other relevant actors can be identifi ed in terms of the spectrum ranging 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism— the two logics of commemo-
ration available in the institutional environment. While some actors might 
subscribe exclusively to  either nationalism or cosmopolitanism, most actors 
are likely to combine the two logics diff erently to articulate their commem-
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orative positions. At the concrete level, some of  these commemorative 
positions can be labeled as “evasion,” “denial,” “pacifi st,” and so forth, as 
Japa nese sociologists Hashimoto Akiko and Tsutsui Kiyoteru have done;35 
however,  these labels or “frames” pertain to commemorative practices spe-
cifi c to  either situations or issues, and they are ultimately derived from com-
binations of nationalism and cosmopolitanism as culturally deeper logics 
of commemoration.36
I also propose to combine fi eld theory with social movement studies to 
analyze how relevant po liti cal actors infl uenced Japan’s offi  cial commemo-
ration. According to sociologists Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, this 
combination extends Bourdieu’s fi eld theory, which mostly takes the indi-
vidual as a unit of analy sis, by incorporating the mechanisms of mobiliza-
tion of collective actions.37 In fact, although not using fi eld theory, several 
sociologists have recently attempted to introduce social movement studies 
into collective memory studies.38 Following their lead, I borrow two major 
analytical concepts from social movement studies— mobilizing structures 
and po liti cal opportunities—to strengthen my fi eld analy sis of East Asia’s 
history prob lem.
Mobilizing structures refers to organ izations and their networks that pro-
vide  human and fi nancial resources for actors to mobilize collective actions 
and promote their commemorative positions.39 In the case of the history 
prob lem, mobilizing structures consist of po liti cal parties and NGOs.  Th ese 
are orga nizational vehicles that enable relevant po liti cal actors to advance 
their commemorative positions. If a po liti cal party promoting cosmopoli-
tan commemoration is weak, for example, Japan’s offi  cial commemoration 
is unlikely to incorporate the logic of cosmopolitanism. Mobilizing struc-
tures are not static,  because some organ izations exit the fi eld and  others en-
ter, and networks of  these organ izations change over time.
Moreover, when and how nationalism or cosmopolitanism is incorpo-
rated into Japan’s offi  cial commemoration depends on po liti cal opportunities 
available for proponents of respective logics of commemoration.40 Po liti cal 
opportunities have two components: access to the government and the rela-
tive signifi cance of the history prob lem in policy debates. If a ruling party 
that supports nationalist commemoration is ousted from power by an op-
position party whose commemorative position is more cosmopolitan, this 
means a lost po liti cal opportunity for proponents of nationalist commemo-
ration and, conversely, a newly gained po liti cal opportunity for proponents 
of cosmopolitan commemoration. In addition, when  there are policy issues 
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more urgent than the history prob lem, such as an economic crisis or a large- 
scale disaster, po liti cal opportunities for changing Japan’s offi  cial com-
memoration decrease for both incumbents and challengers.
In this book, then, I use fi eld theory to examine how relevant po liti cal 
actors, equipped with vari ous mobilizing structures, have promoted their 
commemorative positions and made use of po liti cal opportunities to infl u-
ence Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. I argue that such a fi eld analy sis al-
lows me to combine the strengths of two diff er ent approaches in existing 
research on East Asia’s history prob lem. On the one hand, international- 
relations scholars such as Th omas Berger, Yinan He, and Jennifer Lind have 
made an impor tant contribution by reconceptualizing the history prob lem 
as a relationally constituted phenomenon at the international level.41 Such 
an international perspective is particularly useful in the con temporary world, 
wherein more and more commemorations of the past traverse national 
borders through transnational media networks. Th is focus on international 
relations also mitigates the tendency among so cio log i cal studies of collec-
tive memory that take the nation as a unit of analy sis. On the other hand, 
historians have paid careful attention to public commemorations in civil 
society. Carol Gluck, Tessa Morris- Suzuki, and Franziska Seraphim, for 
example, argued that the evolution of the history prob lem cannot be fully 
explained without reference to multiple, competing commemorations in 
Japa nese civil society and growing transnational NGO networks seeking to 
address Japan’s past wrongdoings.42 Indeed, po liti cal strug gles over his-
torical injustices around the world have begun to involve nongovernmental 
actors  because NGOs and individual citizens are increasingly defi ned as 
legitimate stakeholders in international relations.43 Field theory can com-
bine  these two approaches by taking into account interactions between 
governmental and nongovernmental actors in shaping Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration.
To examine the content of Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, I break it 
down into three dimensions.44 Th e fi rst dimension consists of speech and 
 action by Japan’s prime ministers, as well as by other relevant ministers, as 
representatives of the Japa nese government. Speech includes offi  cial state-
ments on impor tant anniversaries and remarks made by government offi  -
cials during Diet sessions and news conferences, and action includes visiting 
memorials and attending ceremonies. Th e second dimension is compensa-
tion policy. Laws that defi ne which groups of  people are eligible for com-
pensation express the government’s commemorative position: the function 
of compensation is fundamentally symbolic of whose suff ering deserves to 
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be recognized. Th e third dimension is education, by which the Japa nese 
government legitimates a certain version of the past and disseminates it 
among Japa nese citizens. Even though the Japa nese government does not 
produce its own history textbook, it regulates history education and text-
books through the legally binding Course of Study (gakushūshidō yōryō) 
and textbook inspection. While  these three dimensions are not exhaustive, 
they nonetheless constitute the core of Japan’s offi  cial commemoration.
To understand how the three dimensions of Japan’s offi  cial commem-
oration evolved, I focus on the mediating role of po liti cal parties,  because 
the Japa nese government is ultimately controlled by politicians that Japa-
nese citizens elect. While NGOs in Japan could press the government by 
submitting petitions and signatures, for example, their actions have  little di-
rect infl uence on Japan’s offi  cial commemoration,  because their demands 
have to be translated by the ruling party engaged in po liti cal strug gles with 
opposition parties. Take, for example, the Japan Bereaved Families Associa-
tion (Nihon Izokukai) and the Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb 
Suff erers Organ izations (Nihon Hidankyō).  Th ese two NGOs tried to in-
fl uence Japan’s offi  cial commemoration throughout the postwar period, 
but their original demands always had to be pro cessed by their respective 
po liti cal representatives, the LDP and the JSP, which had orga nizational dy-
namics and po liti cal calculations of their own. Similarly, the governments 
and citizens of South  Korea and China pressed the Japa nese government 
through meetings, statements, and protests, but the eff ects of  these actions 
 were always refracted through the po liti cal dynamics inside Japan. Strug gles 
among po liti cal parties in Japan thus decisively shape the evolution of Ja-
pan’s offi  cial commemoration.
For the analy sis of the mediating role of po liti cal parties, I have exam-
ined mainly the proceedings of the Japa nese National Diet sessions (kokkai 
kaigiroku) between 1945 and 2015. Diet proceedings document not only 
speech and action by prime ministers and other cabinet members express-
ing Japan’s offi  cial commemoration but also debates between ruling and op-
position parties trying to represent competing commemorative positions by 
referring to petitions and requests relayed from their constituencies. Diet pro-
ceedings are therefore crucial texts that contain “traces of interactions,” so 
to speak, through which relevant po liti cal actors in the history prob lem have 
tried to infl uence Japan’s offi  cial commemoration.
Moreover, to clarify interactions among relevant po liti cal actors, I 
complemented Diet proceedings with four more sources. First, news arti-
cles published by Asahi shinbun and other major newspapers document 
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commemorative positions and actions of relevant po liti cal actors, both in-
side and outside Japan. Second, pamphlets, books, reports, and statements 
published by government ministries, po liti cal parties, and NGOs in Japan 
elaborate on their commemorative positions. Th ird, Japa nese translations 
of primary historical documents produced by governments, NGOs, and 
citizens in South  Korea and China shed light on their commemorative 
 positions. Fi nally, scholarly lit er a ture on East Asia’s history prob lem avail-
able in En glish and Japa nese provides summaries of the public debates on 
the Asia- Pacifi c War, as well as scholarly interventions, at diff er ent points in 
time.
Organ ization of the Book
Based on my fi eld analy sis of the data, I argue that the history prob lem 
escalated not simply  because conservative politicians and NGOs in Japan, 
aligned with the nationalist logic of commemoration, prevented the Japa-
nese government from fully expressing contrition  toward South Korean and 
Chinese victims according to the logic of cosmopolitanism. Th e history 
prob lem was also aggravated by the very proponents of cosmopolitan com-
memoration, such as left- leaning politicians and NGOs in Japan, that pressed 
the Japa nese government for greater contrition, for they based their com-
memoration on the Tokyo Trial, which had judged Japan as solely and en-
tirely guilty for the Asia- Pacifi c War. As a result, even though they succeeded 
in injecting cosmopolitanism into Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, they gal-
vanized Japa nese conservatives to reject the cosmopolitan commemoration 
by denouncing the Tokyo Judgment as “victor’s justice,” and instead justify 
Japan’s past aggression as an act of self- defense. Th e Japa nese proponents of 
cosmopolitan commemoration also allowed South  Korea and China to 
maintain nationalist commemorations of their own that glorifi ed their re-
sis tance against Japa nese aggression and blame Japan alone for the history 
prob lem, consistent with the Tokyo Judgment.
I also argue, however, that a crucial corrective has emerged over the 
last two de cades in the form of joint historical research and education proj-
ects that promote mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations and re-
ciprocate cosmopolitanism in commemorating the Asia- Pacifi c War. Th is 
growing transnational network of historians and educators began to criti-
cally reassess the Tokyo Judgment that had fueled nationalist resentments 
in Japan and justifi ed one- sided criticisms of Japan by South  Korea and 
China. Indeed, the joint proj ects have shown the potential to push Japa nese 
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citizens to fully commemorate the suff ering of South Korean and Chinese 
victims by confronting the real magnitude of Japan’s past wrongdoings, as 
well as to encourage South Korean and Chinese citizens to refl ect on their 
own nationalism and commemorate the war, including Japa nese victimhood, 
from a more cosmopolitan perspective.
Th e following chapters off er a fi eld analy sis of how the history prob lem 
evolved in East Asia from 1945 through 2015. Chapter 1, “Cross- National 
Fragmentation,” looks at the period between 1945 and 1964, when the his-
tory prob lem did not yet exist as such  because Japan had no diplomatic re-
lations with South  Korea and China. During the Occupation led by the 
United States, the Tokyo Trial prosecuted Japa nese leaders for waging a war 
of aggression against the Allied powers. Th e Japa nese government offi  cially 
acknowledged its past aggression when it signed the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty in September 1951, thereby accepting the Tokyo Judgment. Never-
theless, conservative politicians controlling the Japa nese government openly 
rejected the Tokyo Judgment as “victor’s justice.” Th ey instead justifi ed Japan’s 
past aggression as an act of self- defense and, together with the Japan Be-
reaved Families Association, honored Japa nese war dead as martyrs at the 
Yasukuni Shrine. Moreover,  after the LDP came to power in 1955, the Japa-
nese government increased its control over history education through the 
Course of Study and textbook inspection. Th e LDP thus enjoyed robust mo-
bilizing structures and monopolized po liti cal opportunities, successfully 
framing Japan’s offi  cial commemoration in nationalist terms. But, at the 
same time, opposition parties such as the JSP and the Japan Communist 
Party actively commemorated Japan’s past aggression against  Korea and 
China. Moreover, A- bomb victims and affi  liated NGOs began to adopt cos-
mopolitanism to commemorate all war victims irrespective of nationality, 
though they initially paid  little attention to foreign victims of the Asia- 
Pacifi c War. Since  these po liti cal parties and NGOs  were outnumbered by 
the LDP and its supporters, however, they did not infl uence Japan’s offi  -
cial commemoration.
Chapter 2, “Th e Growth of Transnational Interactions,” examines the 
period between 1965 and 1988, when the history prob lem emerged  after 
Japan normalized its diplomatic relations with South  Korea in 1965 and 
China in 1972.  After normalization, Japa nese A- bomb victims and af-
fi liated NGOs began to commemorate foreign victims of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings by extending the cosmopolitan logic that they had previ-
ously used for commemorating all war victims. Th e South Korean and 
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Chinese governments also pressed the Japa nese government to correct na-
tionalist biases in Japa nese history textbooks and demanded that Japa nese 
prime ministers refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, where Class A 
war criminals  were enshrined. Given  these growing transnational interac-
tions, the Japa nese government expressed remorse for its past aggression on 
several occasions, revised the Course of Study to increase descriptions of 
Japan’s past wrongdoings, and provided relief for South Korean A- bomb 
victims.  Th ese actions injected cosmopolitanism into Japan’s offi  cial com-
memoration, though the LDP continued to possess robust mobilizing struc-
tures and monopolize po liti cal opportunities to defend the nationalist logic 
of commemoration. Moreover, the South Korean and Chinese demands for 
a greater degree of cosmopolitan contrition on Japan’s part  were coupled 
with surging nationalist sentiments of their own. In South  Korea, ethnic 
nationalism was energized by the country’s economic success and the democ-
ratization movement in the 1980s, and in China, the Communist Party be-
gan to promote patriotic education to manage social instabilities created by 
the Cultural Revolution and economic reforms in the late 1970s. Hence, na-
tionalist commemorations in the three countries  were set on a collision 
course.
Chapter 3, “Apologies and Denunciations,” illustrates how the history 
prob lem fully developed between 1989 and 1996, when a major realignment 
of relevant po liti cal actors occurred leading up to the fi ftieth anniversary of 
the war’s end. First of all, the death of Emperor Hirohito in January 1989 
prompted some politicians and A- bomb victims in Hiroshima and Naga-
saki to off er explicit apologies to foreign victims of Japan’s past aggression, 
war time atrocities, and colonial rule. Around the same time, Japa nese and 
South Korean NGOs expanded the transnational network to help former 
“comfort  women” demand apologies and compensation from the Japa nese 
government, while Japa nese NGOs helped Chinese victims fi le compensa-
tion lawsuits against the Japa nese government and corporations. At this 
historical juncture, the LDP was ousted from power in July 1993. Th is 
allowed non- LDP prime ministers to apologize for Japan’s past wrongdo-
ings more decisively than did their LDP pre de ces sors. Th us, po liti cal parties 
and NGOs supporting South Korean and Chinese victims fi  nally gained a 
po liti cal opportunity to introduce cosmopolitanism into Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration. Nevertheless, the LDP remained the largest po liti cal party 
in the Diet. Th is per sis tent dominance of the mobilizing structures for na-
tionalist commemoration undercut the po liti cal opportunity for non- LDP 
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prime ministers and forced them to compromise cosmopolitanism with na-
tionalism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. Th is compromise intensifi ed 
the history prob lem by galvanizing nationalists in Japan as well as in South 
 Korea and China. Japa nese nationalists criticized the Japa nese government 
for failing to honor Japa nese war dead enough, whereas South Korean and 
Chinese nationalists criticized it for failing to commemorate South Korean 
and Chinese victims enough. As a result, the fi rst serious attempt to incor-
porate cosmopolitanism into Japan’s offi  cial commemoration resulted in a 
negative spiral of mutually reinforcing nationalist commemorations.
Chapter 4, “Th e Coexistence of Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism,” 
examines the period between 1997 and 2015, when changes in both domes-
tic and international situations of the three countries made the history 
prob lem more complex. Th e LDP returned to power, but it formed the co-
ali tion government with other small parties, while the JSP, a longstanding 
supporter of cosmopolitan commemoration, was disbanded. Vari ous new 
actors also entered the fi eld of the history prob lem, complicating the 
landscape of mobilizing structures and po liti cal opportunities available 
for nationalist and cosmopolitan commemorations. Perhaps the best- known 
new actor was the Japa nese Society for History Textbook Reform, an NGO 
that promoted “healthy nationalism” in history education by cooperating 
with LDP members who wanted to reduce descriptions of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings in history textbooks. At the same time, historians and educa-
tors in the three countries initiated joint historical research and education 
proj ects to critically refl ect on nationalist biases in historiographies and 
textbooks, and even the LDP- led co ali tion government launched bilateral 
joint historical research proj ects with South  Korea and China to prevent 
further escalation of the history prob lem. Th us, even though the LDP tried 
to exploit its access to the government and other po liti cal opportunities to 
strengthen nationalism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, its action was 
moderated by its co ali tion partner Kōmeitō and constrained by pressures 
from South  Korea and China. Th is made up for the decline of mobilizing 
structures and po liti cal opportunities available for proponents of cosmopoli-
tan commemoration. Nationalist commemorations in the three countries 
continue to fuel the history prob lem, but they now coexist, in a complex 
manner, with mutual cosmopolitan commemoration initiated by gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental joint proj ects.
Th e foregoing fi eld analy sis reveals one striking pattern in the evolu-
tion of the history prob lem: most of the relevant po liti cal actors defi ned their 
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commemorative positions, explic itly or implicitly, in reference to the Tokyo 
Trial. Th us, chapter 5, “Th e Legacy of the Tokyo Trial,” explores why the 
trial became such a key reference point by critically examining ramifi cations 
of its three major prob lems. First, the trial had ele ments of victor’s justice 
 because it prosecuted Japan alone for the Asia- Pacifi c War. Th is created am-
bivalence and even resentment among Japa nese citizens, keeping them 
from fully confronting Japan’s past wrongdoings. Second, the trial did not 
recognize Japan’s victimhood vis- à- vis war crimes of the Allied powers, giv-
ing Japa nese citizens an excuse for reclaiming and dwelling on their own 
suff ering. Th ird, the trial blamed only a small number of government leaders 
for the war and practically absolved Japa nese citizens. Th is government- 
centered view of war responsibility deprived Japa nese citizens of opportuni-
ties to critically refl ect on their share of war guilt. Th e fi rst and second 
prob lems with the trial, in par tic u lar, fueled the Japa nese nationalist com-
memoration by breeding resentment, on the one hand, and justifi ed the 
South Korean and Chinese nationalist commemorations by identifying Ja-
pan as the absolute perpetrator, on the other. All three prob lems then com-
bined to prevent the majority of Japa nese citizens from fully commemorat-
ing the suff ering of South Korean and Chinese victims according to the 
logic of cosmopolitanism. Th e Tokyo Trial therefore needs to be critically 
reassessed, so that citizens in the three countries can disentangle nationalist 
commemoration from its problematic legacy and move  toward a resolution 
of the history prob lem.
Such a critical reassessment of the Tokyo Trial, however, is impossible 
without historians capable of generating what phi los o pher Paul Ricoeur 
called “an open dialectic” of historiography and commemoration, which 
guarantees historical facts and interpretations, as well as national identities, 
to remain open to dialogues and revisions.45 Th is open dialectic manifests 
in the growing joint proj ects by historians in Japan, South  Korea, and China 
who successfully produced reports and teaching materials that critiqued na-
tionalist commemorations in the three countries. But to what extent can 
historians actually infl uence the dynamic and trajectory of the history prob-
lem? Chapter 6, “Th e Role of Historians in the History Prob lem,” explores 
this question. Simply put, historians in East Asia have been unable to ef-
fectively intervene in the history prob lem  because no adequate mechanisms 
are institutionalized through which their critique of nationalist commemo-
ration can move the contents of offi  cial and public commemorations in 
a more cosmopolitan direction. Th is situation is largely engineered by the 
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governments of Japan, South  Korea, and China, which control history edu-
cation through curricular guidelines and textbook inspection. Th e govern-
ments also maintain the education systems that force students to memorize 
“historical facts” for examinations instead of cultivating skills to critically 
evaluate historical materials. Th e  future of the history prob lem therefore de-
pends on  whether the three countries can create mechanisms to mobilize 
historians’ critical refl ections for critiquing nationalist commemorations and 
supporting mutual cosmopolitan commemoration.
In the “Conclusion,” then, I explore how mutual cosmopolitan com-
memoration, supported by historians’ critical refl ections, might facilitate rec-
onciliation in East Asia. To this end, I expand on the “pragmatic” approach 
to the history prob lem advocated by po liti cal scientists. Jennifer Lind, for 
example, has cautioned against demanding more apologies from Japan 
 because this strategy risks triggering backlashes from nationalists in Japan, 
galvanizing nationalist sentiments in South  Korea and China.46 Similarly, 
Th omas Berger has argued that the pursuit of reconciliation over the his-
tory prob lem is not unconditionally desirable, and that any successful 
reconciliation  will require many conditions, including “a degree of reciproc-
ity.” 47 I propose to refi ne the pragmatic approach by anchoring it in princi ples 
articulated by pragmatist phi los o phers, such as John Dewey: a  future- oriented, 
prob lem- solving approach to the past and reciprocal recognition of human-
ity among relevant actors.  Here, how the governments and citizens in 
Japan, South  Korea, and China should commemorate the past is funda-
mentally tied with the prob lem of what kind of international relations 
they envision for the region’s  future. Moreover, while reconciliation requires 
perpetrators to move away from denial  toward admission of their guilt, this 
in turn requires other parties to affi  rm the perpetrators’ humanity and thus 
acknowledge the inhumanities that they, too, suff ered in the past confl ict.48 
How to facilitate such reciprocal recognition of humanity— mutual cosmo-
politan commemoration—is one of the most urgent tasks confronting the 
governments and citizens in the three countries  today.
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CHAPTER 1
Cross- National Fragmentation, 1945–1964
Th e focus of the history prob lem, the Asia- Pacifi c War, was not a single, 
clearly bounded event. Instead, it evolved through a series of armed confl icts 
between Japan and China that began with the Mukden Incident in Septem-
ber 1931 and eventually led to the outbreak of the Second Sino- Japanese War 
in July 1937. Japan then proceeded to war with the United States and other 
Allied powers in December 1941 and quickly advanced to the Pacifi c and 
Southeast Asia. But the tide of war began to turn at the  Battle of Midway in 
June 1942, and Japan was increasingly overwhelmed by the Allied powers. By 
the end of June 1945, the Allied powers had defeated Japa nese troops on the 
Okinawa Islands; the Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, demand-
ing that the Japa nese government “proclaim now the unconditional surren-
der of all Japa nese armed forces.”1 Th e Japa nese government rejected the ulti-
matum, and the Allied powers responded with further military actions. Th e 
United States dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 
6 and 9, respectively. On August 8, the Soviet Union also broke the Soviet- 
Japanese Neutrality Pact to attack Manchukuo, the Kuril Islands, and South 
Sakhalin.  Th ese military actions fi  nally led the Japa nese government to ac-
cept the Potsdam Declaration on August 14. Th e next day, Emperor Hirohito 
read the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War in a radio broad-
cast, offi  cially surrendering to the Allied powers.2
Th e Japa nese government immediately ordered civilian bureaucrats 
and military offi  cers to destroy classifi ed documents. Th e Army Ministry 
followed the order most thoroughly. Th ey destroyed not only classifi ed doc-
uments at the ministry but also army- related documents at the municipal 
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level. Th e Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs also de-
stroyed a large number of classifi ed documents.3 Th e destruction of war- 
related documents continued  until the Allied powers arrived at Atsugi Naval 
Air Base on August 28.
 After the Allied powers occupied Tokyo on September 8, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur ordered the 
arrest of forty- three Japa nese civilian and military leaders for crimes against 
peace, commonly known as Class A war crimes. Th e Allied powers also 
arrested  people suspected of conventional war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, Class B and Class C war crimes, respectively. During the Oc-
cupation, more than ten thousand Japa nese  were  either arrested or indicted 
for  these three types of war crimes.4 In January 1946, SCAP proceeded to 
enact the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in preparation 
for prosecuting Class A war crime suspects.
In the meantime, SCAP implemented policies to demilitarize and 
de moc ra tize Japan. In October, SCAP released communists and other ac-
tivists who had been imprisoned by the Japa nese government, purged mil-
itaristic teachers from schools, and encouraged  women’s po liti cal partici-
pation and the formation of voluntary associations. In December, SCAP 
terminated government sponsorship of Shintoism and ordered the Japa nese 
government to suspend from school curricula moral education (shūshin), 
Japa nese history, and geography— three subjects that had played a central 
role in inculcating nationalism in Japa nese citizens.5 SCAP also purged 
from public offi  ce, corporations, and universities war crimes suspects, mili-
tarists, and  those who had collaborated with the war time government.6
Concurrently, SCAP pressed the Japa nese government to create a new 
constitution. Since the Japa nese government, headed by Prime Minister Shi-
dehara Kijūrō, was hesitant to make a signifi cant departure from the pre-
war Imperial Constitution, SCAP intervened and handed out its own draft 
to the Japa nese government in February 1946. Th e Japa nese government used 
the SCAP version to draft a new constitution and presented it to the public in 
April. Th e new draft constitution included many impor tant changes from its 
prewar counterpart: the emperor was divested of po liti cal power, basic  human 
rights and equality of the sexes  were guaranteed, and war as a sovereign right 
was renounced, to name but a few. In the midst of  these profound transforma-
tions  under the Occupation, the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, also known as the Tokyo Trial, opened on May 3, 1946.
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The Tokyo Trial and the Reverse Course
Th e Tokyo Trial seated eleven judges from eleven Allied powers: Britain, 
British India, the United States, the Republic of China, France, the Nether-
lands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Philippines, and the Soviet 
Union. Th e same eleven countries also sent eleven prosecutors with support 
teams. Twenty- eight Class A war crime suspects  were tried, including Tōjō 
Hideki, the former prime minister who had made the decision to enter war 
with the United States in December 1941; Itagaki Seishirō, an army gen-
eral who was involved in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937; and 
Matsui Iwane, another army general who had directed the attack on Nan-
jing in December 1937.  Th ese and the other twenty- fi ve Class A suspects 
 were defended by a team of Japa nese and American attorneys.7
A focal point of the Tokyo Trial was the category of crimes against 
peace, or Class A war crimes, defi ned as acts of planning, conspiring, and 
executing an aggressive war. Whereas the Nuremberg  Trials determined that 
a war of aggression was a punishable crime  under international law, the eleven 
judges of the Tokyo Trial  were still divided over the issue.8  Toward the end 
of the trial, however, the judges from Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zea-
land, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the Philippines, and the 
United States formed a majority accepting the Nuremberg  Trials’ position; 
three judges, from British India, France, and the Netherlands, dissented.9
Th e Japa nese defendants pleaded not guilty to all charges. Kiyose Ichirō, 
a chief defense attorney for Tōjō Hideki, justifi ed the Asia- Pacifi c War as 
an act of self- defense. Kiyose argued that the Chinese military had been re-
sponsible for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and that Japan had begun 
the war with the Allied powers  because “Japan had no other choice but [to] 
exercise its right to self- defense, simply to survive the impossible situation.”10 
Tōjō, too, justifi ed the war as an act of self- defense and stated that he had 
made the right decision, both legally and morally.11
Along with crimes against peace, the Tokyo Trial prosecuted violations 
of war conventions (e.g., abuse of prisoners of war) and crimes against hu-
manity (e.g., killing of civilians). Th e prosecutors submitted a number of tes-
timonies about Japan’s war time atrocities against civilians across Asia, such 
as Japa nese troops executing  people in Singapore, and forcing local  women 
to serve as military “comfort  women” in the Dutch East Indies.12 Among 
 these atrocities against civilians in Asia, the Nanjing Massacre was the most 
extensively investigated at the trial  because the prosecutor from the Republic 
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of China brought a large amount of evidence and many testimonies. Al-
though  people in Japan had not been informed of the massacre during the 
war  because of government censorship, the evidence and testimonies  were 
so overwhelming that the defendants and defense  lawyers managed to make 
only brief counterarguments.13
On November 4, 1948, Chief Justice William Webb of Australia handed 
out the 1,445- page judgment. Th e Tokyo Judgment accepted that the lead-
ers of the Japa nese government had conspired for aggression, rejecting the 
argument that Japan had only exercised its right to self- defense. Th e judg-
ment also accepted Japan’s conventional war crimes against the Allied pow-
ers.14 Seven defendants, including Tōjō,  were sentenced to death. Sixteen 
 were sentenced to lifelong imprisonment, including Kaya Okinori, who 
would  later become a minister of justice. Two defendants, including Shi-
gemitsu Mamoru, a  future minister of foreign aff airs,  were sentenced to 
imprisonment for multiple years. Two other defendants died during the 
trial, and a third was taken out of the trial  because he became mentally ill. 
In addition to the majority opinion, Delfi n Jaranilla of the Philippines 
fi led a separate opinion criticizing the sentences as too lenient. William 
Webb also hinted at the emperor’s war responsibility in his separate opin-
ion, though he agreed with the majority about the  legal basis for prose-
cuting crimes against peace. Radhabinod Pal of India, Henri Bernard of 
France, and B. V. A. Röling of the Netherlands fi led dissenting opinions. 
While Pal rejected the  legal basis to prosecute crimes against peace, Bernard 
and Röling accepted it but disagreed with the majority about its justifi ca-
tion. Bernard also questioned the tribunal’s decision not to indict Em-
peror Hirohito.15
Although the Tokyo Trial exposed Japan’s war crimes, it did not 
prosecute all Class A war crime suspects. Originally, SCAP had planned 
multiple rounds of international military tribunals. But the trial exposed 
signifi cant logistical prob lems and disagreements among the Allied powers.16 
By the late 1940s, the Cold War had also intensifi ed between the United 
States and its Western allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and 
its satellite countries, on the other. SCAP therefore shifted its policy focus 
from thorough demilitarization and democ ratization to swift reconstruc-
tion and remilitarization of Japan as an ally in the fi ght against commu-
nism. As part of this “reverse course,” SCAP released nineteen Class A war 
crime suspects— including Kishi Nobusuke, who  later became a prime 
minister— from Sugamo Prison on December 24, 1948, one day  after seven 
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Class A war criminals  were executed. Moreover, SCAP made only micro-
fi lms of the trial rec ords available, and only at select places, such as the Li-
brary of Congress— a stark contrast to the proceedings and judgment 
of  the Nuremberg  Trials, which  were published in forty- two volumes 
in Germany.
Th is reverse course in SCAP’s policy accelerated  after the Korean War 
broke out in June 1950. SCAP pressed the Japa nese government to estab-
lish the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai) in August 1950, so that 
Japan could defend itself while US troops moved out to the Korean Penin-
sula. During the buildup to the Korean War, SCAP also purged commu-
nists from public offi  ce, newspaper companies, and corporations, as well as 
suspended the communist newspaper Akahata. Moreover, SCAP began to 
allow former war crime suspects, militarists, and collaborators to return to 
public offi  ce in June 1951. Against the backdrop of the reverse course, Yo-
shida Shigeru’s government signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty on Sep-
tember 8, 1951, by offi  cially accepting the Tokyo Judgment as a condition 
for regaining Japan’s in de pen dence.
Rejection, Ac cep tance, and Critique of the Tokyo Trial
Domestically, Yoshida’s government rejected the Tokyo Judgment and used 
the rejection as the basis for justifying the release of war criminals. As Min-
ister of Justice Ōhashi Takeo stated, “Th e Military Tribunal for the Far East 
and other tribunals by the Allied Powers  were not carried out according to 
Japan’s domestic law. Th erefore,  those acts that  were judged war crimes ac-
cording to the tribunals and international law can no way be regarded as 
crimes as far as Japa nese law is concerned.”17 Th e release of war criminals 
was widely supported by Japa nese citizens. Former war crime suspects cre-
ated the Aid Association for War Criminals (Sensō Jukeisha Sewakai) in May 
1952 to lobby the government to recommend the prompt release of war crim-
inals. Th e Japa nese Red Cross, religious organ izations, and other NGOs 
also supported the release of war criminals. When the National Rally for 
the Release of All War Criminals in Sugamo was held in November 1953, 
approximately thirty million signatures had been collected in support of 
war criminals.18
With in de pen dence regained, Yoshida’s government fi rst ended the 
purge of war criminals, militarists, and collaborators from public offi  ce, al-
lowing Hatoyama Ichirō, Kishi Nobusuke, and Shigemitsu Mamoru, among 
many  others, to return to infl uential positions in politics. Th e Diet also 
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 adopted three resolutions between June 1952 and August 1953 that recom-
mended clemency, reduced sentences, and parole for war criminals.19 Con-
servative politicians supported  these resolutions most actively. For example, 
Tago Kazuomi, a member of the ruling Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), advocated the 
release of war criminals by arguing that the Tokyo Judgment was “persua-
sively objected by Justice Pal of India. All the defense attorneys also argued 
that the tribunal was unfair . . .  and destined to add more wrongs to the 
wrongs of the war.”20 Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi, a member of the Progressive 
Reform Party (Kaishintō) led by Shigemitsu Mamoru, also argued that war 
criminals  were in eff ect “patriots” (aikokusha), and that the government 
should save “ those who had sacrifi ced their lives and fought for our country 
but  were given the bad name of war criminal  because Japan lost the war.”21
Th e conservative attacks on the Tokyo Trial intensifi ed when Hatoyama 
Ichirō became prime minister in December 1954. Hatoyama not only wanted 
to change the postwar constitution that he thought had been imposed by 
the Allied powers but also appointed as ministers several former war crimi-
nals and purgees, such as Shigemitsu Mamoru (minister of foreign aff airs 
and vice prime minister) and Shōriki Matsutarō (chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission). To be sure,  these politicians had been critical of the 
military leaders during the Asia- Pacifi c War, but they nonetheless rejected 
the Tokyo Trial.22 Shigemitsu, in par tic u lar, publicly criticized the Tokyo 
Trial over and again  because he was “fi rmly convinced that  those who are 
called ‘war criminals’ are, in fact, victims of the war.”23 A war criminal was 
“something that the victors made up one- sidedly,” and it was yet to be de-
termined “ whether the Greater East Asia War was  really a war of aggression 
according to the international law.”24 Moreover, Shigemitsu thought that the 
war was justifi able not only  because it had been an act of self- defense, but 
also  because it had benefi ted Asian countries: “I feel very happy that Asian 
countries attained the right of self- determination and gained in de pen dence 
 after World War II. Japan should be satisfi ed with this outcome of the war 
that it participated in.”25 Th us, even though the Japa nese government ac-
cepted the Tokyo Judgment to regain in de pen dence, it was politicians in 
government that most openly denounced it. Th is contradiction, which 
historian Yoshida Yutaka called the “double standard” in addressing interna-
tional and domestic audiences, was  going to defi ne the government’s com-
memorative position for the following de cades.26
In contrast, members of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) commem-
orated foreign victims actively. Since communists had opposed Japan’s 
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imperialist expansion prior to the Asia- Pacifi c War, many of them had been 
tortured to death or imprisoned. JCP members therefore felt that it was cru-
cial to vigorously criticize Japan’s war crimes to prevent postwar Japan from 
regressing into its prewar state. JCP members  were also the most interna-
tionally oriented among Japa nese politicians at the time  because they main-
tained solidarity with other communist countries, including the  People’s 
Republic of China, which had suff ered greatly from Japan’s past aggression. 
During the Diet session in April 1952, for example, JCP member Katō 
Mitsuru expressed his objection to the release of war criminals by citing 
graphic details of Japan’s war crimes from the Tokyo Trial:
In Nanjing in December 1937, even  after the  battle ended, the Japa nese 
army killed about 95,000 Chinese citizens,  women, and  children by 
committing  every conceivable atrocity  under the command of Matsui 
Iwane: execution, decapitation, cutting out a tongue, burning to death, 
hollowing out eyes, beating and kicking to death, raping as an individ-
ual and as a group, raping a dead body, and so on. . . .  Th e Japa nese 
imperialists killed ten million Chinese, more than one million Filipi-
nos, and committed all sorts of atrocities in Vietnam, Malay, Indonesia, 
Burma, New Guinea, and elsewhere.27
From the JCP’s perspective, the release of war criminals would amount to 
forgetting Japan’s war crimes and evading its war responsibility.
Th e JCP was also opposed to signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
 because the treaty excluded the  People’s Republic of China from its signa-
tories. JCP member Hayashi Hyakurō argued that a “peace treaty” without 
China would not bring peace in the real sense: “If we want to rebuild Japan 
as a peace- loving and demo cratic nation in Asia, we should off er atonement 
and apologies for China, the country that we victimized most severely, and 
build friendly relations with the Chinese  people. I believe this is the most 
urgent task for the government in its attempt to  settle legacies of the Asia- 
Pacifi c War.”28 Th us, JCP members, who completely accepted the Tokyo 
Judgment, strongly protested against the conservative government.
Th e JSP, the largest opposition party in the postwar period, took a 
somewhat diff er ent position than the JCP on both the release of war crimi-
nals and the Tokyo Trial. Representing the JSP, Taman Hirofumi supported 
the release of war criminals “by considering the plight of families of war 
criminals . . .  and especially the fact that many of the Class B and C war 
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criminals have turned out to be wrongly convicted.”29 Taman did not en-
dorse the release  because he rejected the Tokyo Trial, as his conservative 
counter parts did, but  because he felt sympathy for the wrongly convicted 
Japa nese soldiers and their families. From the JSP’s perspective, clemency, 
reduced sentences, or parole for the wrongly convicted was not meant 
to absolve Japan of its war crimes. As another JSP member, Ōno Kōichi, 
put it, “We must express our remorse (kaigo) and repentance (kaihsun) for 
the  mistakes, the atrocities that we committed against  people in Asia,” 
and such remorse and repentance was the precondition for the release of 
war criminals.30
At the same time, the JSP took a critical stance  toward the Tokyo Trial. 
JSP member Furuya Sadao argued that he could never accept the act of pros-
ecuting only Japan’s war crimes, especially when he considered the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “the most atrocious acts in  human 
history. Since  these atrocities have not been prosecuted, we the Japa nese 
 people cannot accept the fact that Class B and C war criminals, prosecuted 
for far less atrocious acts, are still imprisoned.”31 Another JSP member, Aono 
Takeichi, went so far as to suggest that the US generals, offi  cers, and pi lots 
should be prosecuted by an international war tribunal for their “inhumane 
act of atomic- bombing.”32 In this regard, the JSP was diff er ent from the JCP, 
which uncritically accepted the Tokyo Judgment. Th e JSP accepted the 
judgment but explic itly argued that the trial had serious fl aws, includ-
ing  the failure to subject the Allied powers to the same standards of 
criminal justice.
But the position of JSP members also diff ered from that of conserva-
tive politicians. Although members criticized the unfairness of the Tokyo 
Trial, they did not deny Japan’s war crimes as the conservatives did. Instead 
of entirely discrediting the trial for failing to prosecute war crimes commit-
ted by the Allied powers, JSP members called for a fairer international 
tribunal that would prosecute war crimes on both sides. Th e JSP thus oc-
cupied a  middle ground between conservative politicians and the JCP.33
In summary,  after Japan regained in de pen dence in 1952, roughly two 
diff er ent commemorative positions on the Asia- Pacifi c War emerged through 
the debates surrounding the Tokyo Trial. Th e fi rst, dominant position was 
taken by conservative politicians who embraced the nationalist logic of com-
memoration and refused to remember the suff ering of foreign victims of 
Japan’s past aggression. In contrast, the opposition parties, such as the JCP 
and the JSP, commemorated foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings by 
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adopting the cosmopolitan logic, though they  adopted diff er ent positions 
on the Tokyo Trial.  Th ese proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration, 
however,  were outnumbered by the conservatives. Th e latter seized the po-
liti cal opportunities  after SCAP’s reverse course, gained access to the gov-
ernment, and promoted nationalist commemoration by rejecting the 
 Tokyo Trial as invalid and justifying Japan’s past aggression as an act of 
self- defense.
Nationalist Commemoration of War Dead
In addition to the Tokyo Trial, Japa nese politicians debated how to provide 
relief for soldiers who had served in the Japa nese military during the Asia- 
Pacifi c War. In prewar Japan, the military had enjoyed a privileged position. 
Originally, the Meiji government had established military pensions in 1875, 
nine years before it had established less generous pensions for civilian 
bureaucrats. Th e military pensions also had been deeply rooted in the logic 
of nationalism, since they had been called onkyū, meaning “bestowed  favor” 
in Japa nese. Sacrifi ces for the nation— ultimately centered on the emperor, 
the  human deity and sovereign— had been defi ned as worthy and deserving 
 favors from the government. SCAP regarded the military pensions as the 
mechanism that had facilitated prewar Japan’s militarism, and it suspended 
them as part of its eff ort to demilitarize Japa nese society.34
Th e suspension of the military pensions forced injured veterans and be-
reaved families into eco nom ically dire situations. Th e number of bereaved 
 family members was particularly large, for about 2.3 million soldiers and 
civilian personnel in the military had been killed during the war. To ame-
liorate their worsening economic situations, bereaved families formed asso-
ciations at the prefecture level and then proceeded to create the Bereaved 
Families Welfare Association (Izoku Kōsei Renmei) at the national level in 
November 1947. At fi rst, SCAP hesitated to authorize the establishment of 
the association  because it feared that the association would interfere with 
demilitarization. SCAP, however, approved the association  after stipulat-
ing three conditions— namely, that the association should include in its 
membership bereaved families of civilians who sacrifi ced their lives for 
public good; defi ne mutual assistance as its main purpose; and exclude 
government offi  cials, purgees, and former military personnel from its board 
of directors.35
Upon SCAP’s approval, the association proceeded to lobby politicians 
and the Ministry of Welfare, and both  houses of the Diet responded in May 
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1949 by adopting resolutions that requested the government to provide 
pensions, condolence money, and social welfare relief for bereaved families. 
Th e association also succeeded in electing its president, Nagashima Ginzō, to 
the House of Councillors in June 1950.36 At its fi rst national meeting in 
Tokyo in February 1951, the association  adopted a resolution declaring that 
“we bereaved families are war victims who suff ered most. Our  family mem-
bers died in the line of duty for the country (kokka). Naturally, the govern-
ment should compensate (hoshō) bereaved families.”37  After the meeting, 
association members submitted petitions to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 
and  house speakers, requesting pensions and other forms of relief.
In response, Yoshida’s government proposed the Bill on Relief for In-
jured Veterans and Bereaved Families (Senshōbyōsha Senbotsusha Izoku 
Engo Hōan) in March 1952. Th e bill proposed to provide pensions and con-
dolence money for veterans and bereaved families while limiting eligibility 
to  those who had been offi  cially employed by the government. Ōishi Buichi 
of the ruling Liberal Party explained the spirit of the bill: “It is natu ral for 
the government to provide for bereaved families and injured veterans who 
showed the highest level of patriotism and died for our country,  whether 
war was won or lost.”38 Put another way, the bill was meant “to give thanks 
and condolences to  those who had sacrifi ced their lives for Japan during the 
war.”39 Th is justifi cation of the bill, to honor sacrifi ces for the Japa nese na-
tion, departed from the 1949 Diet resolutions that had critically probed the 
government’s responsibility for injured veterans and emphasized antiwar sen-
timents among bereaved families.40
Th e JSP opposed the bill for two reasons. First, the JSP argued that “re-
lief” (engo) implied governmental paternalism and should be replaced with 
“compensation” (hoshō), which included the Chinese character meaning “to 
atone” (tsugunau), to clearly defi ne fallen soldiers, bereaved families, and 
injured veterans as victims of the war that the Japa nese government had 
started.41 Second, the JSP criticized the scope of the proposed pension 
scheme. Th e JSP argued that too few funds— about 2.6  percent of the 1952 
budget— were allocated to welfare of injured veterans and bereaved fami-
lies. JSP member Oka Ryōichi cited the example of West Germany, where 
24  percent of the 1951 bud get had been used to compensate war victims, 
including civilians, and urged Yoshida’s government to spend the similar 
amount.42 Moreover, the JSP suggested that pensions be off ered not only to 
bereaved families of fallen soldiers but also to  those of technicians and stu-
dents who had been killed while mobilized for military- related ser vices.43 
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Th e JCP raised similar criticisms, but it also went further than the JSP by 
associating the bill with Japan’s ongoing rearmament. As JCP member 
Kanda Asano put it, “By limiting the coverage to military personnel that had 
received direct payment from the government, this bill aims to facilitate 
Japan’s rearmament. Th e coverage should be expanded to include all war 
victims, at least returnees from former colonies, sailors, technicians, mobi-
lized students, female volunteer corps, and  those who lost their breadwin-
ners to the atomic bombings.” 44 She also questioned why former colonial 
subjects, such as Koreans, who had been mobilized for war eff orts as 
Japa nese citizens, fell outside the scope of the bill simply  because they lost 
Japa nese citizenship  after the war.45 Th us, the opposition parties argued that 
all war victims, both military and civilian, should be compensated  because 
they had suff ered from the wrong war that the government had started.
Yoshida’s government gave the opposition parties a concession: to base 
the proposed bill on “the spirit of government compensation” (kokka hoshō 
no seishin), if not “government compensation” per se. Th e opposition parties 
still objected, but Yoshida’s government successfully passed the bill in April 
1952 and proceeded to submit another bill, proposing to create an additional 
pension scheme for professional military personnel, including former Class 
A war criminals. Specifi cally, the new bill proposed to reinstate the military 
pensions that SCAP had suspended during the Occupation and to create a 
two- tiered pension system for two groups of military- related personnel, pro-
fessional and conscripted. Again, the JSP and the JCP opposed the govern-
ment’s proposal. JSP member Naruse Banji argued, “Th e government should 
compensate all victims of the war in a fair and reasonable fashion. In fact, 
ordinary citizens suff ered most. . . .  Professional soldiers  were not the only 
victims. . . .  It is extremely hard for me to understand why Class A war crim-
inals, who  were responsible for the war,  will receive pensions, whereas many 
other war victims  will receive nothing.” 46 JCP member Iwama Masao also 
criticized the comeback of “militarism” lurking  behind the proposed bill, 
which he argued was “written by  those who intend to make Japa nese  people 
forget the tragedy of the war and wage another one.” 47 Despite the strong 
opposition, Yoshida’s government managed to pass the bill in August 1953 
as well as extend pension eligibility to bereaved families of war criminals 
who had been executed or died while serving their sentences.48
In the midst of po liti cal strug gles over war- related relief, the Bereaved 
Families Welfare Association became the Japan Bereaved Families Associa-
tion (Nihon Izokukai) in March 1953 and began to promote nationalist 
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agendas more explic itly than before. Although the association had previously 
defi ned its purpose as “to make eff orts to create a peaceful Japan, prevent 
war, establish perpetual world peace, and therefore contribute to welfare of 
humankind,” it eliminated  these words from its new statement of purpose.49 
Instead, the association defi ned one of its principal goals as “to honor war 
gods” (eirei no kenshō) and “memorial ser vices for war dead” (irei ni kansuru 
jigyō).50 Th us, having succeeded in restoring material privileges— pensions— 
for military- related personnel who had died for the nation, the association 
now aimed to restore a symbolic privilege for the military war dead. To this 
end, the association began making eff orts to rehabilitate the status of the 
Yasukuni Shrine, the center of nationalist commemoration in prewar Japan.
In prewar Japan, the government- owned Yasukuni Shrine had en-
shrined fallen soldiers as “war gods” (eirei) according to Shintoism: 
the shrine had functioned as the most sacred site of Japa nese nationalism to 
give ultimate, religious meaning to sacrifi ces for the nation. Th e shrine had 
been not only nationalist but also militarist,  because it honored soldiers, 
not civilians. Th e shrine’s militarist nature also had manifested in its ad-
ministrative structure in prewar Japan: army and navy generals had con-
trolled the shrine as agents of Emperor Hirohito, the  human deity of Shin-
toism. Precisely  because the Yasukuni Shrine had served as the religious 
center of prewar Japan’s nationalism and militarism, SCAP eliminated gov-
ernment sponsorship of the Yasukuni and other Shinto shrines in Decem-
ber 1945. Th is separation of religion and state was confi rmed by the new 
constitution that took eff ect in May 1947. During the Occupation, prime 
ministers and imperial  family members also suspended their visits to the 
shrine.51 Th e Yasukuni Shrine was thus stripped of the special status it had 
enjoyed in prewar Japan.
As soon as the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, however, Yo-
shida Shigeru made a prime ministerial visit to the shrine.  After the treaty 
took eff ect and Japan offi  cially regained in de pen dence, Emperor Hirohito 
also paid his fi rst postwar visit in October 1952, cheered by about three 
thousand members of bereaved families.52  Because of the constitutional 
separation of religion and state, Yoshida’s government did not try to re-
store government sponsorship of the Yasukuni Shrine, but it did provide 
special treatment for the shrine. When annual spring and fall festivals to 
honor war gods  were held at the shrine, the government arranged extra 
train rides and off ered discounted fares to help bereaved families come 
to Tokyo. Th e government— the Ministry of Welfare in particular— also 
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covertly helped Yasukuni priests enshrine war dead by providing the 
names of fallen soldiers and the times and places of their deaths. Especially 
 after the newly created LDP took control of government in November 1955, 
the shrine began to enjoy unoffi  cial government sponsorship to a greater ex-
tent. In April 1956, for example, the Ministry of Welfare issued a directive to 
guarantee fi nancial and logistical support for the shrine to identify fallen 
soldiers and enshrine them as war gods.53
Th e Ministry of Welfare actively supported the Yasukuni Shrine  because 
it oversaw the Division of Returnees Support (Hikiage Engokyoku), which 
dealt with issues regarding returnees from abroad, war criminals, bereaved 
families, and injured veterans. In fact, staff  in this division had been recruited 
from the former Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy.  Th ese bu-
reaucrats, many of whom had participated in the administration of the shrine 
in prewar Japan,  were  eager to support the shrine, albeit unoffi  cially. Th ey 
even took the initiative to press Yasukuni priests to enshrine  those who had 
been charged with Class B and C war crimes. In addition,  after all war crim-
inals had completed their sentences in Sugamo Prison in March 1959, the 
Ministry of Welfare sent the shrine “deity enshrinement documents” (saijin 
meihyō) for deceased Class B and C war criminals. Yasukuni priests then 
covertly enshrined 346 Class B and Class C war criminals in April 1959.54
Bereaved families also increased their eff orts to reinstate government 
sponsorship for the shrine. In March 1956, the Japan Bereaved Families As-
sociation created the Sub- Committee on Government Sponsorship of the 
Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja Kokkagoji ni kansuru Shōiinkai). Between 
1959 and 1960, the association collected about three million signatures in 
support of government sponsorship for the shrine and lobbied six prefectural 
and 345 municipal councils to adopt resolutions endorsing renationalization 
of the shrine.55 Th en, in September 1961, the association submitted petitions 
to speakers of both  houses of the Diet, requesting them to promptly create 
a government commission to consider reinstating government sponsorship 
for the shrine.56
Th rough  these lobbying activities, the association strengthened its con-
nections with the government. To begin with, Takahashi Ryūtarō (1953–
1961), a former minister in Yoshida’s government, became the fi rst president 
of the association. Th en, in March 1953, the association also obtained the 
right to use the government’s property, the building near the Yasukuni Shrine 
that had been reserved for professional soldiers in prewar Japan. Th e second 
president, Yasui Seiichirō (1961–1962), was an LDP member, and the third 
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president, Kaya Okinori (1962–1977), another LDP member, had been pros-
ecuted as a Class A war criminal but  later became minister of justice in Ikeda 
Hayato’s government. Moreover, during Ikeda’s tenure as prime minister, 
the government resumed awarding decorations to veterans in April 1964 to 
“off er sincere thanks to  those who sacrifi ced their precious lives for the 
country and honor their accomplishments.”57 Th en, in August 1964, Ikeda’s 
government held the National Memorial Ser vice inside the property of the 
Yasukuni Shrine. In the same year, the Association of Diet Members of 
Bereaved Families (Ikazoku Giin Kyōkai) also  adopted a resolution to 
demand renationalization of the shrine.58
While lobbying politicians with another campaign that accumulated 
more than six million signatures in 1964, the Japan Bereaved Families As-
sociation held its fi rst liaison conference with the Yasukuni Shrine in Janu-
ary 1964, to coordinate their eff orts to reinstate government sponsorship for 
the shrine.59  After the conference, Yasukuni priests submitted a petition for 
renationalization to the prime minister and speakers of both  houses. Th us, 
from the early 1950s through the mid-1960s, the LDP and the Japan Bereaved 
Families Association combined their mobilizing structures to consolidate 
the LDP’s mono poly of the government and promote nationalism in Japan’s 
offi  cial commemoration by honoring Japa nese soldiers without regard for 
the suff ering of foreign victims.
Reinserting the Nationalist Logic into Education
 After the end of the Occupation, the conservative government also tried to 
revitalize nationalism in Japa nese education. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 
criticized the postwar education system  because he felt that it failed to “cul-
tivate love of the nation” (aikokushin) and educate young patriots willing to 
fi ght for their country.60 Amano Teiyū, minister of education in Yoshida’s 
government, similarly advocated greater emphasis on patriotism in educa-
tion on several occasions.61 In essence,  these conservative politicians disliked 
the 1947 Basic Act on Education (Kyōiku Kihonhō), which defi ned the pur-
pose of Japa nese education in predominantly cosmopolitan terms: “We 
have established the Constitution of Japan and declared our determination 
to create a demo cratic and cultured country and contribute to world peace 
and welfare of humankind. Realization of this ideal depends fundamentally 
on the power of education. We  shall educate  human beings who revere the 
dignity of the individual as well as seek truth and peace ardently while vig-
orously promoting the creation of universal and unique culture through 
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education.” 62  Here, the Basic Act on Education promised a signifi cant de-
parture from the prewar education system based on the Imperial Script 
on Education, which had promoted the education of “imperial subjects 
[who] in a time of crisis  shall bravely and loyally shoulder the divine im-
perial destiny.” 63
Th e conservative attacks on the Basic Act on Education increased  after 
Hatoyama Ichirō became prime minister in December 1954. His minister 
of education, Kiyose Ichirō, a former defense  lawyer for Tōjō Hideki, openly 
criticized the act, which he felt “connects the individual to the world directly, 
but it totally lacks a concept of the nation that mediates the two.” 64 Th en, 
in February 1956, Hatoyama’s government submitted to the Diet a bill to 
set up the Ad Hoc Council on Education to review the postwar education 
system based on the act by arguing that the education system had been “re-
formed too rapidly in the peculiar situation  under the Occupation and, as 
a consequence, it is incompatible with the real ity [of Japa nese society] in 
more than a few re spects.” 65 When explaining the motivation  behind the 
bill, Kiyose stated that he had no prob lem with moral princi ples that the 
basic act promoted, except that “when I read the act, I cannot help wonder-
ing, ‘Where on earth does it mention loyalty to our Japa nese nation?’ ” 66
Th e bill, however, was heavi ly criticized by the JSP for “trying to place 
education  under government control.” 67 Th e bill passed the House of Rep-
resentatives in March 1956, but it was discarded at the House of Council-
lors  because Hatoyama’s government focused on two other education- related 
bills during the 1956 Diet session: the Bill on Local Administration of Ed-
ucation (Chihō Kyōiku Gyōsei Hōan) and the Bill on Textbooks (Kyōkasho 
Hōan).68 Th e Bill on Local Administration of Education aimed to replace 
the Act on Boards of Education that had been created during the Occu-
pation to decentralize and de moc ra tize the pro cess of education policy 
making. Specifi cally, the bill proposed to replace local election of board 
members with appointment by municipal heads  because the LDP wanted to 
keep supporters of the JSP and Japan Teachers Union (JTU) from taking 
control of local boards of education. In April and May 1956, JTU and 
other education- related NGOs issued joint statements against the bill.69 In 
addition, approximately fi ve hundred thousand teachers across Japan can-
celled classes to protest what they saw as a regression to prewar Japan’s gov-
ernmental control of education.70 In the end, the LDP used its numerical 
majority in the Diet to push through the bill in June 1956 in the midst of 
angry cries and fi stfi ghts with the JSP and other opposition parties.71
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Concurrently, the LDP tried to modify the pro cess of textbook inspec-
tion with the Bill on Textbooks. Th e government had monopolized the 
production of school textbooks in prewar Japan, but the government mono-
poly was abolished in 1949 and replaced by the government- administered 
system of textbook inspection. Th is encouraged teachers to produce text-
books of their own in collaboration with university professors and textbook 
companies.72  Under the reformed system, textbook se lection also happened 
at the school level, allowing teachers to participate in the se lection pro cess. 
In early 1955, however, Hatoyama’s Japan Demo cratic Party (Minshutō) 
began to criticize textbooks of JTU members by publishing a series of pam-
phlets, Th e Prob lem of Worrisome Textbooks (Ureubeki kyōkasho no mondai).73 
Th en,  after the creation of the LDP in November 1955, attacks on “biased 
textbooks” (henkō kyōkasho) culminated in the Bill on Textbooks, which pro-
posed to increase the government’s prerogative in textbook inspection and 
to authorize a board of education to select textbooks uniformly for schools 
in its district.74 Th e bill was therefore designed to reduce the infl uence of 
JTU members in the production and se lection of school textbooks.
Given the strong opposition from the JSP and the JTU, Hatoyama’s 
government gave up the Bill on Textbooks  because it judged that passing 
the Bill on Local Administration of Education was more impor tant. Th e 
Ministry of Education nonetheless proceeded to use its bud get and discre-
tionary power to expand its staff  to conduct textbook inspection within the 
Textbook Department of the Division of Primary and Secondary Education 
in late 1956.75 Th en, in July 1957, the ministry issued an administrative 
directive, declaring that a board of education should have the authority to 
select textbooks for schools in its district.76 Moreover, when the Course of 
Study for elementary and ju nior high schools was revised in 1958, the 
ministry made it legally binding to require textbook writers and teachers 
to conform more closely to the ministry’s curricular guidelines. A board of 
education was also legally authorized to select textbooks for its district in 
December 1963 when the LDP succeeded in creating the Act on School 
Textbooks for Mandatory Education.77
Th e growing governmental control over education aff ected textbook 
writers who  were critical of Japan’s actions during the Asia- Pacifi c War. One 
of  these writers was Ienaga Saburō, a history professor at Tokyo University 
of Education. His strug gle with textbook inspection began in 1955, when 
he submitted his draft high school textbook New Japa nese History (Shin 
nihonshi) for textbook inspection.78 Although his draft textbook was 
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 approved, textbook inspectors required Ienaga to respond to a total of 216 
suggested revisions: for example, “Replace the sentence ‘the Japa nese mili-
tary occupied Beijing, Nanjing, and Hankou in succession and expanded 
the  battle line across China’ with ‘the  battle line expanded across China’ ”; 
“Delete the fi gure with the caption ‘ women and  children  running in confu-
sion in Hiroshima  after injured by the atomic bombing’ ”; “Delete the fi gure 
with the caption ‘workers opposing Japan’s rearmament.’ ”79  After incorpo-
rating the majority of the suggested revisions, Ienaga’s draft textbook was 
approved for use at high schools. But Ienaga had to go through another 
round of textbook inspection immediately  because the Course of Study for 
high school was revised in 1955. Th is time his draft textbook did not pass 
inspection. Th e Ministry of Education explained the rejection as follows: 
“Since the author [Ienaga] has too much enthusiasm for critical refl ections 
in light of historical facts, this textbook strays away from the educational 
objective of Japa nese history, to make students recognize the eff orts of their 
ancestors, strengthen their awareness as the Japa nese  people (nihonjin to shite 
no jikaku), and cultivate abundant love for the Japa nese nation.”80  After 
learning the reason for the rejection, Ienaga revised and resubmitted his 
textbook, which was approved in 1959.
With another revision of the Course of Study in 1960, however, Iena-
ga’s draft textbook was rejected again.  After Ienaga revised and resubmitted 
his textbook, the Ministry of Education approved it on the condition that 
Ienaga should respond to nearly three hundred suggested revisions. For 
example, the ministry requested Ienaga to “delete the word ‘hopeless (mubōna)’ 
from the phrase ‘hopeless war’  because it seems unreasonable to blame Japan 
alone for the Asia- Pacifi c War in light of the worldwide situation at the 
time,” and to “qualify the word ‘war criminals (sensō hanzainin)’ by explain-
ing how the Tokyo Trial was conducted one- sidedly by the victor coun-
tries.”81 Th is prompted Ienaga to fi le a lawsuit in June 1965. Ienaga and his 
 lawyers did not challenge the required revisions per se but the constitution-
ality of textbook inspection itself. Th ey argued that textbook inspection 
 violated Articles 13, 23, and 26 of the Japa nese Constitution, which guar-
anteed freedom of scholarly research and education, as well as Article 10 of 
the Basic Act on Education, which prohibited the government’s “illegitimate 
control” ( futōna shihai) of education.82 Put another way, what came to be 
known as the Ienaga Textbook Lawsuit questioned the nationalist logic at a 
fundamental level— namely, the very institutional arrangement that autho-
rized the government to exercise control over the education of citizens and 
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promote nationalism in history education. Soon  after Ienaga fi led a lawsuit 
against the government, university professors in education and history, 
schoolteachers, and  lawyers met in Tokyo in August 1965 to discuss strategies 
to support his lawsuit, and they proceeded to create the National Liaison 
Council for Textbook Inspection Lawsuits (Kyōkasho Kentei Soshō wo 
Shiensuru Zenkoku Renrakukai).83 Th is was the beginning of the long  battle 
that Ienaga and his supporters  were to fi ght in the coming de cades.
During this period, then, conservative politicians tried to exploit the 
po liti cal opportunity— their mono poly of the government—to reinsert 
the logic of nationalism into the postwar education system; however, their 
success was compromised  because the JSP, the JTU, and other opposition 
parties and NGOs had suffi  cient mobilizing structures to resist the education- 
related bills proposed by the conservative government. Th e opposition em-
phasized the evils of war in pacifi st terms and criticized the government’s 
education policy as a regression to prewar militarism. To be sure, the opposi-
tion failed to stop the government from strengthening its control over educa-
tion, but it nonetheless succeeded in preserving the Basic Act on Education 
that institutionalized cosmopolitanism.
Imperfect Cosmopolitan Commemoration 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
In postwar Japan, cosmopolitanism manifested most clearly in the commem-
oration of the atomic bombings. When  people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
began holding peace memorial ceremonies in 1947 and 1948, respectively, 
they commemorated the atomic bombings as epoch- making events and 
urged the  whole of humanity to strive for world peace in light of the world-
wide threat posed by potential nuclear war. Th e 1947 Peace Declaration of 
Hiroshima City called out, “Let us eliminate fear and crimes from the earth, 
so that we can establish genuine peace. Let us realize the ideal of world peace 
by renouncing war forever.”84 Similarly, the 1948 Peace Declaration of Na-
gasaki City promised to “establish eternal peace on earth by pleading to the 
entire world, ‘No more Nagasaki.’ ”85 Th is cosmopolitan orientation was 
partly induced by the censorship during the Occupation. Since SCAP did 
not allow Japa nese citizens to criticize the United States for the atomic bomb-
ings, A- bomb victims had to use the universalistic language that transcended 
nationality.86 Th is cosmopolitan frame was also facilitated by emerging world-
wide antinuclear and peace movements. In March 1950, for example, the 
World Peace Council released the Stockholm Appeal, which collected more 
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than fi ve hundred million signatures around the world to demand an absolute 
ban on nuclear weapons. Japan contributed about 7.4 million signatures, 
and the A- bomb poet Tōge Sankichi wrote the poem “Th e Call” (Yobikake) 
to support the Stockholm Appeal.87
A- bomb victims and their supporters not only commemorated the 
atomic bombings but also lobbied municipal and national governments. 
In August 1952, about 250 A- bomb victims in Hiroshima City formed the 
A- Bomb Victims Association (Genbaku Higaisha no Kai) to request  free 
medical examinations, welfare support, and subsidies for treatment of dis-
eases related to the atomic bombing, among other forms of relief.88 While 
the Diet debated the Bill on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved 
Families in 1952, Nitoguri Ikkō, a former speaker of the Hiroshima City 
Council and chair of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconstruction Com-
mittee, testifi ed in front of the House of Representatives Welfare Commit-
tee.  Th ere he requested that committee members consider expanding the 
scope of the bill to include civilians who had been killed by the atomic 
bombings while being mobilized for military- related ser vices.89
Th e JSP supported A- bomb victims most actively. In February 1952, 
JSP member Oka Ryōichi relayed petitions from Hiroshima to the Diet and 
urged the government to protect “A- bomb orphans” (genbaku koji),  children 
who had lost their parents to the atomic bombing, “as part of the attempt to 
reconstruct Japan as a peaceful nation, as the fi rst and only victim of atomic 
bombs on earth.”90 In April, another JSP member, Aono Buichi, argued that 
the Bill on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families should encom-
pass civilian victims of indiscriminate aerial bombings, especially  those who 
had suff ered from the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.91 JSP 
members regularly chaired the Welfare Committee in the Diet and invited 
 people from Hiroshima to testify about their economic and health situations.
Th en, on March  1, 1954, the Lucky Dragon 5 Incident (Daigo 
Fukuryūmaru Jiken) occurred near Bikini Atoll, where the crew of a Japa-
nese fi shing boat was exposed to the fallout of a hydrogen bomb. Th e crew 
suff ered from acute radiation sickness, and the tuna that they brought back 
to Japan showed high levels of radiation. Th e shock of the Lucky Dragon 5 
Incident reverberated across Japan to the extent that all forty- six of the coun-
try’s prefectural councils passed antinuclear resolutions between March 
and October 1954. A nationwide campaign to collect signatures against nu-
clear weapons began in August 1954 and accumulated more than thirty 
million signatures within a year.92 In response to the nationwide antinuclear 
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movement, the House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution 
to ban the use of nuclear weapons in April 1954. During the Diet session, 
fi lled with passionate speeches and loud applauds, JSP member Kinoshita 
Yū endorsed the resolution enthusiastically: “We the Japa nese  people estab-
lished the so- called ‘peace constitution’ in light of our deep remorse ( fukai 
hansei) for our past wrongdoings. . . .  Since we are also the only  people who 
experienced atomic bombings, I believe it is our duty to adopt a nuclear- 
related resolution of this kind.”93
Th e nationwide antinuclear movement culminated in the World Con-
ference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in August 1955. Representa-
tives of fourteen countries and  those of forty- six prefectures of Japan attended 
the conference in Hiroshima, which opened with testimonies from A- bomb 
victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Core participants of the world confer-
ence proceeded to create the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen 
Bombs (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai) to continue their antinuclear 
campaign and started collecting signatures to request government compen-
sation for A- bomb victims.94 Th e second world conference in Nagasaki in 
August 1956  adopted a resolution to demand government compensation for 
A- bomb victims.  After the conference, A- bomb victims created their own 
national- level association, the Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb 
Suff erers Organ izations (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyōgikai) 
to or ga nize victims across Japan to lobby the Japa nese government more 
eff ectively.95
To support A- bomb victims, JSP published An Outline of the Bill on 
Relief for Patients of A- Bomb Diseases (Genbakushō kanja engohōan yōkō), pro-
posing to make the government pay for medical treatment of  those aff ected 
by the atomic bombings. Similarly, Hiroshima and Nagasaki Cities jointly 
proposed a draft bill regarding government relief for A- bomb victims in No-
vember. Th en, in early December, the Japan Council against Atomic and 
Hydrogen Bombs met with Diet members and submitted a petition to Prime 
Minister Hatoyama Ichirō and speakers of both  houses, requesting govern-
ment relief for A- bomb victims.96  Th ese lobbying activities led the JSP and 
the LDP to jointly propose a resolution asking the government to provide 
medical treatment for A- bomb victims “from a humanitarian standpoint” 
( jindōjō no kenchi kara).97  After the resolution was unanimously  adopted at 
the House of Representatives, Ishibashi Tanzan’s government proposed the 
Bill on Medical Care for A- Bomb Victims (Genshi Bakudan Hibakusha 
no Iryōtō ni kansuru Hōritsu) in February 1957. Since the bill had broad 
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support, it passed both  houses quickly and took eff ect on April 1. Th e 
newly created act was to issue “health rec ord books” (hibakusha kenkō techō) 
for A- bomb victims.  Owners of  these health rec ord books  were designated 
as “offi  cial A- bomb victims” and entitled to  free medical checkups twice a 
year. Th ey  were also eligible for  free medical treatment fully funded by the 
government if their symptoms met the criteria of “offi  cial A- bomb patients” 
(nintei kanja). Although the act made the government responsible for pro-
viding medical treatment of A- bomb victims, this responsibility was de-
fi ned as voluntary.
Th is defi nition of the government’s responsibility was challenged in 
April 1955, when a team of  lawyers from the Japan Federation of Bar As-
sociations (Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai) helped three A- bomb victims fi le a 
lawsuit against the Japa nese government— the so- called A- Bomb Trial (gen-
baku saiban) began. Originally, the  lawyers tried to seek compensation 
from the US government, on the grounds that it had  violated the Hague 
Convention prohibiting the use of inhumane weapons; however, the Amer-
ican Bar Association denied any  legal basis for such compensation.98  After 
the  lawyers realized that it would be too diffi  cult to pursue a lawsuit against 
the US government, they deci ded to target the Japa nese government by 
advancing the following argument: the United States had  violated interna-
tional law by using the inhumane atomic bombs; however, the Japa nese gov-
ernment had signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 to renounce all 
compensation claims, including  those of A- Bomb victims, against the United 
States; thus, the Japa nese government should compensate A- bomb victims 
on behalf of the US government.99
Concurrently with the A- Bomb Trial, the JSP pressed the LDP govern-
ment to expand relief for A- bomb victims. In November 1959, the JSP sub-
mitted a bill to expand the Act on Medical Care for A- Bomb Victims into 
the Act on Relief for A- Bomb Victims (Genbaku Higaisha Engohō), com-
parable to the Act on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families. Al-
though Kishi Nobusuke’s government refused to provide compensation for 
A- bomb victims, it agreed to expand the coverage of the existing act for A- 
bomb victims in July 1960 to subsidize medical treatment of diseases that 
 were not directly related to the atomic bombings, as well as to provide 
monthly allowances for A- bomb victims during their medical treatment.100 
In the 1950s, opposition parties and left- leaning NGOs seized the po liti cal 
opportunity— the growing antinuclear movement both inside and outside 
Japan—to press the LDP government to admit its war responsibility and 
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off er compensation for A- bomb victims. Th ey challenged the logic of na-
tionalism in Japan’s compensation policy that recognized only  those who 
had sacrifi ced their lives for the nation through military ser vice. Th e op-
position’s challenge ultimately failed, however,  because the LDP, given its 
robust mobilizing structures and control of the government, defended the 
existing compensation policy.
While politicians and NGOs debated government compensation for A- 
bomb victims,  people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki gradually consolidated 
the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration. In February 1963, four Japa nese 
Buddhist monks embarked on the “Hiroshima- Auschwitz Peace March.” 
Th ey walked from Hiroshima to Auschwitz and visited twenty- four coun-
tries to deliver the message “no more Hiroshima, no more Auschwitz.”101 In 
April 1964, forty A- bomb victims also began the “Hiroshima- Nagasaki 
World Peace Pilgrimage.” Th ey visited a total of 150 cities in eight coun-
tries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, to appeal for world 
peace.102 Th is universalistic frame of commemoration, however, had one 
 fundamental fl aw: it failed to encompass foreign victims who had suff ered 
from Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th is was a self- serving kind of cosmopoli-
tanism, induced largely by the fact that Japan had no offi  cial diplomatic re-
lations with South  Korea and China, its two closest neighbors, which had 
suff ered greatly from Japan’s past aggression.
Postwar Japan’s Relations with South  Korea and China
Japan’s relations with China faced, fi rst of all, the obstacle of Cold War geo-
politics.  After Japan signed the peace treaty, as well as the bilateral security 
treaty, with the United States in San Francisco in 1951, the United States 
demanded that Japan recognize Taiwan as the legitimate China. Th e US 
Senate even argued that the ratifi cation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
should be contingent on Japan’s recognition of Taiwan.103 Given the strong 
pressure from the United States, Yoshida Shigeru’s government deci ded to 
normalize its relations with Taiwan. In turn, Taiwan agreed to renounce its 
compensation claims against Japan, even though Chiang Kai- shek had ini-
tially intended to pursue compensation for war- related damages.104 In April 
1952, Japan and Taiwan signed a peace treaty to normalize their relations, 
locking Japan into the US Cold War strategy in East Asia.
In response, China’s prime minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement in 
May 1952, criticizing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the US- Japan Secu-
rity Treaty, and the Japan- Taiwan Peace Treaty. Zhou, however, directed his 
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criticism against the United States rather than Japan. To be sure, Zhou did 
criticize the Japa nese government for  going along with the United States: 
“ After signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Yoshida’s government imme-
diately released eighty- eight diabolic Japa nese war criminals whose hands 
 were all tainted with blood of the Chinese  people. Th is shows that reaction-
ary rulers of Japan have no sense of remorse and atonement . . .  and plan to 
resume their imperial rule of China and Asian  peoples.”105 Zhou nonethe-
less criticized the United States as China’s real  enemy by attacking the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty as the US government’s attempt to rearm Japan and 
wage a war of aggression against Asian  peoples. Zhou also carefully distin-
guished the Japa nese  people from the Japa nese government, even praised “the 
Japa nese  people’s re sis tance against the illegitimate San Francisco Peace 
Treaty [and] the imperialist occupation by the United States,” and went on 
to express “the Chinese  people’s unlimited solidarity and enthusiastic sup-
port for the Japa nese  people’s strug gle.”106
Zhou’s statement illustrated the benign commemorative position that 
the Chinese government took  toward Japan’s past aggression. While con-
demning prewar Japan’s militarist government, high- ranking government 
offi  cials in China, most notably Mao Zedong, described ordinary Japa nese 
citizens as victims of militarism. Instead, the Chinese government held the 
Kuomintang responsible for the Chinese  people’s suff ering.107 For the Chi-
nese government, re sis tance against US dominance in East Asia was more 
impor tant than commemoration of Japan’s past wrongdoings.
For the Japa nese government, in turn, economic relations with China 
 were more impor tant than war commemoration. From the late 1940s 
through the mid-1950s, Japa nese politicians and businessmen created vari-
ous associations to promote trade with China as a way to boost postwar 
Japan’s economic development: for example, the Association of Diet Mem-
bers for the Promotion of Japan- China Trade (Nitchū Bōeki Sokushin Giin 
Renmei) in 1949, the Japan- China Friendship Association (Nitchū Yūkō 
Kyōkai) in 1950, the Committee for the Promotion of Japan’s International 
Trade (Nihon Kokusai Bōeki Sokushin Iinkai) in 1952, and the Union for 
Japan- China Trade (Nitchū Yushutsunyū Kumiai) in 1955.108  Th ese eff orts 
resulted in a series of nongovernmental trade agreements with China in the 
fi rst half of the 1950s, but Japan’s economic relations with China remained 
limited and fragile. Economic relations between the two countries began to 
improve only in 1960 when Ikeda Hayato, who was keen to pursue economic 
development, became prime minister. Th e Chinese government, too, was 
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 eager to strengthen economic cooperation with Japan since it had suff ered 
substantial economic losses during the  Great Leap Forward movement of the 
late 1950s. China’s relations with the Soviet Union also began to deteriorate 
around the same time, thus making rapprochement with Japan more desir-
able for the Chinese government.109
While Japan- China relations  were largely confi ned to the economic 
dimension, some NGOs in Japan tried to commemorate Japan’s past wrong-
doings against China. Th e Japan- China Friendship Association, for exam-
ple, commemorated the “misery that the Chinese  people suff ered from 
aggressive policies (shinryaku seisaku) of Japa nese militarism” and sought 
“to correct the Japa nese  people’s mistaken view on China” that had facili-
tated Japan’s past aggression.110 When Yoshida Shigeru’s government signed 
the Japan- Taiwan Peace Treaty, the association also issued a statement criti-
cizing the treaty for “denying Japan’s war responsibility to the Chinese 
 people.”111 Such cosmopolitan commemoration of Chinese victims, however, 
was rare in Japan at the time.
In the meantime, Japan had more issues with South  Korea in terms of 
war commemoration, even though Japan and South  Korea had no offi  cial 
diplomatic relations. Soon  after Japan surrendered to the Allied powers in 
August 1945, Koreans formed associations to demand compensation for their 
military and  labor ser vices during the war from the Japa nese government 
and corporations, and South  Korea’s transitional government set up a com-
mittee to deal with compensation claims against Japan in August 1947.112 
Th en, in September 1948, an association of former soldiers and laborers de-
manded that the Japa nese government compensate three billion yen for 
unpaid military and  labor ser vices.113 Th e South Korean government, headed 
by Syngman Rhee, a longtime pro- in de pen dence nationalist, also submit-
ted to SCAP multiple survey reports on South  Korea’s compensation claims 
against Japan. Th e amount of total compensation that Rhee’s government 
demanded exceeded thirty billion yen, covering damages that Korean  people 
had suff ered during the war as well as during “Japan’s colonial rule, a coer-
cive act against the  will of the Korean  people, which  violated princi ples of 
justice, fairness, and mutual benefi ts.”114 In addition, Rhee’s government 
sought to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference as a member of 
the Allied powers.
In August 1947, however, the Allied powers deci ded that South  Korea 
had no compensation claims against Japan and should be satisfi ed with 
vari ous facilities and goods that Japan had left  behind. (Th e Japa nese 
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government and citizens had lost owner ship of their properties in Japan’s 
former colonies upon their surrender to the Allied powers.) Th is decision 
was coterminous with the increasingly lenient position of United States in 
regard to Japan’s responsibility for compensating war- related damages: the 
US government judged that it made more strategic sense to quickly rebuild 
Japan as its ally in the Cold War, rather than impose a large amount of 
compensation that would hinder Japan’s reconstruction eff orts.115
Th e Japa nese government, too, rejected South  Korea’s compensation 
claims. Japa nese returnees from  Korea even argued that the Allied powers 
should compensate them for their confi scated private properties, arguing that 
such confi scation  violated the Hague Conventions.116  After Japan signed 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty,  these returnees began demanding that the 
Japa nese government should compensate them instead. Th e logic of their 
demand was similar to the claim that A- bomb victims made:  because the 
Japa nese government had renounced compensation claims against the Al-
lied powers, it should now take responsibility for compensating Japa nese 
returnees from  Korea and other former colonies.
Th us, when the Japa nese and South Korean governments began the fi rst 
round of normalization talks in Tokyo in February 1952, they had radically 
diff er ent views on the issue of compensation. While the South Korean side 
was determined to press its compensation claims, the Japa nese side argued 
that the annexation of  Korea had been  legal at the time and demanded com-
pensation of confi scated private properties that had belonged to Japa nese 
citizens.117 Japan and South  Korea could not resolve their diff erences during 
the next two rounds of normalization talks. Th en, during the third round, 
one of the Japa nese representatives, Kubota Kan’ichirō from the Ministry of 
Foreign Aff airs, remarked, “Even though I admit  there was a negative as-
pect to Japan’s colonial rule of  Korea, it is undeniable that Japan also did 
good  things for  Korea.”118 Th is angered the South Korean side, but the 
Japa nese government refused to retract Kubota’s comment. As a result, the 
normalization talks broke down in 1953.
Th e normalization talks resumed in 1960, however, when certain key 
po liti cal developments occurred in both South  Korea and Japan. In August 
1960, Yu Bo Seon became president of South  Korea and  adopted a new pol-
icy  toward Japan. Instead of demanding compensation for Japan’s past 
wrongdoings, the South Korean government began to consider accepting 
economic aid from Japan in lieu of compensation. Th e policy shift was 
prompted by two signifi cant changes in South  Korea’s economic situation 
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in 1957: US economic aid to South  Korea began to decrease, and North 
 Korea launched a fi ve- year plan to industrialize its economy.  Under  these 
changed conditions, the South Korean government began to view Japan as 
an impor tant economic partner. Th is view was consolidated  after Park 
Chung Hee seized control of the government through a military coup in 
May 1961. In Japan, too, Ikeda Hayato, who became prime minister in July 
1960, was  eager to stimulate Japan’s economic growth by exporting goods 
and ser vices to South  Korea. In fact, the Japa nese government had already 
begun to develop this economic approach to compensation of war- related 
damages in the 1950s, when it had negotiated peace treaties with Southeast 
Asian countries such as Burma, Indonesia, South Vietnam, and the Phil-
ippines. Th e Japa nese government provided  these countries with “compen-
sation” for Japan’s past wrongdoings in the form of goods and ser vices 
produced by Japa nese corporations.119
Moreover, the Cold War escalated in Asia in the early 1960s. North 
 Korea signed a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union and a friend-
ship and mutual assistance treaty with China in 1961. As the United States 
was increasingly involved in the Vietnam War, it wanted more stable rela-
tions between Japan and South  Korea, its two allies in East Asia. From the 
US perspective, Japan’s economic aid to South  Korea would not only help 
the United States fi nancially but also induce South  Korea to send its troops 
to Vietnam.120 Th e combined threat of North  Korea and pressure from the 
United States thus moved Japan and South  Korea to compromise over 
the issue of compensation.
During the fi nal stage of normalization talks, the Japa nese and South 
Korean governments agreed that the former should off er grants and soft 
loans instead of compensation to the latter, and that normalization of their 
relations should resolve all issues of compensation between the two coun-
tries. But opposition parties and university students in South  Korea protested 
against normalization in March 1964. Th e opposition criticized the terms 
of normalization for essentially abandoning any demands for apology and 
compensation from Japan. Protests in Seoul between March 25 and 27 drew 
forty thousand to sixty thousand participants daily, and university students 
continued to or ga nize protests  until early June, when Park’s government de-
clared a state of emergency to suppress the protests.121
Similarly, opposition parties in Japan pressed the LDP government to 
confront Japan’s past wrongdoings. To be sure, when Minister of Foreign 
Aff airs Shiina Etsusaburō visited South  Korea in February 1965 to conclude 
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negotiation talks, he off ered his “deep remorse ( fukaku hansei) for the un-
fortunate period in the long history of the two countries.”122 But JSP mem-
ber Hososako Kanemitsu had already urged Ikeda himself—as prime min-
ister of Japan—to off er an apology to South  Korea: “If you want to establish 
friendly relations with  Korea . . .  you should fi rst of all apologize. . . .  It is 
not shameful to apologize for the wrongs that Japan committed. In fact, it 
is shameful not to.”123 JCP member Kawakami Kan’ichi also demanded that 
the Japa nese government apologize to South Koreans: “It goes without say-
ing that Japan committed all sorts of atrocities to the Korean  people over a 
long period of time— aggression, oppression, extortion, and enslavement. 
 Today, the Japa nese government should refl ect on its responsibility for  these 
acts, off er an apology to the Korean  people, and set an example of righ-
teousness for the Japa nese  people.”124 Nevertheless,  these criticisms  were 
voiced by only a minority of Japa nese politicians. As a result, the Japa nese 
and South Korean governments proceeded to fi nalize the terms of normal-
ization in Tokyo in December 1964, offi  cially prioritizing economic inter-
ests over questions about the past.
 After the Asia- Pacifi c War, Before the History Prob lem
During the immediate postwar period, the history prob lem did not  really 
exist. Not only did Japan lack diplomatic relations with South  Korea and 
China, but also discussion of Japan’s past wrongdoings was deliberately sup-
pressed by the governments of the three countries based on their economic 
interests and po liti cal calculations. Furthermore, the United States reversed 
the course of its policy objectives during the Occupation and allowed Japan 
to evade its past wrongdoings. Th e cross- national fragmentation of com-
memorations and the reverse course thus provided po liti cal opportunities 
for conservative politicians who consolidated their power by creating the 
LDP and mobilizing support from the Japan Bereaved Families Association 
and other constituencies. Using their robust mobilizing structures, conser-
vative politicians seized the po liti cal opportunities to dominate the govern-
ment and promoted nationalism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. As a 
result, prime ministers engaged in speech and action rejecting the Tokyo 
Judgment, injured veterans and bereaved families  were honored through 
government compensation, and the textbook- inspection pro cess tried to 
minimize descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings.
Th e JSP and the JCP, by contrast,  adopted the logic of cosmopolitan-
ism to commemorate foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Yet, the 
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opposition parties had weaker mobilizing structures and few po liti cal op-
portunities to inject cosmopolitanism into governmental speech and action, 
compensation policy, and education, though they did moderate the degree 
of nationalism that the conservative politicians  were able to institutionalize 
in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. Moreover, while the JSP worked with 
A- bomb victims, who began to articulate the logic of cosmopolitanism to 
commemorate all war victims irrespective of nationality, their cosmopoli-
tan commemoration was imperfect,  because it failed to encompass foreign 
victims of Japan’s past aggression. Nevertheless, the imperfect cosmopoli-
tanism that characterized the early commemoration of the atomic bomb-
ings was to play an impor tant role in commemorating South Korean and 
Chinese victims  after Japan normalized its relations with South  Korea and 
China in 1965 and 1972, respectively. At the same time, normalization was 
also to expand Japan’s interactions with South  Korea and China in both gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental arenas, setting in motion the develop-
ment of the history prob lem.
48
CHAPTER 2
The Growth of Transnational Interactions, 
1965–1988
On June 22, 1965, the Japa nese and South Korean governments signed the 
Treaty on Basic Relations. Th e treaty dodged fundamental disagreements over 
how to interpret past relations between the two countries. First, the two sides 
agreed to disagree about the interpretation of the treaty’s second article, which 
read, “All treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and 
the Empire of  Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.”1 
Th e Japa nese side interpreted this to mean that the 1910 Japan- Korean An-
nexation Treaty had previously been valid, only becoming null and void when 
the Republic of  Korea was founded in August 1948, whereas the South 
Korean side interpreted it to mean that the treaty had been never valid.
Second, both governments evaded Japan’s responsibility for its past 
wrongdoings when they signed the Compensation and Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement along with the Treaty on Basic Relations. Th is agreement 
authorized the Japa nese government to substitute economic aid for compen-
sation for the damages that South Koreans had suff ered from Japan’s war-
time atrocities and colonial rule. With this economic aid, the agreement 
stated that the “prob lem concerning property, rights and interests of the two 
Contracting Parties and their nationals (including juridical persons) . . .  is 
settled completely and fi  nally.”2
Opposition parties in Japan continued to criticize the terms of normal-
ization. JSP member Yokomichi Setsuo pointed to the protests in South 
 Korea and accused Satō Eisaku’s government of substituting economic aid 
for compensation: “If Prime Minister Satō’s government intends to apolo-
gize for the damages and pains of thirty- six years of Japan’s colonial rule, 
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the Korean  people might not have opposed the economic aid.”3 Another JSP 
member, Narazaki Yanosuke, also challenged the government’s interpreta-
tion of the treaty’s second article for ignoring the history of the Korean 
 people’s strug gle for in de pen dence.4 Opposition parties in South  Korea sim-
ilarly rejected the second article, since “it provided a basis for requiring the 
South Korean side to completely renounce its compensation claims . . .  and 
for retrospectively accepting Japan’s imperialism.”5
As problematic as the normalization treaty was, it did open doors of 
interaction between the two countries. Specifi cally, normalization facilitated 
the formation of a transnational network of NGOs trying to address the 
plight of South Korean A- bomb victims.
Commemorating the Double Tragedy of Colonial Rule 
and the Atomic Bombings
South Koreans began to learn about A- bomb victims in March 1965, when 
a broadcasting station in Seoul reported that  there  were about two hundred 
A- bomb victims living in South  Korea.6 Th en, in May, the Korean Residents 
Union in Japan (Mindan) sent delegates to investigate conditions of South 
Korean A- bomb victims. While in South  Korea, the delegates requested the 
South Korean government and the Red Cross Society to conduct a compre-
hensive survey of A- bomb victims. In response, the South  Korea Red Cross 
Society began a survey in August and found at least 426 A- bomb victims.7 
Th e media coverage of the survey encouraged South Korean A- bomb vic-
tims to form an association to seek relief for their medical and economic 
conditions. In July 1967, they established the South Korean A- Bomb Vic-
tims Association. By the end of the year, a total of 1,857 victims had joined.8
First, the association sought medical and economic relief from Park 
Chung Hee’s government, as well as requesting that the Japa nese and US 
governments provide funds and construction materials for hospitals and re-
habilitation centers for South Korean A- bomb victims. Moreover, the as-
sociation asked the Japa nese government, specifi cally, to compensate the 
physical damages that its members had suff ered from the atomic bombings. 
Th e association justifi ed the claim by arguing that South Korean victims 
“had been taken away by the Japa nese imperialists and then struck by the 
atomic bombings during the forced  labor.”9
 Th ese activities by South Korean A- bomb victims  were reported regu-
larly by the Hiroshima- based newspaper Chūgoku shinbun. One of Japan’s 
major national newspapers, Asahi shinbun, also published an extensive 
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report on South Korean A- bomb victims in March 1968. Th e report pre-
sented the victims as embodying the history of Japan’s colonial rule and 
urged Japa nese citizens to “do something about the deep wounds of the 
atomic bombings that we infl icted on them.”10 As more and more  people 
in Japan came to learn about A- bomb victims in South  Korea, they began 
to or ga nize relief activities. In December 1967 and August 1968, high 
school students in Hiroshima and businessmen in Nagasaki, respectively, 
or ga nized fundraising drives for South Korean A- bomb victims.11 In Au-
gust 1968, the National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons 
(Kakuheiki Kinshi Heiwa Kensetsu Kokumin Kaigi) also deci ded to pro-
vide relief for South Korean A- bomb victims.12
While Japa nese citizens began to take action for South Korean A- bomb 
victims, Japa nese A- bomb victims and opposition parties stepped up their 
eff orts to press the Japa nese government for compensation. Specifi cally, the 
Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb Suff erers Organ izations argued that 
the Act on Medical Care for A- Bomb Victims was inadequate  because it 
provided only medical relief. Since A- bomb victims suff ered from chronic 
diseases that often made it diffi  cult for them to hold regular jobs, the con-
federation demanded that the government provide A- bomb victims with 
not only medical but also economic relief. In October 1966, the confedera-
tion also published a pamphlet that demanded a “relief act” (engohō) for 
 A- bomb victims, comparable to the Act on Relief for Injured Veterans and 
Bereaved Families.13
Satō Eisaku’s government responded by proposing the Bill on Special 
Mea sures Concerning A- Bomb Victims (Genshi Bakudan Hibakusha ni tai-
suru Tokubetsusochi ni kansuru Hōan) in March 1968, off ering monthly 
allowances for A- bomb victims with certain medical and economic condi-
tions.14 Th e government, however, continued to insist that relief for A- bomb 
victims should be understood as voluntary, and that “compensation” (hoshō) 
should be off ered only to military- related personnel. As Muranaka Toshiaki, 
an offi  cial of the Ministry of Welfare, repeatedly argued, “We think that 
compensation should be given only to  those who had been employed by the 
government, such as  those who served in the military. It is therefore inap-
propriate to apply the compensation scheme to A- bomb victims who had 
no employment relations with the government.”15 While opposition parties 
criticized the government’s continuing refusal to compensate A- bomb vic-
tims, they eventually accepted the bill by adding a resolution to increase al-
lowances in the  future. Th e bill passed the Diet in May 1968.  Because it fell 
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short of providing government compensation, however, Japa nese A- bomb 
victims and opposition parties continued to press the government.
Th en, in the late 1960s, the two parallel movements by Japa nese and 
South Korean A- bomb victims began to intersect. First, in October 1968, 
Japa nese police arrested Son Gwi Dal, a female South Korean A- bomb vic-
tim who entered Japan illegally to seek medical treatment. Th e arrest of Son 
prompted the Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb Suff erers Organ-
izations to lobby politicians to allow her to stay in Japan. Son was deported 
to South  Korea in November, but  people in Hiroshima formed the Japan- 
South  Korea Council for A- Bomb Victim Relief (Hibakusha Kyūen Nik-
kan Kyōgikai) in October 1969, invited South Korean A- bomb victims to 
Japan for medical treatment, and conducted a survey of A- bomb victims 
in South  Korea.16 In February 1969, the Japan- South  Korea Council for 
A- Bomb Victim Relief also or ga nized a signature- collection campaign re-
questing the Japa nese government to issue health rec ord books to non- 
Japanese citizens.17 Th en, in May 1969, Motoshima Yuriko, a member of 
the Demo cratic Socialist Party— a centrist party created by the former right- 
wing faction of the JSP— brought up the issue of South Korean A- bomb 
victims for the fi rst time in the Diet. She suggested that foreign A- bomb 
victims should be able to receive the same treatment as their Japa nese 
counter parts.18 Observing  these events, Hiraoka Takashi, a Chūgoku shin-
bun reporter who was to  later become a mayor of Hiroshima City, noted in 
August 1969, “Korean A- bomb victims embody the double tragedy, Japan’s 
colonial rule and the atomic bombings. . . .  Confronting the fact that Japa-
nese A- bomb victims  were also perpetrators [from the Korean perspective] 
 shall produce a new philosophy of Hiroshima.”19
Th e movement to support South Korean A- bomb victims accelerated 
in December 1970 when the police arrested Son Jin Du, another South Ko-
rean A- bomb victim who had entered Japan illegally to seek medical treat-
ment. He was imprisoned fi rst but transferred to a hospital  after he became 
ill. While at the hospital, Son applied for a health rec ord book. Although 
his application was rejected, his Japa nese supporters helped him fi le a law-
suit at the Fukuoka District Court in October 1972 to revoke the rejection. 
Meanwhile, journalists, university students, and workers in Osaka and Kobe 
created the Association of Citizens to Support A- Bomb Victims in South 
 Korea (Kankoku no Genbaku Higaisha wo Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai) to 
provide relief for South Korean A- bomb victims.20 Th e National Council 
for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons also sent doctors to South  Korea to 
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examine medical conditions of A- bomb victims in September 1971 and cre-
ated a medical center for A- bomb victims in Hapcheon, South  Korea, in 
December 1973.21
Concurrently, the South Korean A- Bomb Victims Association increased 
its lobbying activities. In August 1971, the association sent a petition to Prime 
Minister Satō Eisaku requesting that the Japa nese government treat South 
Korean A- bomb victims as equal to their Japa nese counter parts. Th en, in 
August 1972, Shin Yong Su, the association president, met with Deputy 
Prime Minister Miki Takeo in Tokyo to hand another petition to Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei. In the petition, the association demanded that 
the  Japa nese government compensate South Korean A- bomb victims be-
cause they had suff ered from the atomic bombings while they had been 
“forcibly mobilized by prewar Japan’s imperialism for military ser vice, 
 labor, and voluntary corps, among other activities.”22 Other NGOs in 
South  Korea, especially Christian NGOs, also joined the lobbying activities. 
Korean Church  Women United, for example, began to work with the South 
Korean A- Bomb Victims Association in spring 1974,  after its members had 
participated in the World Day of Prayer in Hiroshima and learned about the 
plight of South Korean A- bomb victims.23 Supporting the association’s peti-
tion in 1971, Korean Church  Women United sent its own petition to Prime 
Minister Tanaka in July 1974 requesting that the Japa nese government pro-
vide South Korean A- bomb victims with the same relief being off ered to 
their Japa nese counter parts.24 Th e group also asked its  sister or ga ni za tion in 
Japan to write a similar petition to the prime minister.25
Opposition parties in Japan, too, rallied  behind South Korean A- bomb 
victims. JSP member Ōhara Tōru argued that the Japa nese government 
should provide relief for South Korean A- bomb victims “from a humani-
tarian standpoint ( jindōtekina kantenkara) since Japan had mobilized Ko-
reans, and Japan also had more experience of providing relief and medical 
treatment for A- bomb victims,” even though he felt that the United States 
should be held primarily responsible  because it had dropped the atomic 
bombs.26 Kōmeitō member Kashiwabara Yasu made a similar point: “Th e 
Japa nese government argues that the Treaty on Basic Relations between 
 Japan and South  Korea has resolved all issues regarding compensation. Even 
if that is legally the case, I think we, as  human beings, should do something 
humanitarian for South Korean A- bomb victims.”27
Th en, in March 1974, the Fukuoka District Court ruled that it was il-
legal to reject Son Jin Du’s application for a health rec ord book since the 
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Act on Medical Care for A- Bomb Victims had no citizenship or residency 
requirement. Following the ruling, Shin Yong Su visited Tokyo in July 1974 
and applied for a health rec ord book. Tokyo governor Minobe Ryōkichi, 
known for his liberal orientation, agreed to issue a health rec ord book to 
Shin. Th is was the fi rst time a South Korean citizen had obtained a health 
rec ord book since the 1965 normalization. In March 1978, the Supreme 
Court also upheld the ruling of the Fukuoka District Court and stated, “Th e 
Act on Medical Care for A- Bomb Victims has a characteristic that amounts 
to government compensation (kokka hoshōteki hairyo) since it aims to pro-
vide relief for the exceptional war- related damages [of the atomic bombings] 
based on responsibility of the government as an actor that carried out the 
war.”28 Given this ruling, the Japa nese government began to issue health rec-
ord books to foreign A- bomb victims, though it also issued the so- called 
402 Directive to invalidate  these health rec ord books once their holders 
left Japan.29
In response to the Supreme Court ruling, the LDP also sent its del e ga-
tion to meet with members of South  Korea’s ruling Demo cratic Republican 
Party in July 1978 and began negotiations over the issue of South Korean 
A- bomb victims. In June 1979, the two ruling parties reached a three- part 
agreement: Japan should accept South Korean doctors seeking training in 
the medical treatment of A- bomb victims, send Japa nese doctors to South 
 Korea to provide this same training  there, and invite South Korean A- bomb 
victims to Japan for medical treatment.30 When fi nalizing the agreement in 
October 1980, however, the Japa nese government agreed to honor only the 
third part of the original agreement, and even then, the South Korean gov-
ernment was expected to cover the costs of sending A- bomb victims to 
Japan. Th e agreement was also set to expire in fi ve years.31
Although the 1980 agreement fell short of what South Korean A- bomb 
victims and their supporters had hoped for, the 1965 normalization treaty 
stimulated transnational interactions at both governmental and nongovern-
mental levels. In par tic u lar, Japa nese and South Korean NGOs formed a 
transnational network to demand that the Japa nese government recognize 
the suff ering of South Korean A- bomb victims. Th is demand was coupled 
with a demand for the commemoration of what had brought Koreans to Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki in the fi rst place— Japan’s colonial rule and forced 
 labor for the war eff ort. Put another way, the mobilizing structures for 
cosmopolitan commemoration expanded to the transnational scale, while 
the commemoration of the atomic bombings became more inclusive by 
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encompassing foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th us, A- bomb 
victims and the opposition parties and NGOs that supported them began 
to challenge the LDP government to incorporate cosmopolitanism in 
Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. Th is challenge was reinforced by normal-
ization of Japan’s relations with another impor tant neighbor, China.
The Normalization of Japan- China Relations
Th roughout the 1960s, Japan and China made  little pro gress  toward nor-
malization  because of the Cold War that turned “hot” in Vietnam. Th e Japa-
nese government allowed the US military to use bases inside Japan to send 
troops, weapons, and provisions to support South Vietnam, whereas China 
supported North Vietnam, led by the communist leader Ho Chi Minh. As 
Japan became more fi rmly incorporated into the US Cold War strategy in 
Asia, its relations with China suff ered in turn. In November 1964, the of-
fi cial newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party,  People’s Daily, criticized 
Prime Minister Satō Eisaku for his pro- American and anti- Chinese diplo-
macy and accused him of conspiring to “control Taiwan as a stepping stone 
to reach Southeast Asia and reestablish the once debunked ‘Greater East Asia 
Co- prosperity Sphere.’ ”32 In June 1965, the Chinese government also criti-
cized the normalization treaty between Japan and South  Korea by charac-
terizing it as “a strategy of the U.S. imperialism aiming to divide  Korea 
forever, forcibly occupy South  Korea, and use Japan and Park’s government 
to wage an aggressive war.”33
While the Vietnam War continued, more and more governments be-
gan to recognize the  People’s Republic of China as the legitimate China. 
Given the worldwide trend to recognize China rather than Taiwan, 379 Diet 
members in Japan, including members of the LDP, formed the nonpartisan 
group Diet Members for the Promotion of Japan- China Normalization 
(Nitchū Kokkō Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Renmei) in December 1970. Th e 
JSP also sent its del e ga tion to China in November 1970 and created the Na-
tional Council for Japan- China Normalization (Nitchū Kokkō Kaifuku 
Kokumin Kaigi) in February 1971.34 Satō’s government, however, was 
reluctant to pursue normalization with China  because a sizable number 
of LDP members still supported Taiwan. Satō also rejected the idea of apol-
ogizing to China for Japan’s past wrongdoings: “In Japan, some  people 
still feel that Japan has to bow its head to China. But I think  those violent 
and atrocious acts by the Japa nese military ceased to  matter when the 
war ended.”35
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A breakthrough came in July 1971 when the US government admit-
ted that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had visited Beijing, and an-
nounced that President Richard Nixon was scheduled to visit China the 
following year. In September, the UN General Assembly also voted to rec-
ognize China and expel Taiwan. In the midst of rapidly changing interna-
tional relations, Tanaka Kakuei became the new prime minister on July 7, 
1972, and designated normalization with China as one of his highest pri-
orities. Tanaka pursued normalization with China primarily to satisfy the 
LDP’s constituencies, including businesses  eager for China’s huge market 
potential.36
Prior to the negotiations, the Chinese government had already deci ded 
not to pursue compensation from Japan, on condition that the Japa nese gov-
ernment expressed remorse for its past wrongdoings. Th e government’s de-
cision was based on several considerations: China should be as generous as 
Taiwan, which had renounced its compensation claims in the 1952 Japan- 
Taiwan Peace Treaty; the renunciation of compensation claims should be 
used as leverage to make Japan recognize China instead of Taiwan; and 
China should follow Chairman Mao Zedong’s teaching by distinguishing 
Japa nese citizens from the small group of Japa nese militarist leaders who had 
started the war.37 Th e last point was reiterated by Premier Zhou Enlai dur-
ing his welcome speech for the Japa nese del e ga tion on September 25, 1972.38
At the fi rst round of negotiations the next day, the Japa nese side stated 
that China had no compensation claims against Japan in the fi rst place, as 
the Taiwanese government had already renounced them in 1952.39 Zhou an-
grily responded, “We are willing to renounce compensation claims for the 
sake of friendly relations between the Japa nese and Chinese  peoples. But we 
cannot accept your position that the issue of compensation is already resolved 
 because Chiang Kai- shek renounced compensation claims.” 40 At the sec-
ond round of negotiations on the same day, Zhou also criticized Tanaka’s 
speech at the welcome banquet, where Tanaka had used the expression 
“Japan caused much incon ve nience to China” (tadai no gomeiwaku wo oka-
keshita) to refer to the Second Sino- Japanese War.41 For Zhou, the expres-
sion was too casual to address the “extremely horrendous calamity that the 
Chinese  people suff ered from the aggression by the Japa nese militarists.” 42
In the end, the Japa nese government agreed to insert the following sen-
tence in the Joint Communique on September 29, 1972: “Th e Japa nese side 
is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan 
caused in the past to the Chinese  people through war, and deeply reproaches 
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itself ( fukaku hanseisuru).” 43 In the Joint Communique, the Japa nese gov-
ernment also recognized the  People’s Republic of China as the legitimate 
China. In turn, “in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and 
the Japa nese  peoples,” the Chinese government renounced “its demand for 
war reparations from Japan.”  People’s Daily celebrated the normalization by 
emphasizing the importance of extending sympathies and goodwill to Japa-
nese citizens who had been victimized by their militarist leaders.44
Opposition parties celebrated the normalization as an impor tant step 
 toward peaceful international relations in Asia, but they also criticized the 
way Tanaka Kakuei’s government dealt with Japan’s past wrongdoings 
during the normalization negotiations. JSP member Nishiura Kan’ichi ar-
gued that Tanaka needed to off er atonement for “the atrocious acts that the 
Japa nese military committed against the Chinese  people during the Greater 
East Asia War . . .  especially the Nanjing Massacre, which was comparable 
to Auschwitz, the enormous atrocious act that Nazi Germany committed 
against the Jewish  people. . . .  Do you not think you should express apolo-
gies for  those atrocities as a premise of the normalization negotiations?” 45 
Kōmeitō member Watanabe Ichirō also emphasized the importance of 
off ering an apology for the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities, for “the 
Chinese  people are extremely angry  because the Japa nese government has 
never apologized since the end of the war.” 46
In fact, prior to the 1972 normalization, Japa nese citizens had already 
begun to publicly discuss Japan’s past wrongdoings in China and elsewhere 
against the backdrop of the growing anti- Vietnam War sentiments.47 For 
example, the most prominent anti- Vietnam War NGO network, Citizen’s 
League for Peace in Vietnam (Betonamu ni Heiwawo! Shimin Rengō), de-
manded that Japa nese citizens understand their own past as perpetrators and 
stop victimizing Asian  people again through the military alliance with the 
United States.48 Perhaps the most impor tant outgrowth of anti- Vietnam War 
sentiments was a series of articles called “Travels in China” (Chūgoku no 
tabi) that Honda Katsuichi published in Asahi shinbun in August 1971. 
Honda was motivated by his earlier experience of reporting the Vietnam War 
and encouraged by American journalists who had exposed their own mili-
tary’s atrocities in Vietnam. Based on his fi eldwork and interviews, Honda 
detailed the atrocities committed by the Japa nese military against civilians 
in Manchukuo, Nanjing, and other places.49
Around the same time, vari ous eyewitness accounts of the Nanjing 
Massacre appeared in magazines: to name but a few examples, “Testimo-
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nies of Atrocities by Photog raphers” (Satsuriku no genba wo shōgensuru 
jūgun kameraman) in Asahi Weekly Entertainment in January 1971, “I Wit-
nessed the ‘Tragedy of Nanjing’ ” (Watashi wa ano Nankin no Higeki wo 
mokugekishita) in Circle in November 1971, and “Th e Cold- Blooded Ter-
mination Operation: Th e Nanjing Massacre” (Reikokuna minagoroshi 
sakusen: Nankin Daigyakusatsu) in Mainichi Sunday in November 1972.50 
In addition to  these journalistic accounts, Hora Tomio, a history professor 
at Waseda University, pioneered academic research on the Nanjing Massa-
cre by publishing Th e Nanjing Incident (Nankin Jiken) in 1972 and two vol-
umes of primary historical materials in 1973.
Japa nese A- bomb victims also joined the growing commemoration of 
Chinese victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. In July 1970, the Committee 
for the Commemoration of Chinese Prisoners (Chūgokujinfuryo Junansha 
Irei Jikkōiinkai) in Nagasaki requested that the city government offi  cially 
commemorate thirty- three Chinese prisoners who had died as the result of 
the atomic bombing.51 In May 1972, the A- bomb poet Kurihara Sadako also 
wrote the poem “When We Say ‘Hiroshima’ ” (Hiroshima to iutoki), which 
urged Japa nese A- bomb victims and citizens to commemorate foreign 
victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings instead of dwelling on their own vic-
timhood.52 Moreover, in 1974, Maruki Iri and Toshi, A- bomb victims and 
paint ers famous for Th e Pictures of the Atomic Bombing (Genbaku no zu), be-
gan to paint Th e Picture of the Nanjing Massacre, for they felt that “without 
confronting the war crimes that we, the Japa nese  people, had committed, 
our call for peace and pacifi sm cannot be au then tic.”53  Th ese commemora-
tions by Japa nese A- bomb victims confi rmed that they had begun to tran-
scend the self- serving type of cosmopolitanism. As historian James Orr 
pointed out, Japa nese victim consciousness indeed contained “the desire to 
identify with Asian victimhood rather than deny it.”54
In the meantime, the Japa nese and Chinese governments tried to ne-
gotiate a peace and friendship treaty by building on the 1972 Joint Com-
munique, but domestic and international po liti cal situations interfered. In 
Japan, Tanaka Kakuei resigned from the post of prime minister in Septem-
ber 1974  after being suspected of receiving illegal monetary contributions 
from the American aerospace com pany Lockheed. With the arrest of Tanaka 
in July 1976, the LDP had to focus on regaining trust from Japa nese citi-
zens.55 Around the same time, the Chinese government was  going through 
intense power strug gles between Deng Xiaoping and his rivals  after the 
deaths of the two founding  fathers, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, in 1976.56 
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In addition to  these domestic po liti cal situations, the Japa nese and Chinese 
governments had confl icting diplomatic calculations. Th e Chinese govern-
ment proposed to include in a peace and friendship treaty an article to op-
pose imperialism in the region, trying to  counter the threat of the Soviet 
Union. Th e Japa nese government resisted the Chinese proposal since it did 
not want to jeopardize negotiations with the Soviet Union over the disputed 
sovereignty of Kuril/Northern Islands.57
Th e negotiations fi  nally began to make pro gress in 1978. Prime Min-
ister Fukuda Takeo had been keen on signing a peace and friendship treaty, 
and the United States had supported it to contain the threat of the Soviet 
Union in the region.58 Chinese politics was also stabilized in 1977 when 
Deng Xiaoping began to consolidate his power, and the Chinese govern-
ment wanted better relations with Japan, given the escalating tensions 
with Vietnam and the Soviet Union.59 Although the Japa nese government 
was still reluctant to include an article to oppose imperialism, it deci ded to 
compromise with the Chinese government by adding another article to 
clarify that “this treaty has no bearing on each party’s relations with other 
countries.” 60
Th e Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in August 1978 was decid-
edly forward- looking and made no reference to the Asia- Pacifi c War.  People’s 
Daily celebrated the treaty by calling on the Japa nese and Chinese  peoples 
to “maintain friendship for generations to come” and downplayed Japan’s 
past wrongdoings: “Japan and China are neighboring countries with a long 
history of friendly exchange. During the fi rst half of this  century, a war broke 
out between the two countries, which infl icted enormous damages to the 
Chinese  people as well as to the Japa nese. But, the period of war was such a 
short time in light of two thousand years of history of relations between the 
two countries.” 61 When Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping came to Japan in 
October 1978 and met with Emperor Hirohito, he also emphasized the 
importance of  future peace and friendship between the two countries.62
In summary, the Japan- China normalization injected a small degree 
of cosmopolitanism into Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, as “deep reproach” 
was expressed in the 1972 Joint Communique. Th is shows that even the 
LDP, a proponent of nationalist commemoration, could adopt cosmopoli-
tan contrition when  doing so was po liti cally opportune. Th e normalization 
also prompted Japa nese citizens to commemorate Chinese victims of Japan’s 
war time atrocities, though it did not transform Japan’s offi  cial commemo-
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ration signifi cantly  because the LDP as well as the Chinese government pri-
oritized geopo liti cal and economic interests over historical issues.
Pursuing Government Sponsorship for the Yasukuni Shrine
While the normalization pro cesses facilitated the commemoration of South 
Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings, the LDP and the 
Japan Bereaved Families Association continued to work together to defend 
nationalist commemoration at the Yasukuni Shrine. In February 1966, the 
Ministry of Welfare sent the Yasukuni Shrine deity- enshrinement documents 
for the fourteen Class A war criminals.63  After meeting with offi  cials from 
the ministry in May 1967, Yasukuni priests deci ded to enshrine the Class A 
war criminals. Th e shrine’s board of directors approved the decision in 
January 1969, but the ministry and the shrine agreed not to publicize it.64 
Th en, in June 1969, the LDP submitted the so- called Yasukuni Shrine Bill 
(Yasukuni Jinja Hōan) to reinstate government sponsorship for the shrine.65
All the opposition parties, however, denounced the bill by arguing that 
government sponsorship of the Yasukuni Shrine was unconstitutional ac-
cording to the princi ple of separation of religion and state.66 Th e JSP, for 
example, condemned the bill as an attempt to “affi  rm and glorify the impe-
rialist war of aggression  under the name of the emperor and designate the 
Yasukuni Shrine as a place to honor war dead of  future wars of aggression. . . . 
Th e bill fails to examine Japan’s war responsibility for Asian  peoples, who 
 were the worst victims of Japan’s past aggression.” 67 Given the strong criti-
cisms and the tight schedule of the Diet session, the bill was discarded in 
August 1969, when the session was adjourned for a summer recess.68 Th e 
bill met the same fate when the LDP resubmitted it in 1970, 1971, and 1972.
When the LDP submitted the bill for the fi fth time in May 1973, the 
Japan Bereaved Families Association and the Yasukuni Shrine stepped up 
their lobbying activities. In March 1974, the association or ga nized a rally 
near the shrine and demanded that the LDP push through the opposition 
to pass the bill. Meanwhile, the chief Yasukuni priest, Tsukuba Fujimaro, 
submitted to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and speakers of both  houses a 
petition requesting the passage of the bill.69 Th e LDP responded by using 
its numerical dominance to pass the bill at the House of Representatives in 
May 1974, while all the opposition parties boycotted the vote in protest.70
Th e opposition parties, as well as Buddhist and Christian NGOs, 
strongly criticized the LDP’s move. Th e most damaging criticism, however, 
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came from the House of Representatives Legislation Bureau, which fi rmly 
stated that government sponsorship of the Yasukuni Shrine would be un-
constitutional  unless the shrine changed almost all of its current practices 
to eliminate religious ele ments.71 Furthermore, even though the bill was sent 
to the House of Councillors, the ongoing session was to be adjourned in 
fewer than ten days. Given such a short win dow of opportunity, the LDP 
could pass the bill only if it completely ignored the opposition parties again. 
Th e LDP’s po liti cal calculation was complicated by the upcoming election 
for the House of Councillors. Not only was the LDP reluctant to galvanize 
supporters of the opposition parties at this time, but also the Diet custom-
arily did not extend deliberation on a bill to the next session when an elec-
tion was forthcoming.72
In the end, the LDP did not try to push the bill through the House of 
Councillors and, as a result, the bill was discarded in June 1974, for the fi fth 
time. But the LDP still strug gled in the July election of the House of Coun-
cillors and barely secured the  house majority.73 Besides, the Yasukuni 
Shrine became reluctant to support the bill  because they  were worried about 
the bill’s ramifi cations: “If the Yasukuni Shrine Act is created according to 
the House of Representatives Legislation Bureau’s position, the Yasukuni 
Shrine  will surely regress into an amorphous or ga ni za tion devoid of gods 
and spirits (shinrei fuzai). . . .  If we rush and end up enacting a bad law that 
 will destroy the Yasukuni Shrine’s original form, we  will regret forever.”74
Th e LDP and the Japan Bereaved Families Association therefore deci-
ded to suspend their campaign to reinstate de jure government sponsorship 
for the shrine. Instead, they deci ded to pursue de facto government spon-
sorship in the form of an “offi  cial visit” (kōshiki sanpai) to the shrine by a 
prime minister and, ultimately, by the emperor. Such visits would symboli-
cally mark the shrine as the national memorial to honor war dead for their 
sacrifi ces for the Japa nese nation. As a fi rst step in this new direction, Prime 
Minister Miki Takeo visited the shrine on August 15, 1975, the thirtieth 
anniversary of the Asia- Pacifi c War’s end. Miki’s visit was signifi cant  because 
it was the fi rst time any prime minister had visited the shrine on this anni-
versary, the most impor tant day in Japan for commemorating the war. But 
Miki was careful to state that he visited the shrine as a “private person” (shijin), 
not as prime minister, in order to avoid potential criticism from opposition 
parties and non- Shinto religious organ izations.75
Miki’s cautious approach, however, frustrated some LDP members. 
Yagi Ichirō, for example, said to Miki, “I believe it is proper for the prime 
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minister, a representative of the Japa nese  people, to offi  cially visit Yasukuni 
for war gods who died for the country. You should pay an open, offi  cial 
visit.”76 In June 1976, the Japan Bereaved Families Association, the Yasu-
kuni Shrine, and veterans’ groups also formed the Association to Honor War 
Gods (Eirei ni Kotaeru Kai) to advocate an offi  cial visit to the shrine. Th e 
association created local branches in all forty- eight prefectures and lobbied 
prefectural councils to adopt resolutions requesting the government to move 
 toward an offi  cial visit. Th irty- seven prefectures and 1,548 municipalities 
 adopted such resolutions.77 In April 1978, LDP members also created the 
Council of Diet Members to Honor War Gods (Eirei ni Kotaeru Giin 
Kyōgikai) to promote an offi  cial visit.  Th ese eff orts fi  nally paid off  on Au-
gust 15, 1978, when Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo visited the shrine with 
other members of his cabinet and signed the shrine’s guestbook as “Prime 
Minister.”78
Around the same time, the Yasukuni Shrine selected Matsudaira 
Nagayoshi as new chief priest. Matsudaira was a former navy offi  cer and 
more nationalistic than his pre de ces sor, Tsukuba Fujimaro, who had been 
cautious not to implement the 1969 decision to enshrine the fourteen Class 
A war criminals.79  Under Matsudaira’s leadership, the shrine fi  nally and co-
vertly enshrined the Class A war criminals as war gods and “martyrs” ( ju-
nansha) in October 1978. Matsudaira wanted to enshrine the Class A war 
criminals  because he thought that “ unless we reject the Tokyo Trial histori-
cal view (Tokyo Saiban shikan) that regarded Japan as solely and entirely 
wrong, we can never reconstruct Japan spiritually.”80 He also justifi ed the 
enshrinement by referring to the 1953 reform of the Act on Relief for In-
jured Veterans and Bereaved Families that had granted pensions to bereaved 
families of war criminals: “Th e Tokyo Trial was not based on a valid inter-
national law. Th en, the Japa nese government offi  cially deci ded to treat  those 
who had been prosecuted as war criminals as the same as other war dead by 
the domestic law. So,  there was no prob lem in enshrining them.”81
Th e enshrinement of the Class A war criminals was reported by Asahi 
shinbun in April 1979. Opposition parties responded by demanding that 
Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.82 
JSP member Yamahana Sadao criticized Ōhira, who was a Christian, by 
quoting a Christian priest: “Th e enshrinement of Class A war criminals 
leads to the denial of war responsibility.”83 When Ōhira disregarded the 
opposition and went ahead with his visit, JCP member Yamanaka Ikuko 
argued, “Your action absolves the Class A war criminals, the leaders of the 
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aggressive war (shinryaku sensō) that killed tens of millions of  people in 
Japan and Asia. I have to say your action amounts to affi  rmation of the 
aggressive war.”84 Ōhira counterargued that they had to wait for “history 
to hand its judgment” since  there  were competing interpretations of the 
“Greater East Asia War.”85
 After the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals became public 
knowledge, Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, though 
he continued to send his representative (chokushi) to annual festivals. In con-
trast, Ōhira and members of the Council of Diet Members to Honor War 
Gods continued to visit the shrine. When Ōhira suddenly died of a heart 
attack in May 1980, the LDP exploited the public’s sympathy to win a land-
slide victory in elections of both  houses of the Diet. Encouraged by the 
election results, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō visited the shrine eight times 
during his tenure between July 1980 and November 1982— the highest 
frequency of Yasukuni visits among LDP prime ministers.86 LDP Diet mem-
bers also launched the Association of Diet Members for Visiting the Yasu-
kuni Shrine Together (Minnade Yasukuni Jinja ni Sanpaisuru Kokkaigiin 
no Kai) in March 1981, and 197 out of the 259 association members visited 
the shrine during its annual spring festival in April.87
Th us, despite the normalization with South  Korea and China, the LDP 
continued to promote nationalism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. While 
the LDP failed to renationalize the Yasukuni Shrine due to the lack of po-
liti cal opportunity, it pursued an offi  cial visit to the shrine and reinforced 
the nationalist logic of commemoration, justifying the Asia- Pacifi c War as 
a heroic act of self- defense.
Growing Tensions between Domestic and International Demands
In addition to the promotion of the offi  cial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the 
LDP tried to reduce descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in Japa nese 
history textbooks for ju nior high and high schools;  those descriptions in-
creased throughout the 1970s  because Ienaga Saburō had won his case at 
the Tokyo District Court in July 1970.88 Th e LDP began to criticize history 
textbooks by serializing Textbooks  Today (Ima kyōkashowa) in its offi  cial 
newsletters in January 1980.89 LDP minister of justice Okuno Seiryō also 
publicly criticized existing textbooks for their “inadequacy in cultivating love 
of the country,” and in June 1981, the LDP deci ded to create a new law that 
would further strengthen the power of the Ministry of Education to regu-
late the contents of history textbooks.90
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 Th ese attempts to promote nationalism in education aff ected the 1982 
cycle of textbook inspection for high schools: textbook inspectors recom-
mended that authors of Japa nese history textbooks should replace the ex-
pression “aggression” (shinryaku)  toward China with “advancement” (shins-
hutsu) and use more conservative terminology to describe the Nanjing 
Massacre. One of the textbook inspectors, Tokinoya Shigeru, justifi ed the 
recommendations as follows: “I was troubled by the inconsistency, where 
the author [Ienaga Saburo] uses ‘aggression’ only to describe Japan’s acts 
 toward China while using ‘advancement’ to describe the Western Pow-
ers’ acts  toward Asia and China. . . .  Since historical interpretations of 
the Nanjing Massacre became more diverse  after Mr. Suzuki Akira’s A 
Myth of the Nanjing Massacre won the Fourth Ōya Souichi Nonfi ction 
Award, the author can no longer assert his interpretation that the Japa-
nese military committed systematic atrocities immediately  after occupy-
ing Nanjing.”91  After the inspection, two out of the ten Japa nese history 
textbooks for high schools  adopted the recommendations and replaced 
“aggression” with “advancement.”92
Soon  after major Japa nese newspapers reported the changes recom-
mended by the Ministry of Education, newspapers and broadcasting sta-
tions in South  Korea and China began to criticize the Japa nese government 
for trying to distort history. Minister of Education Ogawa Heiji rejected the 
criticism by stating that inspection of history textbooks was a “domestic is-
sue” and not the concern of foreign countries.93 But the criticisms from 
South  Korea and China continued. NGOs in South  Korea or ga nized meet-
ings and demonstrations against the recommended changes, pressing Chun 
Doo Hwan’s government to protest.94 Th e Chinese government told the 
Japa nese embassy in Beijing that the recommended changes contradicted 
the spirit of the 1972 Joint Communique and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between the two countries.95 Th e Chinese government also re-
fused to proceed with Ogawa’s scheduled visit to Beijing.
Suzuki Zenkō’s government initially tried to defend the recommended 
changes. When JSP member Doi Takako asked  whether the government was 
trying to deny the “obvious historical fact that Japan waged a war of aggres-
sion (shinryaku sensō) against China,” Hashimoto Hiroshi from the Minis-
try of Foreign Aff airs stated, “We humbly recognize that such a historical 
view is held by  people in China,” and indicated that Japan did not have to 
adopt the same view.96 Ogawa also argued, “Th e nature of the war that Japan 
waged against China is open to diverse interpretations and judgments. I do 
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not think it is necessary for the Japa nese government to issue a statement 
offi  cially acknowledging that it was a war of aggression.”97  Th ese attempts 
to defend the recommended changes  were consistent with the LDP’s long-
standing rejection of the Tokyo Trial. Explaining why the number of vic-
tims of the Nanjing Massacre was removed from the textbooks, Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi argued, “Even though the Tokyo Trial 
stated that 200,000  people  were killed in Nanjing, I do not know  whether 
we can establish a historical fact solely based on that statement. History is 
far more complicated, and it  will take us a long time to learn what  really 
happened.”98
International criticism continued, however, and prompted the Japa nese 
government to issue a statement, promising to “listen carefully to the criti-
cisms of the textbooks from South  Korea and China, among other coun-
tries” and “modify the current textbook inspection criteria so as to promote 
friendship with neighboring countries in Asia.”99 Th e Japa nese government 
then incorporated the so- called Article on Neighboring Countries (kinrin 
shokoku jōkō) into inspection criteria to encourage textbook writers to in-
clude descriptions of foreign victims of the Asia- Pacifi c War.100 As a re-
sult, the international criticism abated, and descriptions of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings in history textbooks increased during the 1980s.101
Frustrated with this sequence of events, the National Council for the 
Defense of Japan (Nihon wo Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi) announced its plan 
to produce a new history textbook that could “make  children proud of be-
ing Japa nese” as an alternative to the existing history textbooks marred with 
“masochistic tendencies.”102 Th e council then submitted its draft history text-
book for high schools, New Japa nese History (Shinpen nihonshi), to the 
1985–1986 cycle of textbook inspection. Th is history textbook discussed 
myths of the imperial  family extensively, praised the Imperial Rescript on 
Education in prewar Japan, and downplayed Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th e 
draft textbook stated, for example, “Th e  battle over Nanjing was extremely 
intense. Th e Chinese government argues that the Japa nese military commit-
ted atrocities against the Chinese  people at the time. . . .  But a controversy 
exists over truths of the event, and it is yet to be settled.”103  After inspecting 
the draft textbook, the Ministry of Education required the council to make 
about eight hundred revisions.  After the council completed the required re-
visions, the ministry provisionally approved the textbook in May 1986.
Again, the Japa nese government received strong criticisms from South 
 Korea, China, and other Asian countries. Th e South Korean and Chinese 
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governments, in par tic u lar, demanded further revisions of New Japa nese His-
tory. In response, the Ministry of Education required the council to go 
through four additional rounds of revision regarding its descriptions of 
 Japan’s past aggression, war time atrocities, and colonial rule.104 Th is action 
on the ministry’s part pacifi ed the international criticism but also galvanized 
some LDP members to form the Association for the Nation’s Basic Prob-
lems (Kokka Kihon Mondai Dōshikai) in August 1986. Association mem-
bers criticized the government for accommodating foreign demands and 
argued, “Interpretations of history diff er across countries. . . .  By demand-
ing changes in Japa nese history textbooks, China and South  Korea are in-
terfering with Japan’s domestic aff airs.”105
In spite of the controversy over history textbooks in the 1980s, the LDP 
stepped up its eff ort to legitimate an offi  cial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Th e Council of Diet Members to Honor War Gods, the Association of 
Diet Members for Bereaved Families, and the Association of Diet Members 
for Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Together joined forces to press Prime Min-
ister Nakasone Yasuhiro to offi  cially visit the shrine.106 While Nakasone 
visited the shrine on annual festivals as well as on the anniversary of the Asia- 
Pacifi c War’s end, he was careful not to refer to his visits as “offi  cial” and 
avoided spending government funds to pay visit- related expenses.
To fi  nally make an offi  cial visit on the fortieth anniversary of the war’s 
end, Nakasone created the Commission on Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
by Cabinet Members (Kakuryō no Yasukuni Jinja Sanpai Mondai ni kan-
suru Kondankai) in August 1984. Th e commission published its fi nal re-
port on August 9, 1985, concluding that an offi  cial visit was pos si ble within 
the framework of the constitution.107 In addition, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Fujinami Takao issued a statement on August 14, explaining that Prime 
Minister Nakasone’s offi  cial visit should not be interpreted as validating 
 Japan’s past aggression; on the contrary, Fujinami argued, “We are deeply 
aware that we caused  great pains and damages to many  people in the world, 
especially in Asia. Our determination not to repeat such an act . . .  guides 
our offi  cial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. We  will continue to make eff orts 
to help other countries understand the intention of our offi  cial visit, to honor 
war dead and pray for world peace.”108
Despite  these eff orts to preempt international criticism, the Chinese 
government still warned of pos si ble consequences of Nakasone’s planned 
visit: “If Prime Minister Nakasone and other cabinet members visit the 
Yasukuni Shrine, their act  will harm feelings of  people around the world, 
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especially Chinese and Japa nese  people who suff ered greatly from milita-
rism, for the shrine honors war criminals like Tōjō Hideki.”109 Neverthe-
less, Nakasone proceeded with his visit on August  15. As Japan’s prime 
minister, he used government funds to pay off erings for the fi rst time.  After 
his visit, Nakasone held a press conference and stated, “Of course, it was an 
offi  cial visit. I am convinced that the majority of Japa nese citizens support 
a prime minister’s offi  cial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. . . .  My visit  will 
never resurrect prewar militarism, extreme nationalism, and national Shin-
toism. I  will make eff orts to help foreign countries understand the true in-
tention of my visit.”110
Galvanized by Naksone’s action, university students in Beijing protested 
against “Japa nese militarism” and “visits to the Yasukuni Shrine” on Sep-
tember 18, the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident. Protests spread to 
other major cities and continued  until October.111 Opposition parties in 
 Japan also strongly criticized Nakasone’s offi  cial visit. JSP member Doi 
Takako spearheaded the criticism as follows: “In the past, Japan infl icted 
enormous damages on China and the  whole of Asia. Victim countries  will 
never forget it. So, what  will they think of an offi  cial visit to the shrine that 
honors  those who  were prosecuted and punished as war criminals?”112 In No-
vember and December, Japa nese bereaved families critical of Nakasone’s 
offi  cial visit also fi led lawsuits arguing that his offi  cial visit had  violated the 
constitutional separation of religion and state.113
While exploring how Nakasone could continue his offi  cial visit with-
out incurring international and domestic criticism, some LDP members 
considered the possibility of removing the Class A war criminals from the 
shrine. For example, Itagaki Tadashi, an LDP member and son of Itagaki 
Seishirō— one of the seven executed Class A war criminals— tried to con-
tact bereaved families of the other Class A war criminals, hoping that they 
might agree to remove their  family members from the Yasukuni Shrine. 
When Itagaki talked to Tōjō Teruo, a son of Tōjō Hideki, in November 
1985, however, the latter argued that such a move would mean accepting 
the “victor’s justice” of the Tokyo Trial and, thus, he could not allow it for 
the sake of his  father.114 Yasukuni priests also categorically rejected the pos-
sibility of removing the Class A war criminals on religious grounds, insist-
ing it was “impossible to remove a person who has been already enshrined 
as a god.”115
In the end, Nakasone deci ded not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine again. 
To explain the decision, Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotōda Masaharu issued 
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a statement on August 14, 1986: “Since the Yasukuni Shrine honors the so- 
called ‘Class A war criminals,’ the last year’s offi  cial visit drew criticisms 
from  people in neighboring countries who had suff ered enormous pains and 
damages from acts of our country in the past. Th is  will risk causing mis-
understandings and distrust between Japan and neighboring countries . . . 
and  will not serve our national interests and, ultimately, the wish of war dead, 
to promote friendship with other  peoples.”116
By the mid-1980s, then, the Japa nese government had to negotiate the 
opposing demands: that is, South Korean and Chinese calls to commemorate 
how they had suff ered from Japan’s past wrongdoings, and nationalist insis-
tence inside Japan that the government reject such foreign demands. As a re-
sult, even though the LDP had suffi  cient mobilizing structures and controlled 
the government, its attempt to strengthen nationalism in Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration— through prime ministers’ actions and history education— 
did not succeed. In fact, thanks to the international pressure, Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration became less nationalist, in that a prime ministerial visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine was suspended. Instead, it became more cosmopolitan 
 because the government introduced the new textbook- inspection criterion 
to increase descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks.
New Developments in Japan’s Relations with 
South  Korea and China
Notwithstanding the controversies over Japa nese history textbooks and the 
Yasukuni Shrine, Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China continued 
to develop. In January 1983, Nakasone Yasuhiro visited South  Korea as soon 
as he was appointed prime minister,  because he wanted to underscore the 
importance of Asia for Japan’s diplomacy. Nakasone also succeeded in in-
viting South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan to Japan in September 
1984— the fi rst time any South Korean president had visited Japan. At the 
welcome dinner party for Chun, Nakasone expressed his “deep regret” ( fu-
kai ikan) for “serious damages that Japan infl icted on your country and 
 people” and stated Japan’s determination not to repeat the past wrongdo-
ings.117 Similarly, Emperor Hirohito expressed his “regret (ikan) for the un-
fortunate past” between the two countries.118
Around the same time, Japa nese and South Korean NGOs continued 
to cooperate in pressing the Japa nese government to off er relief for South 
Korean A- bomb victims. Japa nese NGOs formed the Hiroshima Commit-
tee for Providing Medical Treatment for South Korean A- Bomb Victims in 
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Japan (Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Jikkōiinkai) in Au-
gust 1984 to raise money for South Korean A- bomb victims to travel to 
 Japan and stay in hospitals for an indefi nite period for medical treatment.119 
Th e South Korean A- Bomb Victims Association and its Japa nese support-
ers also contacted the  Human- Rights Protection Committee of the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations in April 1986 and requested the federation’s 
help in lobbying the Japa nese government.  After the federation conducted 
an investigation in South  Korea, it submitted a report to Nakasone’s gov-
ernment, requesting the extension of the 1980 agreement, wherein the Japa-
nese government had promised to invite South Korean A- bomb victims for 
medical treatment in Japan.120
Th e transnational network of NGOs, however, could not change the 
Japa nese government’s position. Th e 1980 agreement expired in 1985, and 
the Japa nese government took no further action to address the situation of 
South Korean A- bomb victims. To mobilize more support for South Ko-
rean A- bomb victims, Japa nese NGOs or ga nized a two- day symposium, to 
which they invited Shin Yong Su and two other A- bomb victims from South 
 Korea. At the symposium, South Korean A- bomb victims, Japa nese jour-
nalists, and representatives of major Japa nese NGOs supporting A- bomb 
victims gave pre sen ta tions and exchanged opinions. At the end of the sym-
posium, the participants  adopted a joint resolution to press the Japa nese 
government to take appropriate action for South Korean A- bomb victims: 
“When we think about Japan’s ‘negative history ( fu no rekishi)’ vis- à- vis the 
‘Hiroshima- Nagasaki’ experience, we cannot but feel the  great weight of 
our task as Japa nese citizens. . . .  Th is prob lem [of South Korean A- bomb 
victims] is a very serious one— part of ‘unfulfi lled responsibility for the 
war’— that the Japa nese government must resolve as soon as pos si ble.”121 
 After the symposium, the Japa nese participants created the Citizen Council 
for South Korean A- Bomb Victims (Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin 
Kaigi) to help South Korean A- bomb victims obtain compensation from the 
Japa nese government. Along with  these NGOs, opposition parties also ral-
lied  behind South Korean A- bomb victims and demanded that the Japa nese 
government resume medical treatment of South Korean A- bomb victims 
at Japa nese hospitals.122
In addition to the A- bomb victims,  there  were many other victims of 
Japan’s past wrongdoings in South  Korea, and they had been dissatisfi ed with 
the way both the Japa nese and South Korean governments had dealt with 
the issue of compensation.  After the 1965 normalization, Park Chun Hee’s 
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government created a law in January 1971 to provide compensation for  those 
who had lost fi nancial assets, as well as for military- related personnel who 
had died during the war; however, this compensation scheme excluded in-
jured veterans, bereaved families, and other types of war victims. Moreover, 
while Park’s government had created a committee to pro cess compensation 
claims by eligible South Korean citizens, the procedure had been not only 
complicated but also short- lived, as it was eff ective for only eleven months. 
 After all, Park’s government spent less than 6  percent of the three hundred 
million US dollars that it had received from the Japa nese government in lieu 
of compensation for war- related damages.123 To protest against the narrow 
coverage and limited amount of compensations, South Korean war victims 
formed the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of 
the  Pacifi c War in April 1973 and lobbied Park’s government to expand the 
compensation scheme.124
Th is discontent among South Korean victims intersected with growing 
nationalistic sentiments from both below and above. From below, as sociolo-
gist Shin Gi- Wook pointed out, the democ ratization movement in the 1980s 
drew on the ethnic- nationalist concept of the “Korean  people” in order to ar-
ticulate its demo cratic, popu lar demands against military dictatorship.125 
South  Korea’s economic success and hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics 
also stimulated national pride. From above, Chun Doo Hwan’s government 
signifi cantly revised its offi  cial history textbook in 1982 to include extensive 
descriptions of the Korean in de pen dence movement and re sis tance against 
Japan’s colonial rule.126 Th is new history education aimed to emphasize the 
legitimacy of the current government as a culmination of the long strug gle of 
the Korean  people, appeal to ethnic- nationalist sentiments among citizens, 
and defl ect the discontent in the contentious civil society.127 As part of this 
legitimation eff ort, Chun’s government also began the construction of the 
In de pen dence Hall of  Korea in anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of 
the country’s liberation: completed in 1987, the hall commemorated the his-
tory of the Korean nation by highlighting the brutalities of Japan’s colonial 
rule and war time atrocities vis- à- vis the heroism of the Korean re sis tance. On 
the forty- fi rst anniversary of liberation in August 1986, Chun also delivered 
a speech stating, “We still cannot calm our anger at the past aggression by 
Japa nese imperialism. Th e foreign oppression not only gave us our greatest 
pain and shame but also became the root cause of our divided nation.”128
Similarly, relations between Japan and China  were characterized by the 
growth of positive interactions in conjunction with the surge of nationalist 
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commemoration in China. On the one hand, once the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship was ratifi ed in 1978, the bilateral relations made rapid pro gress. 
In December 1979, Prime Minister Ōhira Masahiro visited China and an-
nounced the Japa nese government’s plan to provide China with offi  cial 
development aid (ODA), a total of 330.9 billion yen, to help fi nance Chi-
na’s developmental proj ects between 1979 and  1984.129 Ōhira’s visit was 
reciprocated by Hua Guofeng’s visit to Japan in May 1980, the fi rst such 
visit by any Chinese premier. Th e Japa nese and Chinese governments also 
signed a series of agreements on steel mills, fi sheries, natu ral resources, 
infrastructures, and soft loans to facilitate the development of the Chi-
nese economy.130
In addition, more and more municipalities in Japan and China began 
to sign friendship agreements to facilitate civic exchanges. Between 1978 
and 1988, the number of  sister- city agreements increased from two to 
115, including Tokyo- Beijing and Hiroshima- Chongqing.131 Along with 
municipal- level interactions, cultural and educational exchanges  were pro-
moted based on the Agreement for the Promotion of Cultural Exchange in 
December 1979 and the Agreement for Cooperation in Science and Tech-
nology in May 1980. Given  these agreements, Japa nese and Chinese sports 
teams competed at friendly matches, museums loaned artifacts to each other, 
and exchange programs for students and researchers  were established—
in the name of the promotion of friendship and mutual understanding be-
tween the two countries.132
On the other hand, the Chinese government started “patriotic educa-
tion” in the early 1980s, as the country was  going through signifi cant social 
changes. Th e Cultural Revolution had caused the Chinese  people’s trust in 
the Chinese Communist Party to decline. Th en, Deng Xiaoping took over 
the party leadership and began to implement economic reforms. But the eco-
nomic reforms that introduced market princi ples into China undermined 
existing economic and social structures, creating a greater desire among 
 people for a Western- style liberal democracy, especially university students. 
To contain  these destabilizing consequences of the Cultural Revolution and 
economic reforms, the Chinese government tried to strengthen  people’s 
loyalty to the party. In 1981,  People’s Daily began to publish a number of 
articles about vari ous patriotic educational programs across the country 
and, in July 1982, called for a nationwide campaign for patriotic educa-
tion in the article, titled “Love the Communist Party of China, Love the 
Socialist Fatherland, Love the  People’s Liberation Army.”133 Deng’s gov-
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ernment also expanded on its assertive response to Japa nese history text-
books in 1982 and recommended that patriotic education should be 
strengthened.134
Moreover, the Chinese government constructed the Nanjing Massacre 
Memorial Hall, the Museum of the Criminal Evidence of Unit 731 Bacte-
ria Troop, and other museums across China in 1985 in order to commemo-
rate Chinese victims of Japan’s past aggression and celebrate China’s victory 
over Japan on the fortieth anniversary. Th e growing commemoration of 
Japan’s past wrongdoings departed from the earlier, more benign commem-
orative position of the Chinese government. Th is change refl ected the govern-
ment’s decision to designate reunifi cation of China as one of its main policy 
goals in January 1980. Accordingly, China’s offi  cial commemoration shifted 
the blame for the suff ering of the Chinese  people from the Kuomintang to 
Japan.135 Moreover, the government signifi cantly increased descriptions of 
 Japan’s war time atrocities, especially the Nanjing Massacre, in national history 
textbooks in 1986.136 Th en, to mark the fi ftieth anniversary of the outbreak of 
the Second Sino- Japanese War, the Chinese government opened the Museum 
of the War of Chinese  People’s Re sis tance Against Japa nese Aggression near 
Marco Polo Bridge in July 1987.
Concurrently, the Chinese government began to support public com-
memorations of the Nanjing Massacre and Japan’s war time atrocities.137 
During the early 1960s, historians at Nanjing University, given the strong 
interest among local residents, had already conducted two years of interviews 
with survivors of the massacre and produced a document.138 Th e Chinese 
government, however, had not allowed the document to be published, not 
only  because the government’s commemorative position  toward Japan was 
benign, but also  because the government was unwilling to revisit the his-
tory of a weak China humiliated by foreign powers.139 But in the 1980s, 
government research institutions collaborated with history professors in 
Nanjing to or ga nize scattered historical materials in local and national 
archives, and they produced a series of publications on the Nanjing Mas-
sacre.140 With regard to other war time atrocities, too, scholars, museum 
curators, writers, and journalists across China began to conduct and publi-
cize their historical research along the lines of the Chinese government’s 
offi  cial commemoration.141 Th us,  under Deng’s leadership, the Chinese gov-
ernment began to direct public commemorations of the Asia- Pacifi c War to 
garner popu lar support for the Communist Party as a savior of the Chinese 
 people from the Japa nese aggressors.
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The Beginning of the History Prob lem
During the period between 1965 and 1988, Japan’s offi  cial commemoration 
came to adopt the cosmopolitan logic in a limited way. Japa nese prime min-
isters expressed “deep regret” and “reproach” for Japan’s past wrongdoings 
against South  Korea and China. Th e compensation policy for A- bomb vic-
tims was partially extended to South Koreans. Descriptions of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings in history textbooks also increased, and the textbook- inspection 
criteria  were modifi ed to take into account foreign perspectives.  Th ese small 
changes  were driven primarily by transnational interactions: the Japa nese 
prime ministers’ contrite speech acts took place when meeting with leaders 
of the South Korean and Chinese governments, and criticisms from South 
 Korea and China prompted the changes in Japa nese history textbooks. Sim-
ilarly, the compensation policy for A- bomb victims was initiated by Japa-
nese and South Korean NGOs supporting South Korean A- bomb victims.
 Th ese changes remained small  because the mobilizing structures of cos-
mopolitan commemoration, including the JSP and NGOs affi  liated with 
A- bomb victims,  were much weaker than their nationalist counter parts. 
 Although the proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration succeeded in 
stopping the Yasukuni Shrine from being renationalized, they  were unable 
to make Japan’s offi  cial commemoration decisively more cosmopolitan 
 because they lacked direct access to the government. Th e LDP, backed by the 
Japan Bereaved Families Association and other conservative NGOs, contin-
ued to single- handedly control the government and defend the nationalist 
logic of commemoration, rejecting the Tokyo Judgment. Nevertheless,  these 
small changes demonstrated infl uences of transnational interactions on Ja-
pan’s offi  cial commemoration. Despite its robust mobilizing structures and 
po liti cal dominance, the LDP government— a defender of nationalist 
commemoration— had to incorporate cosmopolitanism into Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration. Put another way, the transnational interactions added an 
international dimension to po liti cal opportunities, constraining the LDP 
government’s attempt to maintain its nationalist commemoration.142
Most signifi cant changes during this period, however, happened at the 
subterranean level rather than at the offi  cial level. Japa nese A- bomb victims 
and affi  liated NGOs began to articulate the cosmopolitan logic of com-
memoration more forcefully than before by encompassing foreign victims 
of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Concurrently, nationalistic sentiments began 
to develop in South  Korea and China, partly engineered by the govern-
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ments and partly springing up spontaneously from citizens. Th is growth of 
nationalism in the two countries fed into, as well as was fed by, their com-
memorations of Japan’s past aggression, war time atrocities, and colonial 
rule.  Th ese subterranean changes did not yet infl uence Japan’s offi  cial com-
memoration, but they  were ready to galvanize the history prob lem in East 
Asia. At this juncture, two historic events happened that changed the dy-
namic of the history prob lem at both domestic and international levels: the 
death of Emperor Hirohito and the end of the Cold War.
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Apologies and Denunciations, 1989–1996
Emperor Hirohito became seriously ill in September 1988, prompting tele-
vi sion programs and newspapers to report his condition daily, including 
changes in his temperature and pulse. When the emperor fell into critical 
condition on January 7, 1989, all the broadcasting stations in Japan began 
airing special programs on the history of “Shōwa,” his reign since 1928. Th e 
special media coverage continued through January 8 when the emperor died.
Ever since SCAP and Japa nese leaders had shielded the emperor from 
prosecution at the Tokyo Trial, it had been taboo to openly question his re-
sponsibility for the Asia- Pacifi c War. Th e special programs that aired be-
tween January 7 and 8, too, focused on positive aspects of the emperor’s 
reign. Nevertheless, the emperor’s imminent death had prompted a small 
number of Japa nese citizens to critically revisit the Shōwa period. In 1988, 
NGOs across Japan or ga nized symposiums and seminars to explore the em-
peror’s war responsibility.  Th ese NGOs included pacifi sts critical of the 
emperor’s role in the war, activists who questioned Japa nese mass media for 
emphasizing positive aspects of the emperor’s reign, as well as Christians 
who feared that funeral ceremonies following the emperor’s death would 
marginalize non- Shinto religious minorities in Japan.1
Among  these critical voices, one in Nagasaki City stirred a nationwide 
controversy. At the Nagasaki City Council in December 1988, JCP mem-
ber Shibata Sunao asked LDP mayor Motoshima Hitoshi, “Do you think 
we could have avoided the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki if 
the emperor had deci ded to end the war sooner?” In his response, Motoshima 
acknowledged that the emperor could have done so and stated, “In light of 
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my experience of serving in the military and involving in military educa-
tion, I think the emperor shares war responsibility (sensō sekinin).”2 Moto-
shima’s statement infuriated his fellow LDP members and right- wing 
organ izations. Th e LDP Nagasaki Prefectural Association immediately de-
manded that Motoshima retract his statement. Members of right- wing 
organ izations also came to Nagasaki City Hall en masse, used loud speak-
ers to denounce Motoshima, and sent him several death threats.
Yet, Motoshima maintained his position.  After barely surviving an as-
sassination attempt, he spoke at the 1990 Peace Memorial Ceremony and 
called for “apologies” (shazai) to “Korean and Chinese  people who  were forc-
ibly taken to Japan, treated inhumanely  under Japan’s brutal colonial rule, 
and killed by the atomic bomb.”3 Th is was the fi rst time  either Nagasaki or 
Hiroshima City had offi  cially commemorated foreign A- bomb victims in 
relation to Japan’s past wrongdoings. In August 1991, Hiraoka Takashi, a 
former Chūgoku shinbun reporter newly elected as Hiroshima City mayor, 
followed Motoshima’s example and stated, “Japan caused enormous suff er-
ings and sorrows among  people in Asia- Pacifi c through its colonial rule and 
war. We are sorry for it (moushiwakenaku omou).” 4 In his 1991 peace decla-
ration, Motoshima went further to commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings 
in greater detail: “Our country had forcefully annexed  Korea, waged the 
Fifteen- Year War in China, and fought the Pacifi c War that led to the atomic 
bombing of Nagasaki and, eventually, Japan’s defeat. We must refl ect on 
 these wars with the feeling of remorse from the bottom of our heart. We 
must also pray for both Japa nese and foreign victims and think about how 
we can off er atonement.”5
Importantly, it was not only the critically minded mayors, Hiraoka and 
Motoshima, who transformed the offi  cial commemoration of the atomic 
bombings. Th e transformation was also prompted by residents in the two 
cities that had participated in the transnational network to demand that the 
Japa nese government commemorate South Korean and Chinese victims. 
Such demand was intensifying as the fi ftieth anniversary of the Asia- Pacifi c 
War’s end approached. For example, NGOs supporting A- bomb victims or-
ga nized multiple symposiums on Japan’s past wrongdoings in Hiroshima 
in summer 1990, one year  after the emperor’s death. One of the symposiums 
was hosted by the Japan Congress Against A- and H- Bombs (Gensuikin) 
affi  liated with the JSP. At the symposium, Iwamatsu Shigetoshi, a Japa nese 
A- bomb victim from Nagasaki, bowed his head and off ered a “deep apology” 
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( fukai owabi) to foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. He explained 
that he had come to realize that “without thorough self- criticism of Japan’s 
atrocious crime, the invasion of the Asia- Pacifi c, our antinuclear movement 
would be a sham.” 6
Th e death of the emperor thus reinforced the commemorations in Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki that tried to atone for Japan’s past wrongdoings. At 
the same time,  these cosmopolitan commemorations of foreign victims  were 
stimulated by the end of the Cold War that created the optimistic atmo-
sphere for greater international cooperation as well as complicated Japan’s 
relations with South  Korea and China.
The Changing Structure of International Po liti cal Opportunities
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Japa nese government had tried to 
strengthen Japan’s position in world politics, given its growing economic 
power. In this regard, Nakasone Yasuhiro’s contrite gestures  toward South 
 Korea and China— the expression of “deep regret” and the suspension of a 
prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine— had been motivated by his 
nationalist ambition to remove the history prob lem as an obstacle prevent-
ing Japan from becoming a regional leader.7 Continuing the eff ort to in-
crease Japan’s international infl uence, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki showed 
further contrition when South Korean president Roh Tae Woo visited 
 Japan in May 1990: “By sincerely refl ecting on the fact that  people in  Korea 
experienced enormous suff erings and sorrows  because of our country’s acts 
during a certain period of the past, I would like to clearly express my apol-
ogy (owabi no kimochi).”8 Kaifu’s word choice suggested a more explicit 
acknowl edgment of Japan’s past wrongdoings than his pre de ces sors. Prime 
Minister Nakasone and Emperor Hirohito, for example, had used only the 
word “regret” (ikan) during President Chun Doo Hwan’s visit to Japan in 
September 1984.9 During the summit meeting, Kaifu also promised to of-
fer four billion Japa nese yen to subsidize medical treatment for South Ko-
rean A- bomb victims as well as to assist with the construction of a medical 
center for A- bomb victims in South  Korea.10
Kaifu’s government found another opportunity to raise Japan’s inter-
national standing in August 1990 when the Iraqi military invaded Kuwait. 
While the UN Security Council condemned Iraq’s aggression and imposed 
economic sanctions, Iraq continued to occupy Kuwait. In response, the 
United States deployed its troops into Saudi Arabia and called for a co ali-
tion force to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. Th e United States fi rst re-
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quested that the Japa nese government provide fi nancial support for the UN 
co ali tion force and deploy the Self- Defense Forces (SDF). But the majority 
of Japa nese citizens did not support sending troops overseas  because Article 
9 of the constitution, renouncing war as a sovereign right, had become in-
tegral to postwar Japa nese identity as a pacifi st nation. Many LDP mem-
bers, too,  were unsure about overseas deployment of the SDF  because of the 
constitutional restrictions.11 Kaifu’s government therefore deci ded not to 
send the SDF but to off er 13.5 billion dollars to support operations of the 
co ali tion force.
Th is prompted the United States and the UN co ali tion force to criti-
cize Japan for trying to buy out the lives of its troops. Th is international 
criticism shocked LDP members, who had opposed the SDF’s overseas 
deployment on constitutional grounds. Since LDP members feared that 
Japan would lose its international standing, they eagerly sought a way 
to authorize the SDF to join peacekeeping operations  after the Gulf War. 
In October 1990, Kaifu’s government submitted to the Diet the Bill on 
Cooperation for the UN Peacekeeping Operations, also known as the 
PKO Bill, to authorize the SDF to join UN peacekeeping operations 
outside Japan.12
Th e JSP and the JCP denounced the bill as a violation of the constitu-
tion. Th e LDP was unable to overcome the determined opposition  because it 
had lost the majority in the House of Councillors during the 1989 election. 
Instead of creating a new law, Kaifu’s government deci ded to rely on the ex-
isting law and authorized the SDF to be deployed to the Gulf region in 
April 1991. Th is action drew strong criticism not only from the opposi-
tion parties and antiwar NGOs in Japan, but also from other Asian coun-
tries along the route that the SDF had to take to arrive in the Gulf region. 
Indeed, the year 1991 marked the fi ftieth anniversary of Japan’s attacks 
on the Allied powers in Southeast Asia and on Pearl Harbor. To pacify 
criticisms from abroad, Kaifu visited member states of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from late April through early May. In 
Singapore, Kaifu gave a speech, expressing his “strong feeling of remorse 
(kibishiku hansei) for our country’s act that caused unbearable suff ering and 
grief among many  people in the Asia- Pacifi c region.”13 Prime Minister of 
Singapore Goh Chok Tong, however, expressed his concern about the grow-
ing role of Japan in the region.14 Former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew also 
argued that many  people in Asia did not want Japan to join peacekeeping 
operations  because allowing the overseas deployment of the SDF was “like 
78     Chapter 3
giving a choco late fi lled with whisky to an alcoholic”— that is, like giving 
more military power to a country unapologetic for its past wrongdoings.15 In 
addition, though acknowledging Japan’s eff ort to join international peace-
keeping, South  Korea’s Foreign Ministry expressed concerns, given Korean 
 people’s “tragic experience [of Japan’s aggression] in the past.”16
Despite  these criticisms, the Japa nese government proceeded to deploy 
the SDF to the Gulf region and tried again to pass the PKO Bill in 1992, 
when the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia was established to man-
age a transition from civil war to democracy. Since peacekeeping operations 
in Cambodia  were unlikely to involve combat, Kōmeitō and the Demo-
cratic Socialist Party, though previously opposed to the 1990 PKO Bill, 
agreed to support the LDP this time. Th e other opposition parties, how-
ever, continued to criticize the bill. JSP member Itō Masatoshi faulted the 
LDP government, now headed by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, for 
having off ered “neither apologies nor compensation for  people that Japan 
victimized through its colonial rule and war of aggression. Such a country 
sending troops abroad is unacceptable for international society, which in-
cludes Asian  peoples.”17 JCP member Kodama Kenji similarly criticized 
Miyazawa’s government for “sending our country’s troops to Asia again, 
even though the Japa nese government has not apologized for the war of 
 aggression or resolved postwar disputes.”18 In the end, the PKO Bill was 
passed in June 1992 with the support from Kōmeitō and the Demo cratic 
Socialist Party.
Th e controversy surrounding the PKO Bill showed that the structure 
of po liti cal opportunities had changed in the post– Cold War period since 
it increasingly acquired an international dimension. In the immediate af-
termath of the Asia- Pacifi c War, conservative politicians in power had been 
able to promote nationalism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration without wor-
rying about reactions from abroad. Th is had begun to change  after the 
normalization of Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China, and the end 
of the Cold War accelerated the internationalization of po liti cal opportuni-
ties. Th e LDP thus faced a diffi  cult dilemma: if it wanted to boost national 
pride by raising Japan’s international standing through peacekeeping oper-
ations and other means, it had to make more contrite, cosmopolitan ges-
tures  toward other countries or at least tone down its nationalism. Th is 
dilemma deepened when “comfort  women” (ianfu) became a diplomatic is-
sue with South  Korea in the midst of the national debate on the SDF’s over-
seas deployment.
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The “Comfort  Women” Controversy between Japan and South  Korea
“Comfort  women”  were  those who had provided “sexual ser vices” to the 
Japa nese military during the Asia- Pacifi c War. Th e military originally had 
set up “comfort stations” (ianjo) to prevent Japa nese soldiers from raping 
Chinese  women and contracting sexually transmitted diseases. Th e military 
had entrusted private contractors to recruit comfort  women and manage 
comfort stations. Comfort  women had been recruited from both Japan and 
its colonies, such as  Korea and Taiwan. Some  women had agreed to work at 
comfort stations, whereas  others had been forced by deception or coercion. 
 After Japan had started war with the Allied powers in December 1941 and 
occupied Southeast Asia, the military had increased its involvement in re-
cruitment, with methods that became increasingly coercive. By 1942, about 
four hundred comfort stations had been set up across Asia.19
Comfort  women fi rst became widely known in South  Korea in Janu-
ary 1990, when Yun Jeong Ok, an En glish professor at Ewha  Womans 
University, serialized her reports in the newspaper Th e Hankyoreh. Th en, in 
October, a total of thirty- seven  women’s associations, including Korean 
Church  Women United, submitted a petition to the Japa nese government. 
In their petition, the associations demanded that the Japa nese government 
should (1) acknowledge the fact that the government forced Korean  women 
to serve as comfort  women for the Japa nese military, (2) off er an offi  cial apol-
ogy, (3) investigate all facts related to the military- administered system 
of comfort  women, (4) erect a memorial for victims, (5) compensate for-
mer comfort  women and their bereaved families, and (6) incorporate facts 
about comfort  women in Japa nese history education so as not to repeat the 
same wrong in the  future.20
In November 1990,  these  women’s associations formed the Korean 
Council for the  Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan.21 In 
December, JSP member Shimizu Sumiko, one of the contacts for the Ko-
rean Council, asked how the Japa nese government was  going to respond to 
the petition. An offi  cial from the Ministry of  Labor refused to admit gov-
ernment involvement, citing a lack of evidence: “Our ministry has no doc-
umentation about Korean comfort  women in the military. We also checked 
with  people who used to work at the Ministry of Welfare . . .  but they told 
us  there was no government involvement.”22 According to the government, 
private contractors had been solely responsible for recruiting comfort  women 
and setting up comfort stations.23
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In the meantime, the Korean Council conducted anonymous interviews 
with former comfort  women as part of its campaign to demand compensa-
tion from the Japa nese government.24 Th en, in December 1990, former com-
fort  women, former soldiers who had served in the Japa nese military during 
the war, and bereaved families— thirty- fi ve South Korean plaintiff s in 
total— fi led a joint lawsuit against the Japa nese government at the Tokyo 
District Court.25 All of the plaintiff s  were members of the Association of 
South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of the  Pacifi c War. With the 
help of Japa nese  lawyers from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 
they demanded that the Japa nese government should off er apologies and 
compensation for the damages that they had suff ered.26 Th e Japa nese gov-
ernment, however, continued to argue that all issues of compensation had 
been resolved upon the 1965 normalization, and that no evidence had been 
found to demonstrate government involvement in the recruitment of com-
fort  women and management of comfort stations.27
Th en, on January 11, 1992, Asahi shinbun reported as top news that 
Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chūō University had found a document at 
the Ministry of Defense Library indicating military involvement in the re-
cruitment of comfort  women.28 Th e document was titled “On Recruiting 
 Women for Military Comfort Stations” (Gunianjo jūgyōfutou boshū ni kan-
suru ken). In this document, the Japa nese military gave its troops an order 
to cooperate with local police to oversee private contractors and prevent them 
from using certain methods of recruitment, such as kidnapping, that could 
harm the reputation of the Japa nese military.29 Th e news came fi ve days be-
fore Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was scheduled to visit South  Korea, 
and was immediately relayed to South  Korea through major tele vi sion and 
radio programs. Th is fueled the growing redress movement in South  Korea. 
On January 15, a day before Miyazawa’s visit to South  Korea, about three 
hundred protesters, including members of the Association of South Korean 
Victims and Bereaved Families of the  Pacifi c War, gathered in front of the 
Japa nese embassy in Seoul and demanded apologies and compensation 
from the Japa nese government.30 In Japan, too,  women’s associations issued 
a statement calling for government compensation for former comfort  women 
and a Diet resolution to off er an apology.31
At the press conference on January 17, President Roh Tae Woo stated 
that the  future of Japan– South  Korea relations should be built on Japan’s 
“correct understanding of and sincere remorse for its past history,” and 
Miyazawa expressed his “sincere apology” (chūshin yori owabi) for former 
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comfort  women who had suff ered from the “hardships beyond words” (hit-
suzetsu ni tsukushigatai shinku).32 Nevertheless, Miyazawa did not promise 
to compensate former comfort  women but only to investigate historical 
facts regarding the issue. Miyazawa’s apology without a promise of compen-
sation only angered South Korean protesters. As one of the former comfort 
 women, Kim Hak Sun, put it, “Simply apologizing means nothing. I would 
like the Japa nese government to fulfi ll its responsibility for compensa-
tion.”33 JSP chairman Tanabe Makoto also criticized Miyazawa’s apology 
as inadequate by arguing, “Apology without compensation is hy poc risy. 
Compensation without apology is strategic calculus. I propose that we dis-
cuss how Japan should compensate and apologize to war victims, including 
former military comfort  women and forced laborers.”34
In the face of the international and domestic criticisms, Miyazawa’s gov-
ernment investigated archives of the vari ous ministries and found 127 doc-
uments related to comfort  women.  Th ese documents showed government 
involvement in the se lection of private contractors and hygienic inspection 
of comfort stations, among other activities. Th e government continued to 
collect historical materials both inside and outside Japan and also interviewed 
sixteen former comfort  women in Seoul.35 In light of the discovered docu-
ments and interviews, Kōno Yōhei, Miyazawa’s chief cabinet secretary, is-
sued the so- called Kōno Statement in August 1993. He acknowledged that 
the government had been involved, directly or indirectly, in the establish-
ment and management of comfort stations and that, in many cases,  women 
had been recruited against their  will. He then went on to state: “Th e Gov-
ernment of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend 
its sincere apologies and remorse to all  those, irrespective of place of origin, 
who suff ered immea sur able pain and incurable physical and psychological 
wounds as comfort  women. . . .  We hereby reiterate our fi rm determination 
never to repeat the same  mistake by forever engraving such issues in our 
memories through the study and teaching of history.”36
Th us, in the early 1990s, the Japa nese government began to commemo-
rate Japan’s past wrongdoings in greater detail, even though the LDP, the 
longtime supporter of nationalist commemoration, continued to control 
the government. Th is change was caused by the growing pressures from the 
transnational network mobilized for comfort  women and other foreign vic-
tims, as well as by the growing constraint of the international dimension of 
po liti cal opportunity. Just as the mobilizing structures and po liti cal oppor-
tunities for cosmopolitan commemoration expanded at the transnational 
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level, an impor tant po liti cal change occurred, pushing Japan’s offi  cial com-
memoration further in the direction of cosmopolitanism: the LDP’s loss 
of power.
A New Opportunity for Cosmopolitan Commemoration
While facing the controversies over Japan’s past wrongdoings, Miyazawa’s 
government was struggling to cope with the worst economic recession since 
1945. Th e LDP was also hit by a high- profi le scandal in October 1992, when 
the Tokyo District public prosecutor’s offi  ce exposed illegal dealings among 
the LDP, the Tokyo Sagawa Express Corporation, and Japa nese yakuza. Th is 
was considered the biggest po liti cal scandal in postwar Japan in terms of 
the amount of illegal monetary dealings and the number of politicians in-
volved. Dissatisfi ed with the way the LDP had tried to downplay the scan-
dal, opposition parties tried to force Miyazawa out of his offi  ce. Even though 
the LDP had a majority in the House of Representatives, a vote of no 
confi dence was  adopted in June 1993, since younger, reform- minded LDP 
members went along with the opposition.37 Instead of resigning, Miyazawa 
dissolved the House of Representatives.
In response, LDP members who had directly or indirectly supported 
the vote of no confi dence left the LDP and formed their own po liti cal parties. 
But the LDP did not lose any more seats at the election in July. Instead, the 
JSP suff ered a considerable loss, decreasing the number of its seats from 137 
to 77,  because many voters deci ded to give the newly formed parties a 
chance, rather than continuing to support the existing opposition.38 Th en, 
 after the election, eight opposition parties agreed to form a co ali tion to se-
cure the majority in the House of Representatives to oust the LDP from 
power.  Th ese parties included the JSP, Kōmeitō, the Demo cratic Socialist 
Party, Sakigake, the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitō), the Japan New Party 
(Nihon Shintō), the Socialist Demo cratic Federation (Shakai Minshu Rengō), 
and the Demo cratic Reform Party (Minshu Kaikaku Rengō).39 On August 9, 
1993, Japan New Party chairman Hosokawa Morihiro became the fi rst 
non- LDP prime minister since 1955, heading the eight- party co ali tion.
As soon as Hosokawa became prime minister, he began revising Japan’s 
offi  cial commemoration. At a press conference on August 10 to outline his 
policy plans, Hosokawa stated that the Asia- Pacifi c War “was a war of ag-
gression (shinryaku sensō), and I see it as a mistaken war (machigatta sensō).” 40 
To be sure, LDP prime minister Nakasone had already admitted in Decem-
ber 1985 that the war was a “mistaken war that Japan should not have 
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started” and that Japan had committed “aggression” against China.41 How-
ever, Hosokawa was the fi rst prime minister to clearly state that Japan had 
waged a war, not simply an act, of aggression. Moreover, at the National 
Memorial Ser vice for the War Dead on August 15, Hosokawa extended his 
“condolences to war victims and their bereaved families beyond national 
borders—to  those in neighboring Asian countries and around the world.” 42 
Again, this was the fi rst time any Japa nese prime minister had commemo-
rated foreign victims at the National Memorial Ser vice. Doi Takako, JSP 
chairperson and speaker of the House of Representatives, also delivered a 
speech reinforcing Hosokawa’s statement: “We have not yet obtained rec-
onciliation with Asian  peoples who suff ered enormously from our past 
 mistake.” 43
Th e LDP immediately criticized Hosokawa for defi ning Japan as the 
sole perpetrator in the Asia- Pacifi c War. On August 11, LDP members from 
the Association of Diet Members for Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Together, 
the Association of Diet Members for Bereaved Families, and the Council 
of Diet Members to Honor War Gods went to the prime minister’s offi  ce 
to demand that Hosokawa retract his statement.  Th ese three associations 
also held a joint meeting on August 13 in which they accused Hosokawa 
of accepting the “Tokyo Trial historical view” that had held Japan solely 
and entirely guilty of the war. At the joint meeting, representatives of 
the Japan Bereaved Families Association and the Association to Honor 
War Gods also requested that the LDP “establish a correct historical view” 
and fi ght against “the historical view poisoned by the Tokyo Trial.” 44
Th e three associations of the LDP Diet members then proceeded to cre-
ate the History Investigation Committee (Rekishi Kentō Iinkai), defi ning 
its purpose as follows: “We cannot overlook the rampage of the one- sided, 
masochistic historical view in the name of remorse for the war, exemplifi ed 
by Prime Minister Hosokawa’s statement on ‘war of aggression’ and the in-
tention of his co ali tion government to ‘express an apology for Japan’s war 
responsibility.’ We are convinced that it is our urgent task to establish the 
Japa nese  people’s own historical view based on undistorted historical facts.” 45 
Beginning in October, the committee began to hold monthly seminars to 
examine historical facts and interpretations of the Greater East Asia War by 
inviting university professors, journalists, and writers critical of the Tokyo 
Trial as guest speakers.
In the face of strong criticism from the LDP, Hosokawa modifi ed the 
wording of his fi rst keynote address in the Diet on August 23, 1993. Instead 
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of “war of aggression,” Hosokawa used “act of aggression” (shinryaku kōi) 
when off ering his apology to foreign victims, and eff ectively retreated to the 
position, previously held by Nakasone, that not all of Japan’s acts had been 
aggressive.46
Nevertheless, LDP members kept criticizing Hosokawa. In early Oc-
tober, the LDP bombarded him with questions about his statement almost 
daily at Diet committee meetings. LDP member Ishihara Shintarō, for 
example, argued that Hosokawa was mistaken in apologizing for the 
Asia- Pacifi c War. Ishihara insisted that Japan had no need to apologize to 
Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States— the imperial pow-
ers that had “engaged in aggressive acts. Colonialism was obviously an ag-
gression and troubled  people in Asia, and they ruled their colonies longer 
than Japan did.” Ishihara continued, “We should apologize to Asian  people, 
but not to the imperial powers we fought against in Asia. . . .  If we are to 
apologize to the Allied powers, our apologies  will have to be mutual. Japan 
suff ered, too. Many civilians  were killed by indiscriminate bombings, 
and 300,000  people have died from the atomic bombings so far. But I have 
never heard of the US government apologizing for  these damages.” In his 
defense, Hosokawa argued that his previous statement on Japan’s “war of 
aggression” was supported by the Tokyo Judgment that Japan had accepted 
as part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ishihara responded by dismissing 
Hosokawa’s argument as an “extremely ridicu lous and masochistic way of 
thinking.” 47
Another LDP member, Itagaki Tadashi, attacked Hosokawa’s defense 
of the Tokyo Judgment, arguing, “Th e so- called Tokyo Trial historical view 
pres ents Japan as solely and entirely wrong. I think this has severely poi-
soned the Japa nese  people’s historical view. . . .  What we should do now is 
to move away from the Tokyo Trial historical view that SCAP tried to re-
lentlessly inculcate in the Japa nese  people.” 48 By rejecting the Tokyo Trial 
historical view, Itagaki off ered his positive appraisal of what Japan had done 
in Asia: “You repeatedly said Japan invaded Asia, but  really, Japan did liber-
ate Asia. Without the Greater East Asia War, could Asia have been liberated 
from colonial rule [by the West]?” 49 Although Hosokawa did not agree 
with Itagaki that the Asia- Pacifi c War was a war of liberation, he eventually 
conceded, “I do not think that the Tokyo Trial was entirely right,  either.”50
In spite of  these criticisms, Hosokawa continued to steer Japan’s offi  -
cial commemoration away from the logic of nationalism that the LDP had 
promoted since the 1950s. When Hosokawa visited South  Korea in Novem-
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ber 1993, he expressed his “heartfelt remorse” (kokoro kara hansei) and of-
fered a “deep apology” ( fukaku chinsha) by acknowledging that Japan’s 
colonial rule had forced Koreans to “adopt Japa nese names, work as ‘com-
fort  women’ and forced laborers.”51 When Hosokawa visited China in 
March 1994, he repeated his “deep remorse and apology” ( fukai hansei to 
owabi) for Japan’s “acts of aggression and colonial rule that brought unbear-
able suff erings and pains to many  people.”52 At the same time, however, 
Hosokawa followed the LDP government’s pre ce dent, to decouple apology 
from compensation for foreign victims, by insisting that the issue of com-
pensation had been resolved upon normalization of diplomatic relations.53
While Hosokawa was promoting cosmopolitan commemoration of for-
eign victims, disagreements among his co ali tion partners grew. In January 
1994, the Po liti cal Reform Bill proposed by Hosokawa’s government was re-
jected in the House of Councillors  because the JSP, one of the co ali tion 
partners, voted against it. Hosokawa was then suspected of illegal mone-
tary dealings, including illegal contributions from the Tokyo Sagawa Ex-
press Corporation. Th e LDP criticized Hosokawa so relentlessly that the Diet 
deliberation was temporarily halted. Hosokawa saw no way out of this dif-
fi cult situation and resigned on April 8, 1994.54
Th e eight parties initially agreed to maintain their co ali tion and selected 
Japan Renewal Party chairman Hata Tsutomu as prime minister. But Hata’s 
co ali tion government was even more fragile than Hosokawa’s. Th e JSP left 
the co ali tion when it became clear that three of the co ali tion members— the 
Japan Renewal Party, Komeitō, and the Demo cratic Socialist Party— were 
scheming to limit the JSP’s infl uence.  After the LDP and the JSP joined 
forces to submit a vote of no confi dence to the House of Representatives, 
Hata resigned in June 1994. At the time of Hata’s resignation, the LDP was 
still the largest party in the Diet, though it did not have the majority in the 
House of Representatives.
To return to power, the LDP made deals with the JSP and the New 
Party Sakigake. Th e JSP agreed to form an alliance with the LDP  after the 
latter off ered Murayama Tomiichi the post of prime minister.55 Th us, on 
June 30, 1994, JSP chairman Murayama became prime minister by form-
ing the three- party co ali tion government. For the fi rst time since 1955, the 
government was headed by the po liti cal party that had pressed for cosmo-
politan commemoration throughout the postwar period. Th is newly gained 
access to the government presented the best po liti cal opportunity for pro-
ponents of cosmopolitanism to change Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. 
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Now, as part of the government, the JSP began to pursue its longstanding 
policy goal, to provide government compensation for A- bomb  victims.
A- bomb Victims as a Focal Point of War- Related Compensation
Th e issue of compensation for A- bomb victims had been gaining momen-
tum in the Diet since the late 1980s. In December 1989, the JSP and fi ve 
other opposition parties had succeeded in passing the Bill on Relief for A- 
Bomb Victims (Genbaku Hibakusha Engo Hōan)— “based on the spirit of 
government compensation (kokka hoshō no seishin ni motozuki)”—in the 
House of Councillors for the fi rst time, though it had been discarded in 
the House of Representatives  because the LDP had refused to extend delib-
eration on the bill to the next Diet session.56 In December 1993, however, 
Hosokawa’s co ali tion government had established the Proj ect Team on the 
Act on Relief for A- Bomb Victims (Hibakusha Engohō ni kansuru Puroje-
kuto Team) by appointing Morii Chūryō, a JSP member from Hiroshima 
Prefecture, as proj ect leader. Th e JSP also had produced its own report pro-
posing to defi ne relief for A- bomb victims as “government compensation.”57 
Th en, a week  after Murayama became prime minister, the proj ect team pub-
lished its fi nal report endorsing a new act on relief for A- bomb victims based 
on the “spirit of government compensation,” comparable to the Act on Re-
lief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families.58
 After taking offi  ce, however, Murayama took a cautious approach to 
the issue of compensation for A- bomb victims: “I am  really concerned about 
the situation of A- bomb victims. But government compensation poses a fun-
damental prob lem in terms of equality between A- bomb victims and other 
civilian victims. So, we need to think about this issue carefully among mem-
bers of the co ali tion government.”59 Murayama and other JSP cabinet 
members became cautious  because the LDP was against government com-
pensation. In fact, the LDP had opposed all sixteen versions of the Bill 
on Relief for A- Bomb Victims that the JSP had previously submitted to 
the Diet.60
Th e LDP’s strong opposition was based on the fact that the entire post-
war framework of commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War depended on 
how to deal with the issue of A- bomb victims. First of all, if the nature of 
relief for A- bomb victims was defi ned as compensatory, the government 
would have to accept its responsibility for having started the Asia- Pacifi c War 
that had led to the atomic bombings. Th is would require the government to 
commemorate the war as wrong for having harmed the lives of Japa nese citi-
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zens. Such commemoration would be unacceptable for the LDP, as well as 
for the Japan Bereaved Families Association,  because they perceived the war 
as a heroic act of self- defense. Second, the government’s compensation scheme 
for war- related damages was predicated on a distinction between military- 
related and civilian populations. Th roughout the postwar period, the gov-
ernment had limited compensation to former military- related personnel and 
their bereaved families as a way to honor their sacrifi ces for the country. If 
the government granted compensation to A- bomb victims who  were civil-
ians, this would legitimate compensation claims from many other civilian 
victims, such as  those who had suff ered from aerial bombings of major Japa-
nese cities by the Allied powers. Last but not least, the government treated 
Japa nese and foreign A- bomb victims equally, so long as the latter resided 
in Japan. Th is was an exception to the government’s compensation scheme 
that required citizenship as part of its eligibility criteria.61 If the government 
compensated A- bomb victims— both Japa nese and non- Japanese— that 
could open the doors to compensation claims by a wide variety of foreign 
victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th is was why the LDP was determined 
to stop the JSP’s attempt to provide government compensation for A- bomb 
victims.
In the end, the JSP accommodated the LDP’s demand, given the latter’s 
numerical dominance: the LDP had 228 and 109 seats in the Houses of 
Representatives and Councillors, respectively, whereas the JSP had 77 
and 73.62 When Murayama’s co ali tion government submitted the Bill Re-
garding Relief for A- bomb Victims (Genshi Bakudan Hibakusha ni taisuru 
Engo ni kansuru Hōritsuan) in November 1994, it included in the bill the 
phrase “government responsibility” (kuni no sekinin), instead of “government 
compensation” (kokka hoshō). Minister of Welfare Ide Shōichi off ered the 
following defi nition of government responsibility: “If we use the phrase ‘gov-
ernment compensation,’  people  will likely interpret it as referring to com-
pensation based on the government’s responsibility for having started the 
war. According to such an interpretation,  there would be vari ous prob lems, 
such as an in equality between A- bomb victims and other civilian war vic-
tims. In light of  these considerations, we agreed not to include the concept 
of ‘government compensation’ in the bill.” 63
Some of the opposition parties immediately challenged the proposed 
bill. Yamamoto Takashi, a member of the Japan New Party, criticized the JSP 
for giving up its longstanding commitment to government compensation for 
A- bomb victims. He also rejected the phrase “government responsibility” as 
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vacuous  because it “best exemplifi es the JSP’s compromise [with the LDP]. 
Th e phrase makes no sense at all. Th e government was already responsible 
for implementing the existing two acts [regarding A- bomb victims].” 64 Kat-
suki Kenji of the Demo cratic Socialist Party also wondered what the JSP 
would do for other civilian war victims: “In the past, the JSP argued that 
the government should compensate civilian victims  because the govern-
ment had mobilized almost all civilians for the war. Th e JSP even proposed 
bills to compensate civilian war victims. . . .  Are you  going to give up the 
Bill on Relief for Civilian Victims of War time Disasters (Senji Saigai Engo 
Hōan)?” In response, Murayama conceded that the JSP had to give up its 
commitment to compensation of civilian war victims  because the JSP was 
now part of the co ali tion government and had to make compromises with 
its co ali tion partners.65
Th us, even though the JSP fi  nally gained access to the government, it 
was unable to change the nationalist logic of postwar Japan’s compensation 
scheme, partly  because its mobilizing structures had weakened, and partly 
 because its control of the government was compromised by the LDP, a power-
ful co ali tion partner. But the po liti cal strug gle over Japan’s offi  cial com-
memoration was not over yet. It only intensifi ed as the fi ftieth anniversary 
of the end of the Asia- Pacifi c War approached.
Ramifi cations of Compromised Apologies and Compensation
When the LDP, the JSP, and the New Party Sakigake formed a co ali tion 
government in June 1994, they agreed to adopt a resolution on the fi fti-
eth anniversary of the war’s end. But the three parties had very diff er ent 
ideas about the resolution. Th e JSP wanted to frame the resolution in 
terms of apology for Japan’s past wrongdoings, whereas the LDP wanted 
a more forward- looking resolution to emphasize Japan’s determination to 
strive for peace while minimizing references to the past.66
To promote their own version of resolution, LDP members created the 
Association of Diet Members for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the War’s End 
(Shūsen Gojūnen Kokkai Giin Renmei) in December 1994. In its statement 
of purpose, the association emphasized the importance of remembering that 
“peace and prosperity that our country enjoys  today is built on two million 
war dead who sacrifi ced their precious lives for defending Japan and peace 
of Asia in the time of the national crisis.” 67 Association president Okuno 
Seiryō also stated that it was senseless for Japan alone to apologize when the 
United States and Rus sia did not apologize for the atomic bombings and 
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the invasion of Manchukuo, respectively.68 Th e association included two 
LDP members of Murayama Tomiichi’s cabinet, Hashimoto Ryūtarō (min-
ister of international trade and industry) and Tamazawa Tokuichirō (direc-
tor general of defense). Nearly half of the LDP Diet members had joined 
the association by March 1995.
Concurrently, the Japan Bereaved Families Association lobbied pre-
fectural councils to adopt resolutions to honor and thank war dead rather 
than to apologize for Japan’s past wrongdoings. By March 1995, eigh teen 
prefectural councils  adopted such resolutions.69 Th e association also launched 
the Citizen Committee on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the War’s End (Shūsen 
Gojūshūnen Kokumin Iinkai) with other NGOs to collect signatures sup-
porting the LDP version of resolution to emphasize Japan’s determination 
to strive for peace.
Given the dominance of the LDP within Murayama’s co ali tion gov-
ernment, the LDP’s position was favored in the Resolution to Renew the 
Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History 
(Rekishi wo Kyōkun ni Heiwa eno Ketsui wo Aratanisuru Ketsugi) submit-
ted to the House of Representatives in early June 1995. Th e proposed reso-
lution stopped short of off ering an “apology,” though it incorporated the 
JSP’s position commemorating Japan’s past wrongdoings. Specifi cally, the 
resolution stated,
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, 
this House off ers its sincere condolences to  those who fell in action and 
victims of wars and similar actions all over the world. Solemnly refl ect-
ing upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the 
modern history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out 
 those acts in the past, infl icting pain and suff ering upon the  peoples of 
other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House express a 
sense of deep remorse. . . .  Th is House expresses its resolve,  under the 
banner of eternal peace enshrined in the Constitution of Japan, to join 
hands with other nations of the world and to pave the way to a  future 
that allows all  human beings to live together.70
Th e resolution passed the House of Representatives in June, but 241 out of 
502 House members boycotted the vote, including fi fty LDP members and 
fourteen JSP members.71 LDP members boycotted the vote  because they 
 were opposed to any resolution regarding the Asia- Pacifi c War, whereas JSP 
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members did so  because they felt the resolution did not go far enough in 
acknowledging Japan’s past wrongdoings.
Since the Diet resolution only expressed “deep remorse,” Murayama 
deci ded to off er his own offi  cial apology as Japan’s prime minister. He con-
sulted with the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs in drafting his statement and 
persuaded LDP members in his cabinet to approve it.72 Given the unan i-
mous approval by his cabinet members, Murayama issued the following apol-
ogy as Japan’s offi  cial position on August 15, 1995:
Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to 
war, only to ensnare the Japa nese  people in a fateful crisis, and, through 
its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suff er-
ing to the  people of many countries, particularly to  those of Asian 
nations. In the hope that no such  mistake be made in the  future, I re-
gard, in a spirit of humility,  these irrefutable facts of history, and ex-
press  here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt 
apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning 
for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.73
In response to Murayama’s apology, government offi  cials across the Asia- 
Pacifi c issued generally positive statements. Australian prime minister Paul 
Keating, Philippine president Fidel Ramos, and White House press secre-
tary Mike McCurry, among  others, welcomed Murayama’s apology and 
stated that it would improve Japan’s relations with former  enemy countries 
in the region.74 South  Korea and China, however, expressed more cautious 
reactions. South  Korea’s Foreign Ministry planned “to carefully observe 
 whether Japan’s subsequent attitude  will support Prime Minister Muraya-
ma’s apology.”75 China’s Foreign Ministry pointed out that “ there are still 
 people in Japa nese politics and society who do not adopt the correct atti-
tude  toward the history prob lem,” though it praised Murayama’s action for 
“expressing deep remorse for Japan’s past colonial rule and aggression and 
off ering an apology to Asian  peoples.”76
In addition to the offi  cial apology, Murayama and other JSP cabinet 
members planned to create a fund for a wide variety of victims of Japan’s 
past wrongdoings, whereby the government and the public would each take 
responsibility for a half of the fund. For the JSP members, this plan was 
meant not to evade the Japa nese government’s war responsibility but to ex-
press genuinely nationwide atonement for foreign victims by enlisting Japa-
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nese citizens. In the end, however, they judged that their plan was infeasible 
both po liti cally and fi nancially. Instead, they deci ded to focus on former 
comfort  women, since this issue had become the center of international con-
troversies in the early 1990s.77
In December 1994, a subcommittee within Murayama’s co ali tion gov-
ernment released the “First Report on the So- called War time Comfort 
 Women Issue,” recommending the establishment of a fund based on con-
tributions from both the government and citizens to off er nationwide atone-
ment for the suff ering of former comfort  women.78 But the report was 
strongly criticized by the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Aff airs and the 
majority of LDP members. Th ey insisted that all issues of compensation had 
been resolved upon normalization of diplomatic relations. Confronted with 
the strong opposition, the JSP again compromised with the LDP. Instead of 
mandating the government to contribute half of the fund as originally pro-
posed, the JSP and the LDP deci ded to hold the government responsible for 
the expenses associated with managing the fund, such as staff  salaries and 
advertising costs. Japa nese citizens, in turn, would be responsible for mak-
ing  actual monetary contributions to be used as “atonement money” (tsugu-
nai kin) for former comfort  women.
In June 1995, Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi Kōzō announced the 
government’s plan for the Asian Peace and Friendship Fund for  Women 
(Josei no tameno Ajia Heiwa Yūkō Kikin). Igarashi explained that the pur-
pose of the fund was “to off er a heartfelt apology for our country’s act that 
infl icted incurable pains on many  women and deeply wounded their honor 
and dignity.” He then summarized the main goals of the fund as follows: 
the fund was to collect donations from the public to off er nationwide atone-
ment for former comfort  women as well as to take responsibility for provid-
ing medical and welfare relief for them through government funding; when 
carry ing out the fund’s activities, the government must clearly express re-
morse and apology for former comfort  women and collect historical mate-
rials related to comfort  women and use them for history education.79 Th e 
fund was offi  cially renamed the Asian  Women’s Fund (Ajia Josei Kikin) and 
launched in July. Promoters of the fund, including well- known university 
professors and former Diet members, published a call for monetary con-
tributions from Japa nese citizens in major national newspapers.
In their call, the promoters frankly admitted disagreements among 
themselves. Some insisted on government compensation, whereas  others 
thought such compensation would be diffi  cult from a  legal point of view. 
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Nevertheless, the promoters  were “unan i mous on one point: we have to 
act as soon as pos si ble  because  little time is left for aging victims.” Th ey 
continued:
We demand that the government should make  every eff ort to uncover 
historical facts and off er a heartfelt apology, so that victims of the “com-
fort  women” system can regain their honor and dignity. . . .  But the 
most impor tant  thing, we believe, is that as many Japa nese citizens as 
pos si ble  will face the suff ering of the victims and express atonement from 
the bottom of their hearts. . . .  Prewar Japan created “war time comfort 
 women.” But Japan is not a country owned solely by the government. 
Japan is a country created by  every citizen who inherits the past, lives in 
the pres ent, and envisions the  future.
Th e promoters thus called for “atonement by the  whole of Japa nese citizenry” 
(zenkokuminteki tsugunai).80
Within a year, the Asian  Women’s Fund collected about four hundred 
million yen from Japa nese citizens. Th e fund then began negotiations with 
fi ve governments that offi  cially acknowledged the existence of former com-
fort  women in their countries: the Netherlands, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
South  Korea, and Taiwan. Th e fund planned to off er two million yen for 
each former comfort  woman, as well as diff er ent amounts of medical and 
welfare support according to living standards of diff er ent countries. In ad-
dition, members of the fund planned to deliver atonement money with a 
“letter of apology” (owabi no tegami) signed by Japan’s prime minister, which 
included the following statements: “I, Japan’s Prime Minister, off er a heart-
felt apology and express remorse for all former military comfort  women who 
suff ered  great pains and incurable physical and  mental wounds. We  shall 
not evade our responsibility for the past and the  future. Our country must 
embrace moral responsibility, take our apology and remorse seriously, and 
confront our past and teach it to  future generations.”81
From the very beginning, however, the Asian  Women’s Fund received 
heavy criticism from both Japa nese and foreign NGOs that supported for-
mer comfort  women. Th e most intense criticism came from South  Korea. 
All prominent  women’s NGOs in South  Korea, including the Korean 
Council for the  Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan and 
the Korean Church  Women United, rejected the fund. Th e Korean 
Council president Yun Jeong Ok criticized it as the Japa nese govern-
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ment’s “attempt to evade its responsibility for the crime [the comfort 
 women system] by asking Japa nese citizens to contribute donations. . . . 
Th e fund  will not resolve the victims’ resentment (han). It  will not liber-
ate Japan from the crime that its government committed,  either.”82 Th en, 
in December 1995, Japa nese and foreign NGOs or ga nized an interna-
tional conference, where they rejected atonement money from Japa nese 
citizens and demanded government compensation.83 In short, instead of 
resolving the controversy over former comfort  women, the Asian  Women’s 
Fund galvanized it.
Growing Strains in Japan’s Relations with China
Relations between Japan and China, by contrast,  were friendly on the sur-
face.  After the Chinese military suppressed the democ ratization movement 
in June 1989, the United States and many other countries, especially in West-
ern Eu rope, condemned the Chinese government and imposed sanctions. 
Th e Japa nese government, too, suspended its loans to China but made an 
eff ort not to isolate China in international society. In August 1989, only two 
months  after the Tian anmen Square protests, the Japa nese government re-
sumed its loans to China and, a month  later, delegates of the Alliance of 
Diet Members for Japan- China Friendship visited Beijing.84 Th en, Prime 
Minister Kaifu Toshiki visited China in August 1991, reciprocated by Gen-
eral Secretary Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in April 1992.  Th ese diplomatic 
exchanges between the two countries culminated in Emperor Akihito’s 
visit to China in October 1992 to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of 
normalization.
On  these occasions, both the Japa nese and Chinese sides minimized 
references to their past confl ict and emphasized the importance of  future 
cooperation. At the welcome dinner for Emperor Akihito on October 23, 
1992, President Yang Shangkun stated, “I regret that the modern history of 
China- Japan relations had an unfortunate period from which the Chinese 
 people suff ered greatly. It  will serve best interests of the  peoples of both China 
and Japan if we remember the past to draw lessons from it.”85 He then de-
voted much of his speech to reviewing friendly relations between the two 
countries over the past two de cades. Emperor Akihito responded by express-
ing his “deep sorrow” ( fukaku kanashimi) over the unfortunate period and 
mentioned the Japa nese  people’s eff orts to build a peaceful country based 
on their “deep remorse” ( fukai hansei) for the war.86 Furthermore, when 
Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihito met with President Jiang Zemin in 
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Seattle in November 1993, Jiang praised Hosokawa’s apology for Japan’s 
past aggression as an “excellent attitude  toward history” and stated, “Even 
though we had an unhappy period in our long history of friendly relations, 
our relations  will improve if we take a forward- looking attitude.”87
By the mid-1990s, however, the Chinese government had changed its 
commemorative position  toward Japan. When Prime Minister Murayama 
Tomiichi visited China in May 1995, Jiang Zemin stated, “It is unaccept-
able that some  people in Japan had a wrong understanding of the Asia- Pacifi c 
War.”88  Here, Jiang referred to the LDP members who had mobilized against 
Hosokawa’s statement on the “war of aggression.” But his strongly worded 
statement also refl ected the Chinese government’s campaign for patriotic ed-
ucation that had intensifi ed since the Tian anmen Square protests.89 In July 
1989, right  after the government suppressed the protests, the National Edu-
cation Committee had launched the “Th ree Love Education Program” to 
counteract the democ ratization movement by emphasizing love for the Com-
munist Party, the socialist fatherland, and the  People’s Liberation Army.90 
Over the following years, the Chinese government had issued multiple di-
rectives to strengthen patriotic education. As part of the patriotic education 
campaign, Chinese history textbooks came to emphasize national humilia-
tion brought by Western imperialism and the eventual triumph of the Chi-
nese  people. Among the imperial powers that had humiliated the Chinese 
 people, Japan was marked out as the paradigmatic devil that had been his-
torically inferior to China.91
Concurrently, in anticipation of the fi ftieth anniversary of China’s vic-
tory over Japan, the Chinese government built new war- related museums 
and renovated the existing ones: the September 18th Historical Museum, 
to commemorate Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, was opened in 1991, 
and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was signifi cantly expanded in 
1995. Th en, on September 3, to celebrate the fi ftieth anniversary of Japan’s 
offi  cial surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri— and thereby China’s 
victory over Japan— President Jiang gave a speech at the  Great Hall of the 
 People: “Th e Japa nese military killed and injured thirty- fi ve million Chi-
nese  people. More than three hundred thousand  people  were killed in the 
Nanjing Massacre alone. . . .  Th ere is a discourse in Japan that not only 
denies the war of aggression and colonial rule but also glorifi es them. . . . 
Japan can only win trust from Asia and international society, as well as pre-
vent another tragedy in history, only if the country learns from the history, 
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atones for its crimes of aggression, and maintains the path of peaceful 
development.”92
While the Chinese government was promoting patriotic education, 
Chinese citizens also began to seek individual compensation for war- related 
damages from the Japa nese government. Th is redress movement had already 
emerged in September 1988 when two hundred residents in Shandong 
Province had submitted a petition to the Japa nese embassy in Beijing, de-
manding compensation for the atrocities that the Japa nese military had 
committed in their village in 1944.93 Th en, in March 1991, activist Tong 
Zeng submitted to the National  People’s Congress a petition arguing that 
since the 1972 Joint Communique had discarded only the Chinese govern-
ment’s compensation claims, Chinese citizens still retained individual com-
pensation claims against Japan.94 Tong’s petition was rejected at the 1992 
congress, but three years  later, when the 1995 National  People’s Congress 
was held at the height of cele bration of the fi ftieth anniversary of China’s 
victory over Japan, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that individual 
Chinese citizens still retained compensation claims for their war- related 
damages.95 Th e Chinese government thus changed its position on compen-
sation to accommodate the growing demand from its citizens and align it 
with the nationwide campaign for patriotism that singled out Japan as the 
worst imperialist aggressor.
Given the government’s permission and the help of Japa nese  lawyers, a 
total of ten Chinese former forced laborers and bereaved  family members 
fi led compensation claims against the Japa nese construction com pany 
Kashima at the Tokyo District Court in June 1995.96 Th e Chinese plain-
tiff s demanded that Kashima off er apologies and compensation for forcing 
them and their  family members to work  under abusive conditions at Hana-
oka Mine during the war. In August, four Chinese former comfort  women 
also sued the Japa nese government, demanding apology and compensation. 
In the following months, more Chinese  people came forward to fi le lawsuits 
against the Japa nese government and corporations, including victims of the 
Nanjing Massacre, the 731 Unit, and indiscriminate aerial bombings.97
Th us, the fi ftieth anniversary of the end of the Asia- Pacifi c War did 
not bring closure to the history prob lem between Japan and China. Rather, 
the history prob lem began to simmer, as more and more Chinese victims 
fi led compensation lawsuits, supported by the Chinese government, which 
increasingly commemorated the Chinese  people’s strug gle against Japan’s 
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imperialist aggression as the most impor tant historical episode in modern 
Chinese history. Put another way, the growing pressure from China in the 
mid-1990s further constrained po liti cal opportunities for proponents of na-
tionalist commemoration inside Japan. But this changing structure of 
po liti cal opportunities at the international level galvanized Japa nese nation-
alists, who perceived their government as giving in to foreign pressures.
Nationalist Counterattacks: Educational Implications 
of the History Prob lem
Just as the history prob lem was deepening in East Asia, Murayama  Tomiichi 
resigned from the post of Japan’s prime minister in January 1996. He deci-
ded to resign partly  because he felt his government had fulfi lled its historic 
mission to off er apologies and relief to Japan’s foreign victims. Besides, fric-
tion within his own JSP had intensifi ed since it lost a substantial number of 
seats in the House of Councillors in July 1995, and this had made it diffi  -
cult for Murayama to lead the co ali tion.98 Upon Murayama’s resignation, 
the co ali tion of the JSP, the LDP, and the New Party Sakigake chose LDP 
chairman Hashimoto Ryūtarō as prime minister. Hashimoto had served 
as president of the Japan Bereaved Families Association between 1993 and 
1995 and joined the Association of the Diet Members for the Fiftieth Anni-
versary of the Asia- Pacifi c War’s End. Given his strong commitment to 
honor Japa nese war dead, Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni Shrine in July 
1996, for the fi rst time in the twelve years since Nakasone Yasuhiro had sus-
pended a prime ministerial visit in response to strong criticisms from South 
 Korea and China.
Soon  after Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, South  Korea’s For-
eign Ministry issued a statement requesting that the Japa nese government 
consider “feelings of the governments and  peoples that suff ered from Japan’s 
imperialist aggression in the past.”99 More than a dozen South Korean Con-
gress members also protested in front of the Japa nese embassy in Seoul, 
arguing, “Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine amounts 
to the second act of aggression that ignores victims and bereaved families 
who suff ered from Japan’s atrocities during World War II.”100 Similarly, 
China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement to reiterate the offi  cial position: 
“Th e Yasukuni Shrine honors militarist leaders, such as Tōjō Hideki. Prime 
Minister Hashimoto deeply hurt feelings of Chinese and other Asian  peoples 
who had suff ered greatly from Japan’s militarism.”101
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Hashimoto argued that his visit was not an offi  cial one but only “per-
sonal” (shiteki), motivated by his wish to pray for war dead, including his 
cousin and some former neighbors who  were enshrined. He also insisted that 
his personal visit had nothing to do with  either the Japa nese government’s 
offi  cial position on the Asia- Pacifi c War or Class A war criminals.102 To mit-
igate the international criticisms, however, Hashimoto deci ded not to visit 
the shrine again during his tenure. In addition, Hashimoto could not af-
ford to let the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine sidetrack his co ali tion 
government’s policy agenda to cope with the worst economic recession since 
1945. Th e recession aff ected the country at large, creating widespread feel-
ings of national crisis. According to government statistics, the percentage of 
Japa nese citizens who thought the country was headed in the wrong direc-
tion increased from 31.4  percent to 72.2  percent between 1990 and 1997.103 
Th e number of suicides also jumped from 24,391 in 1997 to 32,863 in 1998 
and continued to exceed 30,000 annually.104 Th e severe economic recession, 
the growing feeling of anomie, and the seeming incompetence of the gov-
ernment made many  people lose confi dence in Japan’s  future, and the 1990s 
 were  later called “the lost de cade.”
While Hashimoto’s government was busy implementing po liti cal re-
forms to meet the unpre ce dented economic and social challenges, conser-
vative politicians tried to undo the logic of cosmopolitanism that had been 
partially incorporated into Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. In fact, nation-
alist counterattacks had already begun in August 1995, when the LDP’s His-
tory Investigation Committee published Th e Comprehensive Evaluation of 
the Greater East Asia War (Daitōa Sensō no sōkatsu). Th is edited volume col-
lected transcriptions of seminars between October 1993 and January 1995, 
wherein LDP members had engaged in discussions with nineteen guest 
speakers, including Tanaka Masaaki, the author of books denying the Nan-
jing Massacre, and Nishio Kanji, who was  later to become the fi rst presi-
dent of the Japa nese Society for History Textbook Reform. In the edited 
volume, the guest speakers and LDP members justifi ed the Asia- Pacifi c War 
as Japan’s act of self- defense against Western imperial powers, and they 
argued that Japan had helped Asian  peoples gain in de pen dence from their 
colonial rulers  after the war. Moreover, they rejected the Tokyo Trial as 
“victor’s justice” and criticized postwar Japa nese education for propagating 
the masochistic, Tokyo Trial version of history. As Itagaki Tadashi put it in 
the volume’s epilogue, “I cannot but feel overwhelmed by the critical situation 
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of the Japa nese  people’s historical view  shaped by the Occupation policies 
and leftist- biased postwar education. I must say this kind of education is 
wrong  because it fails to cultivate in next generations pride in their country 
and joy of being Japa nese.”105
Th is growing concern about the education of Japa nese youth was per-
haps most systematically articulated by Fujioka Nobukatsu, a professor of 
education at the University of Tokyo. In April 1994, he began serializing 
articles in Social Studies Education (Shakaika kyōiku) to outline what he called 
the “liberal historical view” ( jiyūshugi shikan), and in June 1995, he launched 
the Liberal History Research Group (Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai). Th e 
purpose of liberal history was to write a new history of Japan by rejecting 
the two types of historical interpretation that had dominated postwar 
 Japan: “the Tokyo Trial historical view that describes Japan as the only bad 
guy and the Pro- Greater- East- Asia- War historical view (Daitōa Sensō kōtei 
shikan) that asserts Japan committed no wrongs.”106 According to Fujioka, 
 these two ideologically charged historical views— describing Japan as cat-
egorically  either right or wrong— prevented Japa nese citizens from devel-
oping a more mature historical view. As Fujioka put it, liberal history was 
“liberal” in the sense of being “ free from all ideologies,” so that “if some-
thing is proven to be a fact, prac ti tion ers of liberal history should be ready 
to accept it,  whether they like it or not.”107 At fi rst glance, Fujioka’s mani-
festo of liberal history simply sought a more empirically rigorous approach 
to the history of the Asia- Pacifi c War. But, in real ity, his liberal historical 
view attacked only “the Tokyo Trial historical view that denied anything 
national” and instead advocated “healthy nationalism” as an essential in-
gredient for history education in Japan.108
While members of the LDP and the Liberal History Research Group 
began to mobilize their counterattacks against the greater degree of contri-
tion  adopted by the Japa nese government, the Ministry of Education an-
nounced the results of the latest round of textbook inspection in June 
1996: all history textbooks approved for ju nior high schools now included 
descriptions of comfort  women and expanded descriptions of atrocities 
that Japa nese troops had committed during the Asia- Pacifi c War, such as 
the Nanjing Massacre. Th is signifi cant change in history textbooks hap-
pened not only  because of the eff orts by non- LDP prime ministers and 
NGOs commemorating foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings, but 
also  because of Ienaga Saburō’s lawsuits against textbook inspection. In 
January 1984, Ienaga had fi led his third lawsuit  after his draft history text-
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book for high schools had been rejected during the 1982 cycle of textbook 
inspection. Th is time Ienaga and his  lawyers had focused on eight items 
that the Ministry of Education had disapproved, six of which had per-
tained to the Asia- Pacifi c War: (1) Japan’s aggression against China, (2) the 
Nanjing Massacre, (3) the Korean  people’s re sis tance against Japan’s colo-
nial rule, (4) the Japa nese military’s war time atrocities, (5) Unit 731 and its 
biological experiments, and (6) the  Battle of Okinawa.109 In October 1993, the 
Tokyo High Court had ruled that, among the eight items in Ienaga’s text-
book, descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre and rapes of Chinese  women 
(as part of the Japa nese military’s war time atrocities) had been illegally 
disapproved in the textbook- inspection pro cess.110 Ienaga then had ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the Ministry of Education 
had exceeded its prerogative by having disapproved the other items, whereas 
the ministry had deci ded not to contest the high court’s ruling. Th is led to 
the 1995–1996 cycle of textbook inspection for ju nior high and high 
schools permitting increased descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings.111
Th e results of the 1996 textbook inspection, however, prompted Fu-
jioka Nobukatsu to submit an open letter to the Ministry of Education, 
demanding that the descriptions of comfort  women be removed. In his 
letter, Fujioka stated that the descriptions  were misleading  because they 
gave the impression that the Japa nese military had forcibly drafted  women 
to work at comfort stations, even though facts about comfort  women  were 
still disputed among historians. He concluded his letter by mentioning cases 
of students who had internalized the masochistic historical view: “Some 
ju nior high school students think Japan is the most evil country in the world. 
 Th ere are also female students who feel ashamed about being Japa nese. Th e 
unbalanced and masochistic history education is a serious crime.”112 Th en, 
in December 1996, Fujioka and other university professors and writers 
formed the Japa nese Society for History Textbook Reform (JSHTR).
For  these LDP politicians and conservative intellectuals, the history 
prob lem was no longer simply about the past but also about the  future of 
the Japa nese nation  because it concerned the hearts and minds of younger 
Japa nese citizens. Moreover, they regarded Japan’s domestic prob lems— the 
economic recession and social anomie—as coterminous with the history 
prob lem. Th ey felt that the domestic prob lems could be overcome if Japa-
nese citizens became more patriotic and willing to contribute to their coun-
try. Th ey then placed the blame for the perceived lack of patriotism squarely 
on the “masochistic” Tokyo Trial historical view that the Allied powers had 
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imposed on Japan during the Occupation. To combat this historical view 
as a root cause of the domestic and international prob lems facing Japan, they 
targeted history education as the key for reinvigorating patriotism and 
thereby overcoming the prob lems.
Growing Cosmopolitanism and the Escalating History Prob lem
During this period, Japan’s offi  cial commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War 
became more cosmopolitan, though the logic of nationalism remained dom-
inant. Since po liti cal opportunities increasingly acquired an international 
dimension in the post– Cold War period, even the LDP government had to 
adopt contrite gestures, precisely  because  doing so was necessary to remove 
the obstacle of the history prob lem from its nationalist quest for making 
 Japan a regional leader. Moreover, the LDP lost its mono poly access to the 
government, and this created a po liti cal opportunity for the two non- LDP 
prime ministers, Hosokawa and Murayama, to promote the cosmopolitan 
logic of commemoration. Murayama in par tic u lar off ered a decisive apol-
ogy in August 1995, and his government created the Asian  Women’s Fund 
to provide relief for former comfort  women.
Coterminous with the changing structure of international relations and 
Japa nese politics was the growth of the transnational network consisting of 
Japa nese NGOs and South Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings. While the transnational network had originally emerged to 
provide relief only for South Korean A- bomb victims, it expanded to include 
more actors, such as former comfort  women and forced  labors, and gained 
momentum in the early 1990s. Th e expanded mobilizing structures for 
cosmopolitan commemoration exerted indirect infl uence on Japan’s offi  -
cial commemoration even when the LDP still single- handedly controlled 
the government, and especially when the JSP headed the ruling co ali tion. 
By making the suff ering of foreign victims widely known, the transnational 
network also helped, in conjunction with Ienaga’s textbook lawsuits, to 
make history education more cosmopolitan, that is, to increase descriptions 
of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks.
 Th ese attempts to promote cosmopolitanism in Japan’s offi  cial com-
memoration, however,  were compromised by the LDP. Given the power 
asymmetry between the JSP and the LDP, the former was unable to fully 
exploit the po liti cal opportunity— access to the government—to signifi cantly 
alter Japan’s offi  cial commemoration. Put another way, due to the JSP’s weak 
position, the growth of mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemo-
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ration at the transnational level was not eff ectively translated into Japan’s 
offi  cial commemoration. Th us, the resultant compromise of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration contributed to the his-
tory prob lem’s full development. On the one hand, South Korean and Chi-
nese victims and their Japa nese supporters felt that the Japa nese government 
did not go far enough in adopting cosmopolitanism, and they continued to 
demand apologies and government compensation. On the other hand, con-
servative politicians and NGOs felt that Japan’s offi  cial commemoration 
went too far in the cosmopolitan direction, disrespecting Japa nese war dead 
who had sacrifi ced their lives to defend Japan. Galvanized by the growing 
South Korean and Chinese demands for apologies and compensation,  these 
proponents of nationalist commemoration began to openly challenge the evi-
dential bases of the victims’ demands and raised the stakes of the history 
prob lem by focusing on its educational implications for  future generations.
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The Coexistence of Nationalism and 
Cosmopolitanism, 1997–2015
Th e Japa nese Society for History Textbook Reform (JSHTR), launched in 
January 1997, attacked postwar history education for forcing Japa nese citi-
zens to lose national pride: “Especially the modern historiography treats the 
Japa nese  people as if they  were criminals who must continue to atone and 
apologize forever. Th is masochistic tendency became even stronger  after the 
Cold War ended. Right now, history textbooks in Japan pres ent the propa-
gandas of the former  enemy countries as historical facts.”1 JSHTR members 
also met with Minister of Education Kosugi Takashi, trying to persuade him 
to reject masochistic tendencies— the increased descriptions of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings—in history textbooks.2
Th e LDP, too, challenged the history textbooks that had been approved 
during the 1996 textbook inspection. In February 1997, eighty- seven relatively 
young LDP members established the Association of Young Diet Members for 
Examining Japan’s  Future and History Education (Nihon no Zento to Reki-
shi Mondai wo Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai). Nakagawa Shōichi became 
president of the association, while Abe Shinzō, a  future prime minister, served 
as chief secretary. According to Nakagawa, members of the association  were 
motivated by their shared concern that “Japa nese  children are now using his-
torically inaccurate, anti- Japanese textbooks. Can  these  children  really carry 
the  future of Japan on their shoulders?”3 In order to examine “how Japa nese 
textbooks should be written for the sake of the Japa nese  people,” the associa-
tion or ga nized seminars for Diet members by inviting a total of eigh teen guest 
speakers, three of whom  were JSHTR members.4
Coexistence of Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism, 1997–2015     103
Th is collaboration between politicians and nongovernmental actors 
distinguished the latest wave of nationalist attacks on history education 
from the earlier waves, where the LDP had  either acted alone (the mid-
1950s) or had failed to coordinate its action with the textbook- reform move-
ment led by the National Council for the Defense of Japan (the mid-1980s). 
Th us,  after the fi ftieth anniversary of the Asia- Pacifi c War’s end, JSHTR 
and the LDP joined forces to undo cosmopolitanism that had been incor-
porated into Japan’s offi  cial commemoration.
JSHTR’s Campaign against the “Masochistic Historical View”
Conservative politicians and NGOs  were galvanized most by the issue of 
comfort  women. In the mid-1990s, the dispute between the Japa nese gov-
ernment and former comfort  women attracted worldwide attention, as it was 
increasingly framed as a  human- rights violation in conjunction with aware-
ness of vio lence against  women during the Yugo slav Wars and civil wars in 
Rwanda, Cambodia, and East Timor.5 In January 1996, UN special rap-
porteur Radhika Coomaraswamy submitted an addendum report on comfort 
 women to the Commission on  Human Rights. In her report, Coomaraswamy 
recommended that the Japa nese government should acknowledge, apolo-
gize to, and compensate former comfort  women, as well as punish  those who 
had been involved in the management of comfort stations.6 Given the grow-
ing concern for  women’s  human rights worldwide, Japa nese NGOs or ga-
nized an international symposium in Tokyo in 1997 by inviting forty guests 
from twenty diff er ent countries. Symposium participants then established 
the Vio lence Against  Women in War Network- Japan and began advocacy 
activities to support three groups of female victims around the world: former 
comfort  women during the Asia- Pacifi c War,  women living near US mili-
tary bases, and  women living in countries involved in armed confl icts.7 
Th en, in June 1998, another special rapporteur, Gay McDougall, submit-
ted a report, “Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery- like Practices 
during Armed Confl ict,” to the Commission on  Human Rights. In the 
appendix of her report, McDougall argued that the Japa nese government 
should do more than simply set up the Asian  Women’s Fund to atone for 
having forced “over 200,000  women into sexual slavery in rape centres 
throughout Asia.”8
JSHTR counterargued that  these criticisms  were based on inaccurate 
historical facts. For example, Coomaraswamy’s report cited Yoshida Seiji’s 
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1983 book My War Crimes: Th e Forced Draft of Koreans (Watashi no sensō 
hanzai: Chōsenjin no kyōsei renkō), wherein Yoshida, a former soldier, testifi ed 
how he had forcibly taken Korean  women from Cheju Island in 1943. Th e 
JSHTR vice president Fujioka Nobukatsu rejected Coomaraswamy’s report 
by quoting Hata Ikuhiko, a Japa nese history professor who had conducted 
interviews with residents of Cheju Island and questioned the credibility of 
Yoshida’s testimony. In fact, Yoshida himself admitted that he had deliber-
ately fi ctionalized his testimony. Fujioka thus ridiculed Coomaraswamy’s 
report as follows: “Yoshida’s testimony was contradicted by all his military 
colleagues, dismissed by residents of the Island . . .  and even the author him-
self admits it is a fi ction, but it is cited in the report submitted to the United 
Nations commission and used as a basis for prosecuting Japan. And, in 
South  Korea, Yoshida’s book is translated and accepted as entirely true.”9 
Fujioka also questioned the credibility of former comfort  women’s testimo-
nies by pointing out how they had changed over time.10
To be sure, Fujioka deliberately infl ated the signifi cance of inaccura-
cies to discredit the entire issue of comfort  women as historically untrue. 
Nevertheless, NGOs that supported former comfort  women did make 
problematic factual claims. Yoshimi Yoshiaki and other Japa nese historians 
who conducted research on Japan’s war crimes agreed that Yoshida’s book 
was not reliable enough to be used as historical evidence for the forced draft 
of Korean  women to comfort stations.11 Japa nese historians also warned that 
another book that Coomaraswamy extensively cited in her report, Th e Com-
fort  Women by journalist George Hicks, lacked suffi  cient scholarly rigor: 
Hicks, too, cited Yoshida’s book and made vari ous factual errors.12 Similar 
evidentiary prob lems  were found in McDougall’s report, in which her esti-
mate of the number of comfort  women who had died during the Asia- Pacifi c 
War relied on an unfounded story told by LDP member Arafune Seijūrō in 
1965.13 In addition, while South Korean NGOs and newspapers repeatedly 
stated that two hundred thousand Korean  women had been forcibly drafted 
to serve as comfort  women as part of the female volunteer corps (teishintai), 
Yoshimi cautioned against both overestimating the number and confl ating 
comfort  women and female volunteer corps.14 Japa nese historians like Yo-
shimi  were worried that historical inaccuracies such as  these  were providing 
JSHTR with ammunition to reject the issue of comfort  women. In the heat 
of the controversy, however, their cautious and critical voices  were not taken 
seriously.
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JSHTR employed a similar tactic against the Nanjing Massacre, an-
other high- profi le Japa nese war time atrocity that came to be widely known 
beyond East Asia  after Iris Chang’s Th e Rape of Nanking: Th e Forgotten Ho-
locaust of World War II was published in 1997. Chang’s book argued that 
the Japa nese military had killed about three hundred thousand Chinese ci-
vilians in Nanjing through the government’s genocidal program. It also 
criticized Japa nese history textbooks for making no reference to the Nan-
jing Massacre. In response, Fujioka and another JSHTR member, Hi-
gashinakano Shūdō, coauthored Study of the Rape of Nanking (Th e Rape of 
Nanking no kenkyū) in 1999. In their book, Fujioka and Higashinakano 
claimed to have found nearly 170 inaccuracies in Chang’s book and ques-
tioned its credibility. Th ey concluded that Th e Rape of Nanking was an at-
tempt to continue the propaganda war initiated by the Chinese Commu-
nist Party during the Asia- Pacifi c War: “Th e Tokyo Trial imposed on Japan 
the stigma of war- criminal country, and the tendency to one- sidedly prose-
cute Japan’s past is becoming more pronounced in Japa nese history text-
books in the post- Cold War period. . . .  If Th e Rape of Nanking succeeds in 
consolidating the image of the war- criminal Japa nese  people, we are afraid, 
Japan  will never be able to recover.”15
While Fujioka and Higashinakano overemphasized the inaccuracies in 
Chang’s book in order to discredit the Nanjing Massacre, Chang did make 
numerous errors and unwarranted arguments, being neither trained as a pro-
fessional historian nor fl uent in Chinese and Japa nese languages. For ex-
ample, Kasahara Tokushi, a professor of modern Chinese history at Tsuru 
University and one of the most respected experts on the Nanjing Massacre, 
was troubled by Chang’s inability to “understand the importance of critically 
evaluating the credibility of primary materials. She is  eager to uncritically 
cite the statistics on victims of the Nanjing Massacre submitted to the 
Tokyo Trial to support her argument [even when no systematic survey was 
carried out at that time]. Th is shows that she is an amateur in historical re-
search.”16 Kasahara and other Japa nese historians  were worried that JSHTR 
would exploit many fl aws in Chang’s book to discredit the Nanjing Mas-
sacre as a fabrication, when the large number of testimonies by former sol-
diers as well as research by historians in the 1980s had led many Japa nese 
citizens to accept the massacre as a historical fact.17
While trying to discredit the historical validity of comfort  women and 
the Nanjing Massacre, JSHTR proceeded with its most impor tant objective: 
106     Chapter 4
writing new history textbooks. To this end, JSHTR fi rst teamed up with 
Fusōsha, a publishing com pany known for its conservative orientation, to 
produce draft history and civics textbooks for ju nior high schools. As they 
worked on  these drafts, JSHTR established branches in all forty- eight pre-
fectures to advertise the textbooks in October 1999. Th en, in April 2000, 
JSHTR submitted its draft textbooks, History of the Japa nese  People (Koku-
min no rekishi) and New Civics (Atarashii kōmin), to the textbook- inspection 
pro cess. Th ey also established the Liaison Council for the Improvement of 
Textbooks (Kyōkasho Kaizen Renraku Kyōgikai) in cooperation with other 
nationalist NGOs, including the Japan Council (Nippon Kaigi), a succes-
sor of the National Council for the Defense of Japan, which had produced 
New Japa nese History in 1985. Together, they began lobbying local boards 
of education to adopt JSHTR’s history and civics textbooks. In the mean-
time, LDP members in municipal councils formed associations to support 
JSHTR’s activities.18
In December 2000, the Ministry of Education asked Fusōsha to make 
137 and 99 revisions to JSHTR’s history and civics textbooks, respectively, 
as preconditions for approval. Many of the required revisions concerned sen-
tences that downplayed Japan’s past wrongdoings and overemphasized 
patriotism. Th e sentences marked for required revision included “Japan 
annexed  Korea legally according to the international law at the time”; “Th e 
Tokyo Trial accepted that the Japa nese military had killed more than 
200,000 Chinese  people during the  Battle of Nanjing in 1937. . . .  Since 
many questions about the incident remain unresolved, however,  there is still 
controversy  today. Th e Nanjing Incident was nothing like the Holocaust, 
even if  there had been some killings”; and, “Kamikaze soldiers did not 
hesitate to sacrifi ce their lives for Japan.”19  After JSHTR made the required 
revisions, the ministry— now reor ga nized and renamed as the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology— approved its history 
and civics textbooks in April 2001.
Th e 2000–2001 textbook inspection not only approved JSHTR’s his-
tory textbook but also reduced descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in 
history textbooks that other companies produced. Prior to this inspection 
cycle, all the seven textbook companies had included descriptions of com-
fort  women in their history textbooks for ju nior high schools, but four of 
them deleted the descriptions. Similarly, two of the four textbook compa-
nies that had discussed the “Nanjing Massacre” in previous editions of their 
history textbooks deci ded to use the phrase the “Nanjing Incident,” down-
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playing the magnitude of the event.20  Th ese changes reversed the trend of 
history textbooks set in 1997, when the Supreme Court had ruled it illegal 
for the Ministry of Education to disapprove descriptions of the Nanjing Mas-
sacre, the Japa nese military’s vio lence against Chinese  women, and Unit 
731 in Ienaga’s draft textbook.21 Th is rolling back of textbook descriptions 
of Japan’s past wrongdoings was linked to the LDP’s eff orts to intervene in 
the textbook- inspection pro cess beginning in the mid-1990s. In June 1998, 
Minister of Education Machimura Nobutaka had argued that “many his-
tory textbooks overemphasized negative aspects of Japan’s history especially 
 after the Meiji period. Th at is why the Textbook Inspection Commission is 
now examining ways to help textbook editors fi nd a better balance [between 
positive and negative descriptions of Japan’s history].”22 Th en, in January 
1999, the Ministry of Education had requested chief editors of textbook 
companies to revise their history textbooks to have a “better balance.”23 Th e 
Association of Young Diet Members for Examining Japan’s  Future and 
History Education also had asked chief editors to come to LDP Headquar-
ters and subjected them to two hours of criticism regarding descriptions of 
comfort  women and other “biases” in their history textbooks.24
Proponents of cosmopolitanism  were galvanized by the results of the 
2000–2001 textbook inspection. Japan Teachers Union chairman Toda Tsu-
nami issued a statement criticizing JSHTR for endorsing the “Greater East 
Asia War and failing to recognize the pains that Japan’s colonial rule and 
war infl icted on Asian  peoples,” and twelve NGOs, including the  Children 
and Textbooks Japan Network 21 (Kodomo to Kyōkasho Zenkoku Netto 21), 
held a joint press conference criticizing the Japa nese government for approving 
JSHTR’s history textbook.25 Similarly, Nobel laureate Ōe Kenzaburo and 
other writers submitted a joint statement to the government. In their state-
ment, they argued that the latest round of textbook inspection forced text-
book companies to reduce descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings, and that 
JSHTR’s history textbook lacked sincere remorse for the Asian victims of the 
Asia- Pacifi c War.26
Th e South Korean and Chinese governments also joined the ensuing 
controversy over JSHTR’s history textbook. In May 2001, South Korean 
president Kim Dae Jung demanded that the Japa nese government make 
twenty- fi ve revisions in JSHTR’s history textbook and another ten revisions 
in the other seven history textbooks. Kim’s government criticized JSHTR’s 
textbook particularly for making no reference to comfort  women and show-
ing no remorse for Japan’s colonial rule.27 China’s Foreign Ministry, too, 
108     Chapter 4
demanded eight major revisions in JSHTR’s textbook, including descriptions 
of Manchukuo, the Nanjing Massacre, the Second Sino- Japanese War, and 
the Tokyo Trial.28 Given  these domestic and international criticisms, less than 
0.05   percent of the ju nior high schools in Japan  adopted JSHTR’s history 
textbook.29 With such a low adoption rate, the latest round of textbook con-
troversy subsided, at least temporarily.
A Downward Spiral of Nationalist Commemorations
While JSHTR’s history textbook rocked Japan’s relations with South  Korea 
and China in spring 2001, Koizumi Jun’ichirō was newly elected as LDP 
chairman. During his campaign for the chairman position, Koizumi had 
already promised to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, distinguishing himself from 
the other candidates, including Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who had declined to 
make the same promise.  After Koizumi took offi  ce in April 2001, he an-
nounced his plan to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, the anniver-
sary of the war’s end: “I believe that Japan’s peace and prosperity  today was 
built on the invaluable sacrifi ces made by war dead. I would like to visit the 
Yasukuni Shrine to off er my utmost res pect and thanks to them.”30 In re-
sponse, the South Korean government expressed concerns regarding both 
Koizumi’s planned visit to the shrine and the offi  cial approval of JSHTR’s 
history textbook.31 Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan also warned of 
the potential ramifi cations of Koizumi’s visit and asked the Japa nese gov-
ernment to “consider feelings of the victim nations seriously” and “confront 
its past history.”32 Opposition parties in Japan, too, criticized Koizumi’s 
planned visit for attempting to justify the war of aggression and undermin-
ing Japan’s relations with Asian neighbors.33 Even the chairman of the LDP’s 
co ali tion partner Kōmeitō, Kanzaki Takenori, pointed out that the prime 
minister’s offi  cial visit to the shrine would violate the constitutional separa-
tion of religion and state, and he suggested that Koizumi “should take 
caution and avoid creating unnecessary tensions with Asian neighbors in 
light of the history of controversies over the enshrinement of Class A war 
criminals.”34
In the end, Koizumi chose to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 
2001, two days prior to the anniversary of the war’s end.  After his visit, Koi-
zumi issued a statement to express his remorse for damages and pains that 
Japan’s “colonial rule” and “aggression” had infl icted on its Asian neighbors. 
He also stated that he had avoided the anniversary to prevent  people both 
inside and outside Japan from misunderstanding his true intention, to thank 
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war dead for “Japan’s peace and prosperity” and “pray for peace,” rather than 
to honor Class A war criminals and justify Japan’s past aggression.35
Nevertheless, Koizumi’s visit drew heavy criticisms from both his sup-
porters and his critics. Chief secretaries of prefectural LDP associations 
expressed their disappointment with Koizumi for not honoring his original 
promise to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on the anniversary.36 Th e nonpartisan 
Association of Diet Members Who Support Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine (Koizumi Sōri no Yasukuni Jinja Sanpai wo Jitsug-
ensaseru Chōtōha Kokkaigiin Yūshi no Kai) also criticized Koizumi for giv-
ing in to pressure from South  Korea and China and pressed him to honor 
his promise the following year.37 On the other hand, Koizumi was denounced 
by left- leaning Japa nese NGOs that had opposed his visit.  Th ese NGOs cre-
ated the Asian Association of Plaintiff s against Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
Unconstitutional Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (Koizumi Shushō Yasukuni 
Sanpai Iken Ajia Soshōdan) and fi led fi ve diff er ent lawsuits against Koizumi 
between October and November 2001. Th e plaintiff s, including members 
of the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of the 
 Pacifi c War, argued that Koizumi’s visit had  violated the constitutional sep-
aration of religion and state as well as caused them psychological pain.38 
Furthermore, South  Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing 
“deep regret for Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the 
symbol of Japan’s militarism,” which enshrined “the war criminals that de-
stroyed world peace and infl icted indescribable damages on neighboring 
countries.”39 China’s Foreign Ministry issued a similar criticism, though it 
did recognize the changed date of his visit— August 13 rather than 15—as 
evidence that the Japa nese government had considered the feelings of its 
neighbors. But the  People’s Congress dismissed the changed date as “triv-
ial,” compared with “the fundamental issue of how Japan should understand 
its history of aggression.” 40
Despite  these criticisms, Koizumi continued to visit the Yasukuni Shrine 
annually, and the controversy over his visit began to intersect with the chang-
ing landscape of world politics. For example,  after the terrorist attacks in 
the United States on September 11, 2001, led to the invasion of Iraq in 
March 2003, Koizumi’s government deployed the SDF to support the US- 
led co ali tion and created laws to specify what the Japa nese government and 
the SDF could do if Japan became involved in an armed confl ict. In late 
2004, Koizumi’s government also pushed UN reforms to expand the mem-
bership of the Security Council, so that Japan could become a new council 
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member. South  Korea and China, however, did not support Japan expand-
ing its military capability and gaining greater infl uence in international so-
ciety: the two countries did not trust Japan  because they  were not con-
vinced of the sincerity of Japan’s contrition for its past wrongdoings.
Th e growing tensions in the region reached a new level of intensity in 
spring 2005. First, in late February, the Shimane Prefectural Council pro-
posed a bill to designate February 22 as a day to celebrate the incorporation 
of the disputed island, Dokdo/Takeshima, into Japan’s territory. Th is gal-
vanized South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun to criticize Japan at the 
memorial ceremony celebrating the March 1st Movement, the demonstra-
tion against Japan’s colonial rule that had taken place in 1919: “Although 
the South Korean government has refrained from fueling the  people’s anger 
and hatred, South  Korea alone cannot solve the history prob lem. . . .  Japan 
should investigate historical truths and truly express remorse and off er apol-
ogies and compensation. Th at is the universal formula for solving a history 
prob lem.” 41 Th en, in late March, UN secretary general Kofi  Annan stated 
that Japan could become one of the new permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council. Annan’s statement prompted Chinese citizens to launch peti-
tion campaigns against the UN reform and vandalize Japa nese stores.42 Th e 
anti- Japanese sentiments in China escalated in early April, when the Japa-
nese government approved the new edition of JSHTR’s history textbook. On 
April 9, approximately ten thousand protesters gathered in Beijing and broke 
win dows of the Japa nese consulate, Japa nese restaurants, and buildings that 
 housed Japa nese companies. Th e protests spread to other major cities, such as 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. On April 16, more than ten thousand 
protesters attacked the Japa nese consulate and restaurants in Shanghai.43 Th e 
anti- Japanese protests continued in China  until late April.
 Th ese strong reactions from South  Korea and China  were coterminous 
with growing nationalist commemorations in the two countries. Th e Ko-
rean Council for the  Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan 
continued to criticize the Asian  Women’s Fund for “trying to drive a wedge 
between the Korean Council and former comfort  women” and refused to 
meet with the fund’s representatives.44 In fact, Usuki Keiko, one of the fund’s 
promoters and also president of the Association for Exposing Japan’s War 
Responsibility, was denied entry to South  Korea  because she was planning 
to meet with former comfort  women  there.45 When representatives of the 
fund fi  nally managed to meet with seven anonymous former comfort  women 
in South  Korea and provided each of them with a letter of apology, atone-
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ment money, and medical and welfare relief, South Korean NGOs and mass 
media denounced them as traitors to the Korean nation.  Th ese anti- Japanese 
sentiments, widespread among South Korean citizens,  were reinforced by 
history education centered on the strug gle of the Korean  people  under 
Japan’s colonial rule; for example, South Korean history textbooks posi-
tively described all forms of re sis tance against Japa nese imperialism 
while negatively presenting all of Japan’s colonial policy.46 Between 2004 
and 2005, the National Assembly also passed bills to authorize the gov-
ernment to investigate acts of collaboration  under Japan’s colonial rule 
and confi scate properties owned by  those who  were judged as pro- Japanese 
collaborators.47
Similarly, the Chinese government continued to promote patriotic 
education by defi ning Japan as the worst  enemy in modern Chinese history. 
In 2001, for example, the Chinese government published new standard his-
tory textbooks for mandatory education that expanded descriptions of the 
Nanjing Massacre, and gave teachers the following instructions: “By show-
ing pictures of the Nanjing Massacre and making students read diaries by 
the Japa nese soldiers, the barbarity of the Japa nese empire’s aggressive war 
against China must be exposed. . . .  Students must be taught to relive the 
unspeakable tragedy and acquire deep resentment and intense hatred  toward 
Japa nese imperialism.” 48 Indeed, many of the Chinese citizens who staged 
anti- Japanese protests in 2005  were younger generations who had been 
exposed to patriotic education in primary and  middle schools since the 
1990s.49 Th e commercial growth of print and digital media also fueled both 
nationalistic and anti- Japanese sentiments among Chinese citizens, fre-
quently ignoring the offi  cial distinction between “evil Japa nese fascists” 
and “innocent Japa nese  people.”50
Since the logic of nationalism dominated Japan, South  Korea, and 
China, citizens in the three countries came to commemorate the Asia- Pacifi c 
War very diff erently. According to an opinion survey that Asahi shinbun, 
Dong- A Ilbo, and the Chinese Acad emy of Social Sciences jointly conducted 
in March 2005, 66  percent of the Japa nese regarded the Yasukuni Shrine as 
a place to commemorate war dead, whereas 61  percent and 59  percent of 
South Koreans and the Chinese, respectively, regarded it as a symbol of mili-
tarism. Moreover, 43   percent and  48   percent of South Koreans and the 
Chinese, respectively, thought that an apology from Japan was the key to 
solving the history prob lem, whereas only 13  percent of the Japa nese shared 
this opinion.51
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As the history prob lem escalated, Koizumi issued an offi  cial statement 
on August 15, 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of the Asia- Pacifi c War’s end 
by  reaffi  rming Murayama’s apology ten years earlier: “In the past, Japan, 
through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suf-
fering to the  people of many countries, particularly to  those of Asian nations. 
Sincerely facing  these facts of history, I once again express my feelings of deep 
remorse and heartfelt apology, and also express the feelings of mourning for 
all victims, both at home and abroad, in the war.”52 Koizumi’s apology, how-
ever, did not help repair Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China. Only 
 after Koizumi’s successor, Abe Shinzō, refrained from visiting the Yasu-
kuni Shrine was the Japa nese government able to stop criticisms from the 
two countries. Th e two successive LDP prime ministers, Fukuda Yasuo and 
Asō Tarō, also did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine out of consideration for dip-
lomatic relations with South  Korea and China. Th is shows that the LDP 
government recognized the constraint imposed by the international dimen-
sion of po liti cal opportunities, and it was once again willing to moderate its 
pursuit of nationalist commemoration.
The Compromise of Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Education
While the controversies raged over the Yasukuni Shrine and JSHTR’s his-
tory textbook, Koizumi’s government also tried to reform the Basic Act on 
Education to emphasize patriotism in school curricula. Th is move  toward 
reform had begun in August 1999, when Obuchi Keizō’s government had 
created a new law to formally defi ne Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the na-
tional fl ag and anthem, respectively.53 Obuchi had also established the 
National Commission on Educational Reform in March 2000, and the 
commission’s fi nal report in December 2000 had emphasized the impor-
tance of “educating the Japa nese  people in the new era” and recommended 
that the Japa nese government and citizens should debate how to reform the 
Basic Act on Education for the new  century.54 In March 2003, the Central 
Council for Education, too, had recommended that the act be reformed to 
put greater emphasis on the cultivation of “love for the country” (kuni wo 
aisuru kokoro).55
Th e recommended reform gained momentum in 2005. In May, Koi-
zumi’s government submitted a bill to privatize the postal ser vice, and the 
House of Representatives passed the bill in July. However, the bill was re-
jected at the House of Councillors in August when a signifi cant number of 
LDP members voted against it. Koizumi promptly dissolved the House of 
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Representatives, and the election held in September propelled the LDP to a 
landslide victory, thanks to popu lar support for Koizumi’s reform- minded 
gestures.56  After the 2005 election, the co ali tion of the LDP and Kōmeitō 
began to discuss the content of a bill to reform the Basic Act on Education.
At fi rst, the LDP and Kōmeitō disagreed over how to include patrio-
tism in a bill. Th e LDP insisted on the phrase “to love the country” (kuni 
wo aisuru), whereas Kōmeitō wanted to moderate patriotism and suggested 
another phrase “to value the country” (kuni wo taisetsuni suru). In April 2006, 
the LDP and Kōmeitō reached an agreement to adopt the phrase “to love 
the country,” provided that the “country” should be understood as exclud-
ing the government, and that other phrases be included to express the im-
portance of respecting other countries and contributing to international 
society.57 Koizumi’s government then submitted a reform bill to the House 
of Representatives in May 2006.
Opposition parties objected to the bill for diff er ent reasons. Th e Demo-
cratic Party of Japan (DPJ) agreed with the government on the princi ple of 
patriotism but argued that the phrase “to love Japan” (nihon wo aisuru) was 
better  because the word “country” in the government’s proposal had a con-
notation of prewar Japan’s ultranationalism.58 Th e communist and socialist 
parties  were squarely opposed to the idea of legally specifying inculcation 
of patriotism as an educational objective. Specifi cally, they criticized the pro-
posed reform of the Basic Act on Education as a step  toward a  future revi-
sion of Article 9 of the constitution to allow Japan to engage in war again.59 
While the 2006 regular session of the Diet was ending in June, the govern-
ment and the opposition parties remained locked in heated debate. Th e co-
ali tion of the LDP and Kōmeitō therefore voted to extend deliberation to 
the next Diet session.
Th en, during a summer recess, the LDP elected Abe Shinzō as new 
chairman. Abe had been more vocal about his nationalistic sentiments than 
his pre de ces sor Koizumi. For example, Abe had felt that “it was a shame 
that the Diet passed the ‘apology’ resolution on the fi ftieth anniversary of 
the war’s end”  because he did not think that Japan should apologize to the 
Asian countries that it had invaded.60  After Abe was sworn in, he prom-
ised to reform the Basic Act on Education as soon as pos si ble and empha-
sized the importance of “cultivating in next generations confi dence and 
pride as the Japa nese,” given that “our country has the world- class natu ral 
environment as well as long history, culture, and traditions.” 61 When the 
Diet resumed deliberation on the reform bill in October, however, Abe’s 
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government and the opposition parties could not work out a compromise. In 
the meantime, teachers  unions and antiwar NGOs across Japan held demon-
strations against the proposed reform,  under the slogan “Stop the Deforma-
tion of the Basic Act on Education” (Kyōiku Kihonhō Kaiaku Hantai).62 
Given its majority in both  houses of the Diet, Abe’s government pushed the 
reform bill through the Diet in December 2006, while the opposition par-
ties boycotted the vote in protest.63
Th e emphasis on patriotism notwithstanding, the new Basic Act on 
Education retained cosmopolitanism. Th e preamble of the new act, for ex-
ample, introduced “inheritance of the tradition” into the purposes of Japa-
nese education, but it reaffi  rmed the cosmopolitan objective to “contribute 
to world peace and welfare of humankind.” 64 Th e second article also intro-
duced a new emphasis on the “cultivation of respectful attitudes to the tra-
dition and the culture, as well as love of our country and native land that 
have produced them,” but again, this was coupled with the commitment to 
cultivate “attitudes to res pect other countries and contribute to peace and 
pro gress of international society.” Th us, while the LDP fi  nally succeeded in 
institutionalizing patriotism as a goal of Japa nese education, it had to si mul-
ta neously reaffi  rm the cosmopolitan princi ples in the old Basic Act on Edu-
cation. Th e pro cess and outcome of the reform thus confi rmed that, even 
for conservative politicians, the choice was no longer simply how to defend 
nationalism but how to combine it with cosmopolitanism.
Joint Historical Research and Textbook Proj ects
Indeed, cosmopolitanism expanded in the fi eld of the history prob lem at 
large  because more and more historians and educators joined the transna-
tional network of NGOs supporting cosmopolitan commemoration. In fact, 
transnational proj ects by historians in East Asia had already begun to emerge 
in the early 1980s.  After the 1982 textbook controversy, Japa nese historians 
had formed the Comparative History and History Education Research 
Group (Hikakushi Hikaku Rekishi Kyōiku Kenkyūkai) in Tokyo in De-
cember 1982. Since August 1984, the research group had or ga nized the East 
Asia History Education Symposium  every fi ve years by inviting South Ko-
rean and Chinese historians to exchange interpretations of historical events 
in the region.65 Moreover, in December 1997, the Japan History Education 
Research Group (Rekishi Kyōiku Kenkyūkai) and the South  Korea History 
Textbook Research Group began holding joint symposiums on Japa nese and 
South Korean history textbooks. Th ey tried to understand how Japa nese 
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and South Korean historians interpreted the history of relations between the 
two countries diff erently, as well as explore the possibility of creating com-
mon teaching materials. Th en, in June 2000, the Japa nese and South Ko-
rean research groups jointly published Perspectives on Japa nese and South 
Korean History Textbooks (Nihon to Kankoku no rekishi kyōkasho wo yomu 
shiten), a collection of research reports by symposium participants. In ad-
dition, professors of history and history education from Japan and South 
 Korea or ga nized a joint symposium in Tokyo in December 2001, criticiz-
ing JSHTR’s history textbook as “inappropriate as a history textbook that 
should seek historical truths and facilitate mutual understanding and 
peaceful cooperation.” 66
In contrast, it was diffi  cult for historians in Japan and China to or ga-
nize similar joint proj ects given the Chinese government’s policy. In 1994, 
Murayama Tomiichi’s government tried to start joint historical research with 
the Chinese government, but in fall 1995, the Communist Party’s propa-
ganda department, the State Education Commission, and the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Sciences reportedly issued a secret directive to ban Chinese 
historians from participating in research proj ects sponsored by the Japa nese 
government. Although the Chinese side  later retracted the directive, it still 
demanded that the Japa nese side “should not engage in  free exchange with 
Chinese research institutes and scholars. . . .  Since Japan’s aggression  toward 
China is an objective historical fact,  there is no need for joint historical re-
search to create a new historical understanding or reevaluate existing ones. . . . 
Th e prob lem is that Japa nese  people do not suffi  ciently acknowledge and feel 
remorse [for Japan’s past aggression].” 67
In July 2001, however, a small but impor tant development occurred in 
Beijing. At the international symposium on Japan’s militarism or ga nized by 
the Chinese Acad emy of Social Sciences, Japa nese participants proposed 
creating a forum for exchanging historical views and collaborating on his-
torical education through the nongovernmental channel. Th e Chinese 
Acad emy welcomed the proposal and or ga nized the Forum on Historical 
Understanding and Peace in East Asia in Nanjing in March 2002. At the 
forum, participants from Japan, South  Korea, and China agreed to jointly 
produce a history textbook.68
To implement the joint history textbook proj ect, participants from the 
three countries held the fi rst editorial meeting in Seoul in August 2002. 
Th e Japa nese side consisted of university professors, high school history 
teachers, and members of  Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 and 
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the Asian Network for History Education in Japan— NGOs that had been 
demanding more extensive coverage of Japan’s past wrongdoings in Japa-
nese history textbooks. Th e South Korean side consisted mostly of university 
professors and high school teachers affi  liated with NGOs that had investi-
gated historical facts about Japan’s war time atrocities; for example, the Coun-
cil for Correcting Japa nese Textbooks ( later renamed Solidarity for Peace 
in  Asia and History Education) and the Korean Council for the  Women 
Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. Th e Chinese side consisted of 
members of the Chinese Acad emy of Social Sciences, university professors 
and doctoral students in history and history education, and researchers at 
the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, who specialized in the Second 
Sino- Japanese War and Japan’s war time atrocities in China.69
Th roughout the duration of the proj ect, participants critically exam-
ined their textbook drafts. Th eir discussions became heated at times  because 
the participants had diff er ent educational backgrounds and understandings 
of what historical research should be.70 Given  these diff erences, the partici-
pants strongly disagreed with one another over the section on the Nanjing 
Massacre. Th e Chinese side originally submitted a draft that contained 
graphic pictures and descriptions of rapes, looting, and atrocities to illustrate 
how three hundred thousand  people had been massacred. Th e Japa nese side 
argued that students could not properly understand both the massacre and 
the Second Sino- Japanese War  unless the textbook described the sequence 
of events that had led the Japa nese military to Nanjing in the fi rst place. 
Eventually, the editorial board deci ded that it was more constructive to 
develop a comprehensive picture of the Nanjing Massacre based on histori-
cal evidence than to pass down the Chinese government’s offi  cial com-
memoration to the next generation. Th e editorial board therefore deci ded 
not to pres ent three hundred thousand as the correct number of dead, but 
to cite the vari ous numbers of dead estimated at the Nanjing Military Tri-
bunal and the Tokyo Trial and to provide detailed descriptions of historical 
contexts that had led to the massacre.71
Another point of contention was how to describe civilian victims of the 
Asia- Pacifi c War. At fi rst, the Japa nese side presented a draft chapter that 
discussed the bombings of Chongqing by Japan and the atomic and fi re 
bombings of Japa nese cities by the Allied powers as examples of large- scale 
damages to civilian populations. Th e South Korean and Chinese sides 
responded by expressing the following concerns: fi rst, it might not be ap-
propriate to categorize Chinese and Japa nese victims as the same type of 
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victims of indiscriminate bombings; second, in countries that had suff ered 
from Japan’s aggression, some  people might think positively of the atomic 
bombings as bringing an end to the war; third, the Japa nese side, for its part, 
might risk downplaying Japan’s war responsibility by emphasizing the in-
humane aspects of the atomic bombings. In the end, the editorial board 
deci ded not to use the pictures of dead bodies that the Japa nese side had 
originally submitted, but to focus on detailed descriptions of the capabilities 
of the atomic and fi re bombs, and print Japa nese survivors’ testimonies of the 
bombings.72
 After three years of discussion, the editorial board published the joint 
history textbook, A History to Open the  Future, in May 2005, in three dif-
fer ent languages and countries. Th e editorial board noted that the textbook 
was meant to off er a counterpoint to the nationalist commemoration of the 
Asia- Pacifi c War in Japan— specifi cally, JSHTR’s history textbook that “jus-
tifi es Japan’s war of aggression and colonial rule, distorts historical facts, 
look down on Asia from a Japan- centered xenophobic perspective, and 
promotes narrow- minded nationalism.”73 Between 2005 and 2007, about 
79,000 copies of the joint history textbook  were sold in Japan, 65,000 in 
South  Korea, and 130,000 in China.74  After the publication of A History to 
Open the  Future, the proj ect continued and published the second and ex-
panded edition of the textbook in September 2012.
In addition to A History to Open the  Future, other joint history text-
books and teaching materials came out of similar collaborative activities by 
Japa nese and South Korean NGOs in the mid-2000s: for example, Gender 
in the Modern History of Japan and  Korea ( Jendā no shiten kara miru Nikkan 
kingendaishi) by the Japan- South  Korea Joint Commission for History 
Teaching Materials in 2005; Confrontation of Japa nese and Korean Histories 
(Mukaiau Nihon to Kankoku no rekishi) by the History Educationalist Con-
ference of Japan and the South  Korea National Associations of History 
Teachers in 2006 and 2015; A History of Japan- Korea Relations (Nikkan kōryū 
no rekishi) by the Japan History Education Research Group and the South 
 Korea History Textbook Research Group in 2007; and Learn and Connect: 
A Modern and Con temporary History of Japan and South  Korea (Manabu tsu-
nagaru Nihon to Kankoku no kingendaishi) by Japan- South  Korea Team for 
the Production of Common History Teaching Materials in 2013.75
Along with  these joint proj ects by NGOs, the governments of Japan, 
South  Korea, and China also began to or ga nize joint historical research proj-
ects in response to the escalating history prob lem. First, the Japa nese and 
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South Korean governments launched the Joint Historical Research Proj ect 
in May 2002, based on the agreement that Prime Minister Koizumi 
Jun’ichirō and President Kim Dae Jung had made during their summit meet-
ing in October 2001. Between May 2002 and March 2005, the members of 
the proj ect had meetings in both Japan and South  Korea and published a 
fi nal report in June 2006.76
Mitani Taichirō, cochair of the proj ect and professor of Japa nese poli-
tics and diplomacy at the University of Tokyo, explained that they hoped to 
create “an academic community of historians that transcends national bor-
ders through the joint historical research proj ect [ because] the prob lem of 
history textbooks is rooted ultimately in vari ous controversies over the his-
tory of relations between Japan and South  Korea.” At the same time, how-
ever, he recognized that the creation of such a transnational academic 
community was diffi  cult, “particularly in the discipline of history  because 
 every country has a tradition of national history . . .  [and] the discipline of 
history contributed to the formation of nationalism.”77 Bearing this out, sev-
eral South Korean members expressed their frustration with the Japa nese 
side in the fi nal report. In par tic u lar, they questioned why the Japa nese side 
refused to discuss the issue of history textbooks even when it had motivated 
the joint historical research proj ect in the fi rst place. Th ey also noted that 
both the Japa nese and South Korean sides failed to adequately address na-
tionalist biases in their own versions of history. Jeong Jae Jeong, a history 
professor at Seoul City University, observed, “ Every commission member 
felt pressured to speak on behalf of his government . . .  and this increased 
distrust and misunderstanding between the two sides.” Kim Hyeon Gu, a 
professor of history education at  Korea University, was also disappointed that 
“neither side could move away from self- centered nationalism in any signifi -
cant way.”78
Although the proj ect members  were frustrated, they nonetheless agreed 
to continue the dialogue. Th e Japa nese and South Korean governments then 
launched the second round of the joint historical research proj ect in June 
2007. Th is time the governments expanded the proj ect by creating a new 
subcommittee on history textbooks. Th is new subcommittee was also the 
largest, consisting of twelve members.79 Th ey held multiple meetings in 
Japan and South  Korea between June 2007 and November 2009 and pub-
lished a fi nal report in March 2010. Again, Japa nese and South Korean proj-
ect members had strong disagreements over the interpretation of vari ous 
historical events. Th e debates of the subcommittee on history textbooks  were 
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so intense that one of the South Korean members  later refl ected, “Since both 
sides engaged in criticisms that came close to personal attacks, we could not 
have scholarly debates,” while another noted that “committee members  were 
unable to have constructive discussion  because they lacked mutual trust.”80 
Despite  these prob lems, the Japa nese and South Korean governments agreed 
in December 2011 to or ga nize the third round of the joint historical research 
proj ect.81
Concurrently, the Japa nese government started a similar joint proj ect 
with China. At the height of anti- Japanese sentiments in China in April 
2005, Japan’s minister of foreign aff airs, Machimura Nobutaka, met with 
his Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing, in Beijing, and they agreed to pur-
sue a joint historical research proj ect.  After Abe Shinzō became prime min-
ister in September 2006, he immediately visited Beijing to repair Japa nese 
relations with China. During the summit meeting, Abe and Chinese presi-
dent Hu Jintao agreed to proceed with a joint historical research proj ect, 
and the two governments launched the Japan- China Joint Historical Re-
search Proj ect in December by commissioning a total of twenty historians.82 
Th e proj ect was cochaired by Kitaoka Shin’ichi, a professor of diplomatic 
history at the University of Tokyo, and Bu Ping, a professor of modern Chi-
nese history at the Chinese Acad emy of Social Sciences, who had also 
participated in the production of A History to Open the  Future. Between 
December 2006 and December 2009, proj ect members held multiple 
meetings to discuss their research papers and exchange comments on the 
history of Japan- China relations. Th en, in January 2010, the Japa nese and 
Chinese governments published a fi nal report of the joint historical re-
search proj ect.83
Th e fi nal report  adopted a “parallel history” format: for each historical 
event or period, two diff er ent papers  were presented— one by a Japa nese his-
torian and one by a Chinese historian. Despite this parallel- history format, 
papers written by Japa nese and Chinese historians converged on the inter-
pretation that Japan had waged a war of aggression against China. Another 
convergence was found in the research on the Nanjing Massacre. As Shōji 
Jun’ichirō, a historian at the Ministry of Defense, recounted, all members 
of the subcommittee on the modern- con temporary period agreed that it was 
more impor tant to examine how and why the massacre occurred than to 
argue over the number of dead.84 In other re spects, however, the Japa nese 
and Chinese versions of history remained divergent. Th e Japa nese partici-
pants tended to describe Japan’s aggression against China in terms of a 
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nonlinear and contingent sequence of events that resulted from a complex 
interplay between geopo liti cal situations and decisions made by Japa nese 
government offi  cials. Th eir Chinese counter parts, on the other hand, tended 
to see Japan’s aggression in terms of a linear and deterministic sequence of 
events originating from the Meiji Restoration.85
Moreover, the fi nal report did not publish two components of the joint 
proj ect: papers on the con temporary period ( after 1945) and comments on 
all the papers. Originally, the Japa nese and Chinese sides agreed to incor-
porate  these two components in the fi nal report. Th e Chinese government, 
however, reportedly intervened during the fi nal stages of the proj ect.  After 
the Japa nese and Chinese sides had negotiated for over a year, the latter eventu-
ally agreed to publish all but the six papers on the post-1945 period and the 
participants’ comments. Th roughout the negotiations, China’s proj ect leader 
Bu repeatedly told the Japa nese side that they wanted to publish all the 
outcomes of the joint proj ect, but it was diffi  cult for them to do so  because of 
“vari ous pressures.”86
In January 2010, the Japan- China Joint Historical Research Proj ect fi -
nally published its report with twenty- four papers on the history of rela-
tions between the two countries from the seventh  century to 1945. Both 
Kitaoka and Bu evaluated positively the fi nal outcome of the proj ect  because 
they believed that both Japa nese and Chinese members managed to reach 
“the level of proper scholarship where both sides can say, ‘Even though I can-
not agree with the other side’s opinion, I can at least understand how the 
other side came to such an opinion.’ ”87
Th us, despite their shortcomings, the joint proj ects promoted the logic 
of cosmopolitanism: the pro cess of constructing historical narratives incor-
porated foreign perspectives, and the content of historical narratives focused 
on transnational interactions. Specifi cally, the fact that the national govern-
ments of Japan, South  Korea, and China supported the joint proj ects dem-
onstrated the degree of institutionalization of cosmopolitanism. Although 
national governments had previously focused on nation- building, they now 
began to operate as vehicles for “cosmopolitan nation- building” by combin-
ing nationalism and cosmopolitanism.88
New Dynamics in Domestic and Regional Politics
While  these joint historical research proj ects  were making pro gress, the LDP 
decisively lost an election for the House of Representatives in August 2009. 
In place of the LDP, the DPJ became the largest party in the Diet and formed 
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a co ali tion government with the Social Demo cratic Party and the  People’s 
New Party (Kokumin Shintō) in September 2009. Overall, the DPJ was less 
nationalistic than the LDP, partly  because many of its founding members 
came from the JSP, the New Party Sakigake, and Japan New Party— namely, 
the po liti cal parties that had played a key role in increasing cosmopolitan-
ism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration in the early 1990s.89 DPJ members 
had not only strongly criticized Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
but also actively supported government compensation for former comfort 
 women. In December 1999, for example, the DPJ had published the Draft 
Bill for Promoting a Resolution of the Prob lem of Victims of War time Forced 
Sex (Senji Seiteki Kyōsei Higaisha Mondai no Kaiketsu no Sokushin ni 
Kansuru Hōritsuan). Th is draft bill had held the Japa nese government re-
sponsible for providing former comfort  women with apologies and com-
pensation to “restore their honor.”90 In November 2001, the DPJ had sub-
mitted the bill to the House of Councillors jointly with the JCP and the 
Social Demo cratic Party; however, it had been discarded  because the LDP 
had opposed it by arguing that all issues of compensation had been resolved 
upon the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.91
 After the DPJ took control of the government, former comfort  women 
and their supporters hoped that the bill would pass the Diet.92 However, 
the co ali tion government headed by DPJ chairman Hatoyama Yukio faced 
many diffi  culties from the beginning. Hatoyama’s changing position on re-
location of the Futenma Air Station for the US Marine Corps frustrated 
the US government, Okinawa Prefecture, and one of the co ali tion partners, 
the Social Demo cratic Party. Hatoyama’s illegal dealings in campaign fi -
nance also undermined his credibility.93 Since  these diffi  culties  were more 
urgent for the DPJ than compensation for former comfort  women, the DPJ 
did not submit the bill to the Diet.94
Furthermore, the DPJ faced growing diplomatic tensions with South 
 Korea and China over Dokdo/Takeshima and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
respectively. In fact, ever since Japan surrendered to the Allied powers in 
1945, the Japa nese government had continuously engaged in territorial 
disputes over the islands with the two neighboring countries. For example, 
during the normalization talks between Japan and South  Korea in the 
1950s, South  Korea’s Foreign Ministry responded to Japan’s claim over 
Dokdo/Takeshima by arguing, “Dokdo was the fi rst victim of Japan’s ag-
gression against  Korea. With the defeat of Japan, it came back to us. It is 
the symbol of our in de pen dence. . . .  Remember, if Japan tries to take over 
122     Chapter 4
Dokdo, it means another round of Japan’s aggression against  Korea.”95 Th e 
Japa nese and South Korean governments had continued to dispute their 
sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima  until June 1965 when they had fi  nally 
agreed not to resolve the dispute with the normalization treaty.96 Th e issue 
of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, by contrast, had not interfered with Japan’s 
normalization talks with China  because Zhou Enlai had already deci ded to 
defer discussion of territorial claims over the islands.97 And yet, the nego-
tiations of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship had been almost derailed in 
April 1978 when Chinese activists critical of Deng Xiaoping had landed on 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to disrupt the signing of the treaty.98 While 
the Japa nese and Chinese governments had signed the treaty by agreeing 
not to engage in a diplomatic dispute over the islands, fi shermen and activ-
ists in both Japan and China had continued to assert their claims over the 
islands.99
Th en, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands exploded 
in September 2010, when the Japan Coast Guard arrested the captain of a 
Chinese fi shing boat near the islands: the fi shing boat was operating inside 
territory claimed by Japan and collided with two Japa nese patrol boats.100 
In the end, the Japa nese government, headed by DPJ chairman Kan Naoto, 
released the Chinese captain.101 Th is action prompted LDP members to crit-
icize Kan for undermining Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands and exposing the lives of Japa nese citizens to security risks.102 Na-
tionalist NGOs in Japan, most notably the Do Your Best Japan! National 
Action Committee (Ganbare Nippon! Zenkoku Kōdō Iinkai), also voiced 
their criticism of Kan’s government and or ga nized multiple protests between 
early October and December in Tokyo and Osaka.103 Former and current 
members of the Diet and municipal councils joined  these protests, calling 
on Japa nese citizens to defend the islands against “China’s aggression.” In 
turn, anti- Japanese protests broke out in multiple cities in China in mid- 
October, attacking Japa nese department stores and restaurants, burning 
Japa nese fl ags, and calling for the boycott of Japa nese products.104
Although  these anti- Japanese protests in China had subsided by No-
vember, they fl ared up again in summer 2012. Th is new round of disputes 
was set in motion by Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō, who declared in 
April 2012 that his prefectural government planned to legally purchase the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Ishihara’s plan collected nearly one billion yen of 
monetary donations. Realizing that Ishihara’s plan was on course to become 
real ity, DPJ prime minister Noda Yoshihiko deci ded that it would be better 
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if the Japa nese government, rather than the Tokyo metropolitan government, 
owned the islands.  After Noda’s government purchased the islands on Sep-
tember 11, the Chinese government responded by sending six patrol boats— 
the largest number ever—to the islands, as well as cancelling events to 
celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the 1972 Japan- China normaliza-
tion.105 Moreover, Chinese citizens began to protest against Japan on Sep-
tember 15, and  these protests spread to nearly one hundred cities on the 
eve of the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident. Th is cycle of anti- 
Japanese demonstrations was much larger and more violent than  those in 
2005 and 2010.106
Concurrently, the South Korean government pressed the Japa nese gov-
ernment over the issue of comfort  women. In October 2011, the South 
Korean Constitutional Court ruled it unconstitutional that the South 
Korean government had not taken appropriate action  toward Japan with 
regard to individual compensation claims of former comfort  women and 
A- bomb victims.107 Given the court ruling, Lee Myung Bak’s government 
brought up the issue of compensation with Noda’s government, but the lat-
ter maintained that it had been already resolved upon the 1965 normaliza-
tion. Th en, in December 2011, the Korean Council for the  Women Drafted 
for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan erected a statue of “13- year- old Com-
fort  Woman” as a “symbol of sadness and anger” in front of the Japa nese 
embassy in Seoul.108 When the Japa nese government requested that the 
statue be removed, South  Korea’s Foreign Ministry rejected the request, stat-
ing, “Th e statue embodies the victims’ wish for Japan’s responsible action 
and restoration of their dignity” and “Japan needs to make an eff ort on the 
issue of comfort  women.”109
Increasingly frustrated with the Japa nese government’s refusal to ne-
gotiate the issue of compensation for former comfort  women and other South 
Korean victims, Lee made the fi rst presidential visit to Dokdo/Takeshima 
on August 10, 2012, in spite of the Japa nese government’s protest, where he 
erected a monument with the Korean- language inscription, “Dokdo, the Re-
public of  Korea, President Lee Myung Bak, Summer 2012.”110 On Au-
gust 14, a day before the anniversary of  Korea’s liberation, Lee also stated 
that he would welcome Emperor Akihito to South  Korea only if the em-
peror  were prepared to “off er sincere apologies to  those in de pen dence activ-
ists who died in their strug gle against Japan’s colonial rule.”111 Th en, South 
 Korea’s Foreign Ministry distributed to its embassies and consulates 3.5 mil-
lion copies of a pamphlet in ten diff er ent languages, which presented 
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Dokdo/Takeshima as “the fi rst victim of Japan’s past aggression” and criti-
cized Japan for “continuing its unjustifi able be hav ior.”112
While Japan’s territorial disputes with South  Korea and China deep-
ened, the DPJ began to lose popu lar support  because Noda’s government 
passed the bill to raise consumption tax from 5 to 10  percent in August 2012, 
while Japa nese citizens  were still grappling with the aftermath of the  triple 
disaster— the earthquake, tsunami, and the nuclear accident—of March 11, 
2011. Dissatisfi ed with the DPJ, Japa nese citizens handed the LDP the ma-
jority in the House of Representatives in December 2012. Th is allowed the 
LDP to form a co ali tion government with Kōmeitō and its chairman, Abe 
Shinzō, to become prime minister again.113 Th e LDP and Kōmeitō went on 
to win the House of Councillors election in July 2013 and secured the ma-
jority in both  houses of the Diet.
During his fi rst term as Japan’s prime minister, between 2006 and 2007, 
Abe had worked hard to repair Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China 
that had been damaged by Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
However, Abe had always maintained strong nationalist sentiments. In fact, 
Abe’s “greatest regret” (tsūkon no kiwami) during his fi rst term was being 
unable to visit the shrine.114 Although he did not immediately visit the shrine 
 after taking offi  ce in December 2012, he sent off erings to the shrine on an-
nual festivals in April and October 2013, and his cabinet members visited 
the shrine.
Around the same time, South  Korea and China also chose new po liti-
cal leaders who  were more assertive  toward Japan than their pre de ces sors. 
In December 2012, South  Korea elected Park Geun Hye, a  daughter of Park 
Chung Hee, for president. When Park attended a ceremony commemorat-
ing the March 1st Movement in 2013, she characterized the relationship be-
tween South  Korea and Japan as “victim and perpetrator” and demanded 
that Japan “squarely face its past and take responsibility,” so that the two 
countries could become partners.115 Moreover, in November 2012, the Eigh-
teenth Central Committee voted in Xi Jinping for general secretary of the 
Chinese Community Party. In his speech to the assembly, Xi repeatedly em-
phasized the greatness of the Chinese  people, signaling more assertive 
foreign policy. Th is was evinced by a signifi cant increase in the number of 
Chinese boats and jet fi ghters entering Japan’s territories during 2012.116
Park and Xi introduced a new dynamic into East Asia’s history prob-
lem by joining hands to press Japan. First, Park visited Beijing in June 2013 
for a summit meeting with Xi. Th is was the fi rst time any South Korean 
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president had visited China before Japan, indicating Park’s intention to 
strengthen South  Korea’s relations with China. At the summit meeting, she 
requested Xi to build a memorial in Harbin for Ahn Jung Geun, a Korean 
in de pen dence activist, hailed as a national hero in South  Korea for his 1909 
assassination of Japa nese prime minister Itō Hirobumi.117 Xi promised co-
operation, and the Chinese government built a memorial hall, not simply a 
memorial, inside the Harbin Station in January 2014.”118 On November 23, 
2013, the Chinese government also unilaterally declared it would expand 
its Air Defense Identifi cation Zone to include the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands.
Partly responding to the increasing assertiveness of South  Korea and 
China, and partly acting out his personal belief in the importance of love 
for the country, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013. 
He justifi ed his visit as an act to “honor war dead who sacrifi ced their 
precious lives for our country . . .  and to renew my commitment to the re-
nunciation of war ( fusen no chikai),” whereas the South Korean and Chinese 
governments immediately issued statements to “strongly protest and criti-
cize” his action.119 Opposition parties in Japan, too, criticized Abe’s action 
for escalating tensions in Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China. 
DPJ member Okada Katsuya pointed out that the two countries criticized 
Abe’s visit  because “the Yasukuni Shrine enshrines Class A war criminals and 
promotes a par tic u lar historical view . . .  [that] justifi es the Greater East Asia 
War as a war of self- defense and liberation of Asia.”120 JCP member Kasa-
hara Akira also asked Abe, “Are you aware of this historical view that the 
shrine defends, and you still visit the shrine?”121 Instead of answering the 
questions in a straightforward manner, Abe indicated his defi ance of the To-
kyo Judgment: “It is true that the defendants  were judged guilty of crimes 
against peace at the Tokyo Trial . . .  but the sentences handed out at the trial 
are not valid according to our domestic law.”122
In the end, Abe did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine again  because the 
US government pressed him to make eff orts to maintain friendly relations 
with South  Korea and China for the stability of the region. Soon  after Abe’s 
visit to the shrine, the US government expressed its disappointment with 
his action “that  will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors.”123 Presi-
dent Barak Obama also or ga nized a trilateral meeting between Park, 
Abe, and himself during the Nuclear Security Summit in Th e Hague in 
March 2014.124 Abe then briefl y met with Xi in Beijing in November 2014 
during the meeting of the Asia- Pacifi c Economic Cooperation summit and 
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held another brief talk with him during the Asian- African Conference in 
Jakarta in April 2015.125 Th us, just as during his fi rst term as prime minis-
ter, Abe chose to compromise his own nationalistic sentiments in  favor of 
Japan’s economic and geopo liti cal gains.
To prevent the history prob lem from negatively aff ecting Japan, Abe 
also deci ded to issue an offi  cial statement to commemorate the seventieth 
anniversary of the end of the Asia- Pacifi c War. To this end, in February 2015, 
he created the advisory panel (21- seiki Kōsō Kondankai) to refl ect on the 
history of the twentieth  century and to envision a new world order and 
Japan’s role in the twenty- fi rst  century.126 Based on the advisory panel’s fi -
nal report, Abe held a press conference on August 14, 2015, and read out a 
statement that had been offi  cially approved by his cabinet. His statement 
exemplifi ed the mixture of nationalist defi ance and cosmopolitan contrition, 
consistent with the trajectory of Japan’s offi  cial commemoration since the 
1990s. At the beginning of his statement, Abe narrated the history of mod-
ern Japan by positively evaluating the Russo- Japanese War as a historic event 
that “gave encouragement to many  people  under colonial rule from Asia to 
Africa,” on the one hand, and by clearly acknowledging “Japan took the 
wrong course and advanced along the road to war,” on the other hand.127 
Similarly, he implicitly warned against South  Korea and China by stating, 
“We must not let our  children, grandchildren, and even further generations 
to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apolo-
gize,” while si mul ta neously emphasizing, “We have the responsibility to in-
herit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the  future.”128
Although the governments and citizens in South  Korea and China  were 
critical of Abe’s statement, no huge controversy erupted, unlike in 1995 
and 2005. For example, at a memorial ceremony celebrating the seventieth 
anniversary of  Korea’s liberation, Park expressed her disappointment with 
Abe’s statement, but she also took note of his commitment to the historical 
view articulated by the previous cabinets, including Murayama’s.129 Simi-
larly, while China’s Foreign Ministry stated that Japan should have made a 
“clear statement on its war responsibility” and off ered a “sincere apology” to 
victims, it nonetheless toned down the statement by choosing not to use the 
phrase “strongly dissatisfi ed,” the ministry’s offi  cial expression of diplomatic 
protest.130
In fact, in early November 2015, Abe, Park, and China’s premier Li 
Keqiang held a trilateral summit meeting in Seoul. At the meeting, the three 
leaders agreed to strengthen regional cooperation on security, economic, en-
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vironmental, and other issues facing East Asia and international society.131 
 After this meeting, the Japa nese and South Korean governments also be-
gan negotiations to resolve the issue of former comfort  women.  Th ese nego-
tiations led to an offi  cial agreement on December 28, 2015, wherein “Prime 
Minister Abe expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all 
the  women who underwent immea sur able and painful experiences and suf-
fered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort  women. . . . 
To be more specifi c, it has been deci ded that the Government of the ROK 
[Republic of  Korea] establish a foundation for the purpose of providing sup-
port for the former comfort  women, that its funds be contributed by the 
Government of Japan as a one- time contribution through its bud get . . .  for 
recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of 
all former comfort  women.”132 While it remains to be seen  whether this 
agreement  will resolve the issue of former comfort  women “fi  nally and ir-
reversibly” as the two governments intended, the escalation of the history 
prob lem seems to have stopped, at least temporarily, as 2015 came to a close.
The  Future of the History Prob lem
During this period, the history prob lem peaked once in the early 2000s, 
when Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine intersected with JSHTR’s 
history textbook and the changing landscape of world politics. It then esca-
lated again in the early 2010s, when commemorations of Japan’s past wrong-
doings combined with the territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima and 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But the history prob lem had deescalated somewhat 
by the seventieth anniversary of the Asia- Pacifi c War’s end, and the govern-
ments of Japan, South  Korea, and China began to take steps to improve their 
diplomatic relations and promote trilateral cooperation.
Importantly, Japan’s offi  cial commemoration during this period con-
solidated the trajectory that had emerged in the 1990s: the coexistence of 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism. To be sure, the LDP regained control of 
the government and tried to use this po liti cal opportunity to reinvigorate 
nationalism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration; for example, Koizumi and 
Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings 
 were reduced in history textbooks, and the government continued to deny 
compensation to South Korean and Chinese victims. At the same time, how-
ever, even Koizumi and Abe reaffi  rmed Japan’s remorse and apology in 
their offi  cial statements. Th e new Basic Act on Education also maintained 
cosmopolitan princi ples, and the LDP government initiated the joint 
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historical research proj ects with South  Korea and China. Th is was partly 
 because po liti cal opportunities for nationalist commemoration came to 
be constrained by the growing scrutiny from the governments and citizens 
in South  Korea and China, and partly  because the logic of cosmopolitan-
ism had been already institutionalized in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration 
during the previous period. As a result, the best the LDP could do was to 
compromise, not replace, cosmopolitanism with nationalism in Japan’s of-
fi cial commemoration. In this res pect, the LDP turned into a mobilizing 
structure of both nationalist and cosmopolitan commemorations.
And yet, the  future of East Asia’s history prob lem is still uncertain, 
 because the LDP- led co ali tion government is still unwilling to decisively 
 incorporate cosmopolitanism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, whereas 
South  Korea and China continue to use nationalism as the dominant logic 
of commemoration. Given the latest dynamic and trajectory of the fi eld, 
what actions can Japan, South  Korea, and China take to move  toward re-
solving the history prob lem? Th e next two chapters  will prepare the ground 
for answering this question by unpacking the most impor tant fi ndings of 
the fi eld analy sis.
129
CHAPTER 5
The Legacy of the Tokyo Trial
Th e preceding chapters have analyzed how East Asia’s history prob lem 
evolved through continuous strug gles among relevant po liti cal actors com-
peting for the legitimate commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War.  Th ese ac-
tors included the government, po liti cal parties, and NGOs in Japan; the 
governments, NGOs, and victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings in South 
 Korea and China; and historians and educators from the three countries. 
Th ey defi ned their commemorative positions by drawing diff erently on 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism and tried to infl uence Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration by exploiting available mobilizing structures and po liti-
cal opportunities. I argue that one of the most impor tant fi ndings of this 
fi eld analy sis is a striking commonality between proponents of nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism: both used the Tokyo Trial as a reference point to ar-
ticulate their commemorative positions.
Conservative politicians in Japan consistently rejected the Tokyo Trial. 
In the immediate postwar period, Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichirō, and 
other conservative leaders treated the trial as invalid on a variety of policy 
issues, including the release of war criminals and compensation for injured 
veterans. Th is rejection of the trial was perpetuated by LDP politicians, 
including Abe Shinzō, who labelled the Tokyo Judgment as “victor’s justice” 
and insisted that “Class A, B, and C war criminals  were not  really crimi-
nals.”1 Similarly, conservative NGOs that worked with the LDP, such as the 
Japan Bereaved Families Association and JSHTR, rejected the “Tokyo Trial 
historical view” that blamed Japan alone for the Asia- Pacifi c War. Nation-
alist commemoration in Japan was thus consistently based on the rejection 
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of the Tokyo Judgment and, by the same token, the justifi cation of Japan’s 
past aggression as a heroic act of self- defense.
Proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration, by contrast, accepted the 
Tokyo Judgment. Between the mid-1940s and the 1950s, the JSP and the 
JCP urged the conservative government to commemorate foreign victims 
of Japan’s past aggression by referring to war crimes that the Tokyo Trial 
had exposed. Left- leaning NGOs also pressed the government to compen-
sate A- bomb victims based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which had 
accepted the judgment— since the Japa nese government had started the war 
leading to the atomic bombings, it should take responsibility for A- bomb 
victims. Murayama Tomiichi’s offi  cial apology in 1995 was also consistent 
with the trial that had prosecuted Japan’s aggression.
Outside Japan, too, the governments and citizens of South  Korea and 
China defi ned their commemorative positions in reference to the Tokyo 
Trial. Th ey criticized Japa nese prime ministers for visiting the Yasukuni 
Shrine where fourteen war time leaders, prosecuted as Class A war criminals 
at the trial,  were enshrined. South  Korea and China also blamed the his-
tory prob lem squarely on Japan, consistent with the Tokyo Judgment that 
had defi ned Japan as solely and entirely guilty of the Asia- Pacifi c War.2
Th us, the relevant po liti cal actors in the fi eld of the history prob lem 
each defi ned their commemorative position, explic itly or implicitly, in rela-
tion to the Tokyo Trial. Th e possibility of resolving the history prob lem 
therefore depends on understanding why the trial became such a key refer-
ence point for the relevant po liti cal actors and entangled multiple threads 
of controversy over Japan’s past wrongdoings. In this chapter, then, I fi rst 
situate the debates among the po liti cal actors, illustrated in the preceding 
chapters, within the wider context of how ordinary citizens, intellectuals, 
and historians in Japan grappled with the problematic legacy of the trial. I 
then illuminate how that legacy came to fuel nationalist commemorations 
both inside and outside Japan, while preventing the full realization of cos-
mopolitan commemoration.
Postwar Debates on the Tokyo Trial and War Responsibility
During the Occupation, the majority of Japa nese citizens already had mixed 
feelings  toward the Tokyo Trial. Take, for example, Peace Declaration Chap-
ter One: Refl ections on the Tokyo Trial (Heiwa sengen dai 1- shō: Tokyo Saiban 
oboegaki) published in April 1949 by Nomura Masao, an Asahi shinbun re-
porter who had covered the trial. Nomura praised the trial for “proving 
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that . . .  a war of aggression is the biggest crime in the world and, therefore, 
leaders who plan and start it  shall be sentenced to death by hanging.”3 At 
the same time, he recognized many diffi  culties of the trial, for “even the 
eleven judges could not reach consensus. . . .  In fact,  these diffi  culties in the 
Tokyo Trial are indicative of  those facing the entire world  today. Th e trial 
deals with all sorts of questions about war and peace. What exactly is a war 
of aggression (shinryaku sensō)? Can we  really attain universal justice when 
only the vanquished are prosecuted?” 4 Similarly, Takigawa Seijirō, a former 
defense attorney at the trial, acknowledged Japan’s war time atrocities and 
urged Japa nese citizens, especially critics of the trial, not to turn back to pre-
war nationalism, though he thought of the trial as a “farce” whose storyline 
had been deci ded by the Allied powers.5 As po liti cal scientist Ōnuma Yas-
uaki pointed out, neither complete ac cep tance nor complete rejection of the 
Tokyo Trial was widespread in the immediate postwar period.6
Concurrently, Japa nese intellectuals debated war responsibility (sensō 
sekinin) more generally— how to distribute responsibility among Emperor 
Hirohito, politicians, intellectuals, and citizens—in conjunction with the 
Tokyo Trial.7 Th eir debates often used as their reference point Karl Jaspers’s 
Th e Question of German Guilt, which delineated four types of war guilt: 
criminal guilt of  those who actually committed war crimes; po liti cal guilt 
of leaders and citizens who supported the war; moral guilt that individuals 
could only voluntarily feel by critically refl ecting on their war time be hav-
iors; and metaphysical guilt in the eyes of God.8 Perhaps Tsurumi Shun-
suke, a professor of philosophy at Tokyo Institute of Technology, was the 
best- known intellectual who drew on Jaspers to examine Japan’s war respon-
sibility. Soon  after the Occupation ended, Tsurumi observed, “Precisely 
 because an examination of war responsibility as a  legal issue is now con-
cluded, I think that  every one of us should examine our own war responsi-
bility and give new directions to our morality (rinri). I doubt that the issue 
[of war responsibility] can be terminated simply by making Mr. Tōjō a scape-
goat.”9 In January 1959, Tsurumi also published “Th e Prob lem of War Re-
sponsibility” (Sensō sekinin no mondai) to criticize the tendency among 
Japa nese intellectuals and citizens to discuss war responsibility  either in the 
 legal- criminal or religious- metaphysical sense without adequately examin-
ing their po liti cal and moral guilt as individual members of prewar Japan.10
While Tsurumi emphasized the moral perspective on war responsibility 
as a participant in the Asia- Pacifi c War, Maruyama Masao, one of the most 
prominent po liti cal theorists in the postwar era, discussed war responsibility 
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mostly in the po liti cal sense. Given his theory of ultranationalism, which 
explained Japan’s past aggression in terms of the emperor- centered polity 
that dominated individual psychological pro cesses,11 Maruyama attributed 
war responsibility mostly to government leaders who had been closely as-
sociated with the emperor and practically absolved the majority of Japa nese 
citizens of war responsibility.12 By contrast, Maruyama’s younger critic, cel-
ebrated writer Yoshimoto Takaaki, thought that older generations, includ-
ing Maruyama, bore war responsibility in the sense of having failed to resist 
the emperor- centered polity.13 Nevertheless, Yoshimoto also failed to criti-
cally refl ect on his own generation’s war responsibility  because he ulti-
mately attributed the Japa nese military’s cruelty, and even the origin of 
the emperor- centered polity itself, to the impersonal “folk customs” of the 
Japa nese  people.14  Whether focusing on the emperor or the folk, much of 
the postwar debate on Japan’s past aggression did not adopt the moral per-
spective to probe into war responsibility of individual citizens, as Tsurumi 
tried to do by following Jaspers.
Tsurumi also brought another new perspective on Japan’s past aggres-
sion. In January 1956, he published “Intellectuals’ War Responsibility” (Chi-
shikijin no sensō sekinin) and proposed the concept of the “Fifteen- Year 
War” that designated the 1931 Mukden Incident as the beginning of the war 
that had ended in August 1945.15 Th is was a signifi cant departure from the 
concept of the “Pacifi c War,” popu lar ized during the Occupation, that fo-
cused on Japan’s war with the United States, for the “Fifteen- Year War” fore-
grounded Japan’s victimization of China. Tsurumi further reinforced Japan’s 
identity as a perpetrator in the Asia- Pacifi c War by organ izing the Citizen’s 
League for Peace in Vietnam with his colleagues, including the activist and 
writer Oda Makoto, and criticizing Japan’s complicity in the Vietnam War.16
Ienaga Saburō, too, endorsed the concept of the Fifteen- Year War both 
in his history textbooks and through his textbook lawsuits in the 1960s. Two 
of Ienaga’s essays, “Th e Fifteen- Year War and Pal’s Dissenting Opinion” (15- 
nen Sensō to Pal Hanketsusho) in November 1967 and “A Tentative Argu-
ment on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East” (Kyokutō 
Saiban ni tsuiteno shiron) in August 1968, emphasized the continuity be-
tween Japan’s aggression against China and Japan’s war with the United 
States.17 Ienaga, however, also expressed ambivalence  toward the Tokyo Trial: 
“Since the victors judged the vanquished, the former’s war crimes  were 
exempted, and only the latter’s war crimes  were prosecuted. . . .  In this re-
gard, it is diffi  cult to deny that the trial was imperfect as a mechanism of 
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‘justice and fairness.’ ”18 Although Ienaga dedicated much of his  career to 
exposing Japan’s war crimes, he was also deeply troubled by the failure to 
prosecute the atomic bombings by the United States and atrocities commit-
ted by the Soviet Union against Japa nese civilians and soldiers.19
 Here, Ienaga’s discussion of Japan’s past wrongdoings vis- à- vis the To-
kyo Trial was part of the incipient intellectual movement in the 1960s that 
began to connect discussion of war responsibility with a critical assessment 
of the trial. Th is movement was initiated by Takeuchi Yoshimi, a writer and 
China scholar, who published “Overcoming Modernity” (Kindai no chōkoku) 
and “On War Responsibility” (Sensō sekinin ni tsuite), in 1959 and 1960, re-
spectively. By observing arguments advanced by Tsurumi, Maruyama, and 
 others, Takeuchi argued,
In both German and Japa nese cases, prosecutors argued that Germany 
and Japan had waged wars of aggression, and  these wars  were aggression 
against civilizations. Th e judgments supported this argument, but I am 
skeptical about them. At the same time, I cannot accept the argument 
that the plaintiff s and defense  lawyers made at the Tokyo Trial— namely, 
Japan waged a war of self- defense, not of aggression. . . .  I therefore con-
clude that the Japa nese are responsible for the war of aggression [against 
Asian countries], but the Japa nese should not be held responsible one- 
sidedly for the war between the imperial powers (tai teikokushugi sensō).20
Takeuchi’s intervention notwithstanding, the debate on the Tokyo Trial 
among Japa nese intellectuals remained limited, and it tended to be philo-
sophical, lacking empirical investigation of the trial as a historical event.
Around 1980, however, the intellectual debate on the Tokyo Trial fi -
nally took off , as a growing number of  legal scholars and historians began 
to study the trial empirically. In 1979, professors of law and history, librar-
ians, and journalists in Japan created the Tokyo Trial Study Group (Tokyo 
Saiban Kekyūkai), which held meetings to discuss historical facts and im-
plications surrounding the trial.21 Moreover, B. V. A. Röling, one of the 
eleven judges at the trial, published two edited volumes on the trial in 1977, 
and R. John Pritchard, a historian based in London, began to edit and pub-
lish the trial proceedings in 1981.  Th ese activities inside and outside Japan 
led to the International Symposium on the Tokyo Trial in Tokyo in May 
1983 to mark the thirty- fi fth anniversary of the Tokyo Judgment. Th is sym-
posium enlisted nineteen participants, including some of the foremost 
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experts on the history of the Asia- Pacifi c War and international law, such as 
Awaya Kentarō, Ōnuma Yasuaki, Ienaga Saburō, R. John Pritchard, Richard 
Minear, and B. V. A. Röling.22
Refl ecting on the two- day symposium, one of the organizers, Andō 
Nisuke, a professor of international law at Kobe University, summed up the 
task for Japa nese historians and citizens in terms of  going beyond the di-
chotomous view of the Tokyo Trial:
One position is to accept the majority opinion based on the prosecu-
tors’ argument, and condemn the aggressive nature of the Japa nese gov-
ernment’s action and the cruelty of the Japa nese military’s be hav iors. Th e 
other is to completely reject the majority opinion by invoking the de-
fense team’s argument and, in par tic u lar, Justice Pal’s argument that the 
Japa nese government and military merely engaged in unavoidable acts 
of self- defense, and Japan was therefore not guilty. However, I suspect 
that the truth lies in the  middle of  these two positions. . . .  In short, what 
the Japa nese should do is not to take the black- and- white, categorical 
approach  toward the Tokyo Trial but instead to consider the entirety of 
the trial as objectively as pos si ble and distinguish ele ments of the trial 
that we should use for  future cases from  those that we should not.23
Such rejection of the dichotomous view consolidated in the 1990s. Even 
Fujioka Nobukatsu and his colleagues in the Liberal Historical Research 
Group at least initially attempted to critique the dichotomy.24 In fact, while 
extremists on both the left and the right continued to adopt the dichoto-
mous view, its rejection seemed to be fi rmly entrenched among younger 
generations of historians on both sides of the po liti cal spectrum. Take, for 
example, Ushimura Kei (born in 1959) and Higurashi Yoshinobu (born in 
1962), two of the most prominent right- leaning Japa nese historians in the 
younger generation. Ushimura is currently a professor at the International 
Research Center for Japa nese Studies, and Higurashi is a professor at Teikyō 
University. Ushimura published Beyond the “Judgment of Civilization”: the 
Intellectual Legacy of the Japa nese War Crimes  Trials, 1946–1949 (“Bunmei 
no sabaki” wo koete: tainichi senpan saiban dokkai no kokoromi) in 2001, while 
Higurashi published International Relations of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial: 
Power and Norms in International Politics (Tokyo Saiban no kokusai kankei: 
kokusai seiji ni okeru kenryoku to kihan) in 2002.  Th ese works propelled 
Ushimura and Higurashi to the status of foremost experts on the trial in 
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Japan. Despite their diff erences, Ushimura and Higurashi shared the same 
position on the Tokyo Judgment: it was neither the “judgment of civiliza-
tion” nor “victor’s justice.”25 Both Ushimura and Higurashi rejected the 
binary opposition in  favor of a more empirically rigorous approach to un-
derstanding the trial in its full complexity and ambiguity.
Ushimura was particularly vocal in his criticism of “historically unin-
formed, narrow- minded nationalists who tried to argue that Japan was not 
guilty on all accounts.”26 Even though Ushimura took a sympathetic stance 
 toward JSHTR members, including his former teacher Nishio Kanji, he 
blamed older generations of Japa nese intellectuals for having approached 
the Tokyo Trial historical view as a moral, rather than empirical, prob lem. 
He also criticized Japa nese nationalists who refused to listen to criticisms 
from abroad. Instead, he insisted that it was crucial to approach the inter-
national controversy surrounding the Tokyo Trial with “empathy—an act 
of thoroughly placing oneself in the other’s position, no  matter how diffi  cult 
it may be.”27 Ushimura consistently promoted an empirically grounded ap-
proach to understanding both the history of the Asia- Pacifi c War and its 
divergent commemorations by diff er ent groups of actors.
While Ushimura and Higurashi represented voices from the right of 
the po liti cal spectrum, similar calls for a more rigorous approach  were also 
heard from the younger generation of left- leaning Japa nese historians. For 
example, Totani Yuma (born in 1972), a professor of history at the Univer-
sity of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, published Th e Tokyo War Crimes Trial: Th e Pur-
suit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Tokyo Saiban: Dai Niji Taisen go 
no hō to seigi no tsuikyū) in both Japa nese and En glish in 2008. She worked 
with Kasahara Tokushi and Yoshida Yutaka, two of the most prominent 
Japa nese historians of Japan’s war crimes, and collaborated with an interna-
tional team of scholars critically exploring the potentials and limitations 
of the Tokyo Trial as a model for international criminal justice in the 
con temporary world.28 In this regard, Totani followed in the footsteps of 
older left- leaning scholars in Japan, but she also tried to inject more empiri-
cal rigor into the debate and challenged the existing research on the trial by 
drawing on hitherto unused archival materials.
To be sure, historians have no authority to change the judicial judg-
ment of the Tokyo Trial, but they can nonetheless problematize its histori-
cal judgment. As Paul Ricoeur observed, judges must decisively rule upon 
and close cases, something historians can never do. Historians must always 
submit historical facts and interpretations “to the critique of the corporation 
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of historians . . .  to an unending pro cess of revision, which makes the writ-
ing of history a perpetual rewriting. Th is openness to rewriting marks the 
diff erence between a provisional historical judgment and a defi nitive judicial 
judgment.”29 A critical reassessment of this kind off ers a crucial fi rst step in 
resolving East Asia’s history prob lem by helping to disentangle commemo-
rative positions of relevant po liti cal actors from the problematic Tokyo 
Judgment.
Beyond “Victor’s Justice”: Collectively Confronting the Imperial Past
One of the most problematic ele ments in the historical judgment of the To-
kyo Trial concerns “war responsibility,” that is, responsibility for causing 
the Asia- Pacifi c War. Th e Tokyo Trial historical view blames Japan solely 
and entirely for the wars with China and the Allied powers between 1931 
and 1945 and pres ents Japan’s actions as self- propelled by taking them out 
of their specifi c historical contexts. From a long- term perspective, however, 
Japan’s actions  were deeply embedded in the historical context of the Western 
imperial domination of Asian countries. At the 1983 international sympo-
sium on the Tokyo Trial, for example, Yu Xinchun, a Chinese professor of 
Japa nese history at Nankai University, argued, “From the Chinese per-
spective, the victor countries— Britain, the Netherlands, France, and the 
United States— are all ‘thieves,’ ” though he pointed out that Japan had been 
the most horrible thief from the 1920s onward. Yu was disappointed with 
the limited scope of the trial, but he was also certain that “in the long run, 
humankind  will surely put colonialism on trial.”30 From a short- term his-
torical perspective, too, the Japa nese government had not planned to launch 
attacks on the Allied powers when it invaded Manchuria in 1931. Japan’s 
act of entering war with the Allied powers was contingent on a nonlinear 
sequence of decisions that the Japa nese government took by responding 
to the Allied powers’ economic sanctions and the changing po liti cal and 
military situation in Eu rope.31 In this sense, agency for causing the war was 
distributed among multiple actors— Japan, the United States, Britain, and 
so on— even though Japan no doubt had the largest share in this collec-
tive agency.32
Yet, this collective distribution of agency vis- à- vis war responsibility was 
impossible  because of the structure of the Tokyo Trial, whereby the victor 
countries prosecuted the vanquished. Collective distribution of the cause of 
the war would have risked allowing Japan to evade its responsibility and, 
more importantly, would have called into question the narrative of the “good 
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war,” which created positive identity for the Allied powers, especially for the 
United States. According to Röling, “a trial in which vanquished and vic-
tors should both be held in judgment” was impossible, given geopolitics and 
international laws at the time.33 Indeed,  legal mechanisms to authorize such 
a trial still do not exist  today. In essence, then, the Tokyo Judgment was 
itself a nationalist commemoration that eliminated ambiguities of the past 
and legitimated the par tic u lar version of the past that favored the Allied 
powers.
It is thus hardly surprising that the Tokyo Trial historical view made 
the majority of Japa nese citizens ambivalent and angered Japa nese nation-
alists to brand the judgment as “victor’s justice.” In fact, participants in the 
trial knew that the trial was unfair. In May 1946, Ben Bruce Blakeney, a 
defense attorney for the Class A war crime suspects, questioned why killing 
in war by the Allied powers was considered  legal, whereas the same act by 
Japan was prosecuted as criminal. He then brought up the atomic bombing 
of Hiroshima and argued that if the Japa nese generals who had planned the 
attack on Pearl Harbor  were to be prosecuted for murder, the chief of staff  
who had planned the atomic bombing of Japan and the pi lot who had 
dropped the bomb should be prosecuted as well.34 Th is prob lem of victor’s 
justice was most forcefully criticized by the Indian judge Radhabinod Pal 
in his dissenting opinion: “If it is  really law which is being applied I would 
like to see even the members of the victor nations being brought before such 
tribunals. I refuse to believe that had that been the law, none of the victors 
in any way  violated the same and that the world is so depraved that no one 
even thinks of bringing such persons to book for their acts.”35 Even Röling, 
who disagreed with Pal and fi rmly believed that the trial was an impor tant 
milestone in the development of international law, admitted that the trial 
had ele ments of victor’s justice: “Of course, in Japan we  were all aware of 
the bombings and the burnings of Tokyo and Yokohama and other big 
cities. It was horrible that we went  there for the purpose of vindicating the 
laws of war, and yet saw  every day how the Allies had  violated them 
dreadfully.”36
Nevertheless, the fact that the Tokyo Judgment had ele ments of victor’s 
justice does not justify the Japa nese nationalist position that Japan, there-
fore, committed no war crimes.37 Th e two wrongs— the acts of aggression 
committed by Japan and the Allied powers—do not make a right. Instead, 
as phi los o pher Ashis Nandy pointed out, “Culpability, Pal sought to argue 
in his Tokyo judgment, could never be divisible and responsibility, even 
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when individual, could paradoxically be fully individual only when seen as 
collective and, in fact, global.”38 But ele ments of victor’s justice prevented 
such articulation of Japan’s share of war responsibility with the actions of 
the Allied powers.
Such distribution of war responsibility would also create a new set of 
challenges. To begin with, it would risk obscuring the  legal and moral re-
sponsibility of Japan. Th is risk is compounded by the failure to adequately 
inform Japa nese citizens of their country’s war crimes. During and  after the 
Occupation, SCAP deci ded not to disseminate the trial proceedings widely, 
while Japa nese newspapers focused on counterarguments that the defendants 
put forward.39 Th is allowed the majority of Japa nese citizens to underesti-
mate the extent of the suff ering that Japan had infl icted upon  people in the 
Asia- Pacifi c. As Totani Yuma pointed out, a large amount of the evidence 
for Japan’s war time atrocities that prosecutors submitted to the tribunal still 
needs to be analyzed, and scholars have yet to tap into a vast corpus of “the 
rec ords of national war crimes  trials that individual Allied governments 
held in the Pacifi c region  after the war.  Th ere  were more than 2,200  trials 
against some 5,600 war crimes suspects at 51 locations in Australia, Burma, 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
and on other Pacifi c islands.” 40 Th e idea of collective agency in causing the 
Asia- Pacifi c War thus risks letting Japan discount its war responsibility 
even further.
More importantly, collective distribution of war responsibility would 
challenge the former Allied powers to face up to their own history of impe-
rialist aggression and colonial rule and to problematize their triumphant, 
nationalist commemorations. As John Dower and other historians have 
demonstrated, the Asia- Pacifi c War was a war between imperial powers em-
bracing racist ideologies as well as between fascist and liberal- democratic 
countries.41 But it is diffi  cult for the former Allied powers to admit the 
wrongs of their imperialist aggression  because they have remained domi-
nant over their former colonies since the war’s end. To be sure, at the 2001 
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance in South Africa, some Western countries expressed “re-
gret” for the fact that “colonialism has led to racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, and that Africans and  people of African 
descent, and  people of Asian descent and indigenous  peoples  were victims 
of colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences.” 42 However, 
the former imperial powers have yet to off er clear apologies and compensa-
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tion for their former colonial subjects who  later formed their own in de-
pen dent nation- states.43 So long as the former Allied powers remain reluc-
tant to fully confront their imperial past that contributed to an outbreak 
of the Asia- Pacifi c War, Japa nese nationalists  will continue to regard the 
Tokyo Judgment as victor’s justice, and the majority of Japa nese citizens 
 will likely retain their ambivalence  toward it.
In fact, the Tokyo Trial’s failure to confront colonialism obstructed Ja-
pan’s commemoration of the suff ering of Asians, most of whom had been 
colonial subjects in the fi rst half of the twentieth  century.44 As historian 
Awaya Kentarō has argued, since the Allied powers sought to maintain their 
colonial rule  after the Asia- Pacifi c War, war crimes that Japan had commit-
ted against Koreans and other colonial subjects  were not adequately prose-
cuted.45 As a result, many Japa nese citizens forgot Japan’s prewar history as 
an imperial power vis- à- vis the wrongs that Japan had committed in the 
countries that it had invaded and occupied.46 Th is “amnesia” of Japan’s im-
perial past exacerbated the history prob lem  because it prevented Japa nese 
citizens from understanding the depth of anger that South Korean and Chi-
nese citizens felt  toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Especially for South 
Koreans, Japan’s colonial rule is integral to their commemoration of the war. 
As Lee Jong Wong, a law professor at Rikkyō University, pointed out, “Th e 
history prob lem between the Korean Peninsula and Japan originates from 
the colonial rule, not from the war. Th is is one of the  factors that has com-
plicated the history prob lem between Japan and South  Korea and delayed 
reconciliation— the question is  whether or not colonial rule can become an 
object of compensation and apology.” 47 China, too, suff ered from imperial-
ist aggressions by the West and Japan and, consequently, Chinese history 
education emphasizes the importance of building a strong Chinese nation 
in order to prevent another national humiliation.48 Put another way, the 
world- historical perspective on imperialism and colonialism is the key to 
helping Japa nese citizens fully commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings and 
understand South Korean and Chinese commemorations.
To eff ectively recontextualize Japan’s past aggression in the world his-
tory of imperialism and colonialism, I suggest that Japan’s offi  cial commem-
oration be revisited from its margins. Take, for example, Korean soldiers 
who fought in the Japa nese military.  After the war’s end, a total of 148 Ko-
reans  were prosecuted at war tribunals across the Asia- Pacifi c, and twenty- 
three of them  were sentenced to death.49 When Japan regained in de pen dence 
in April 1952, twenty- nine Koreans  were still serving their sentence at 
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Sugamo Prison, even though they had lost Japa nese citizenship upon the 
signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.50  After release from prison,  these 
Korean veterans formed an association to seek relief from the Japa nese gov-
ernment: even though they had fought for Japan, they  were ineligible for 
military pensions  because they  were no longer Japa nese citizens.51 Simi-
larly, bereaved families of Korean soldiers received no relief from the Japa-
nese government.
Opposition parties noticed this prob lem and occasionally pressed the 
government to provide pensions and other relief for former military- related 
personnel and their bereaved families, irrespective of citizenship. During the 
1962 Diet session, for example, Ukeda Shinkichi of the Demo cratic Social-
ist Party argued, “Bereaved families of Japa nese war gods receive relief from 
the government. Speaking of Koreans who fought and died as Japa nese 
soldiers, by contrast, their parents, wives, and  children who live in Japan 
receive no relief or pensions. I think this is a very serious prob lem.”52 Even-
tually, in June 2000, the Japa nese government provided one- time condo-
lence money for Korean veterans and bereaved families who had become 
permanent residents in Japan: 2.6 million yen for a bereaved  family and 
four million yen for a severely injured veteran.53 Th e government, however, 
maintained that all issues of compensation had been resolved upon the 1965 
Basic Treaty. Condolence money was therefore off ered on the “humani-
tarian ground in light of the plight of aging Koreans who served in the 
Japa nese imperial military.”54
While the Japa nese government treated South Korean veterans and be-
reaved families diff erently from their Japa nese counter parts, the Yasukuni 
Shrine treated them as the same by honoring 21,181 Koreans as war gods.55 
Th is angered South Korean bereaved families. In April 1978, a South Ko-
rean resident in Tokyo protested against the shrine, arguing, “My  brother 
went to war only reluctantly. Even  after South  Korea became in de pen dent, 
my  brother is still enshrined as a war god at Yasukuni. Th is does not let my 
 brother rest in peace.”56 In response, the Yasukuni Shrine insisted that it was 
impossible to nullify the enshrinement: “When they died, they  were Japa-
nese. It is impossible for them to cease to be Japa nese  after they died. Since 
they fought and died, hoping that they would be honored at the Yasukuni 
Shrine, we cannot de- enshrine them simply upon requests from their be-
reaved families. It is also only natu ral to enshrine them  because they willingly 
cooperated with the war eff ort and wanted to fi ght as Japa nese.”57 JSP mem-
ber Hirota Koichi clearly saw the contradiction in this: “ Th ese Koreans . . . 
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followed  orders of the Japa nese government and died in fi ghting. Th ey are 
enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine. . . .  But their families have received no 
compensation whatsoever  because the Japa nese government says they are 
not Japa nese.”58 Th e government, however, continued to argue that the citi-
zenship requirement made it impossible to apply the Military Pension Act 
and the Act on Relief for the Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families to 
foreign veterans and bereaved families.59
Th is contradiction in Japan’s nationalist commemoration has been in-
creasingly exposed in recent years.  After Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine 
in August 2001, bereaved families and war victims from both inside and 
outside Japan fi led fi ve diff er ent lawsuits to challenge the constitutionality 
of the prime minister’s visit. Th e lawsuit at the Tokyo District Court, for 
example, included 724 South Koreans as plaintiff s.60 At one of the court 
hearings, in February 2003, Kim Gyeong Suk, a former forced laborer and 
chairman of the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Fami-
lies of the Pacifi c War, forcefully criticized the contradiction: while the 
Japa nese government off ered no compensation for South Korean bereaved 
families, “the Yasukuni Shrine honors Korean war dead without asking 
permissions from their bereaved families. . . .  Does Japan want to keep forc-
ibly drafting our relatives even  after their death?” 61
 Here, the focus on  these South Korean veterans, bereaved families, 
and other marginalized victims can illuminate the real extent to which the 
Japa nese government failed to recognize the suff ering of foreign victims 
and, more importantly, how this failure angered the victims. It is diffi  cult, 
however, to make Japa nese citizens fully confront Japan’s imperialist past 
simply by collectively distributing the responsibility for the Asia- Pacifi c War 
between Japan and the Allied powers in light of the world- historical context 
of imperialism and colonialism. To be sure, such distribution of war respon-
sibility can reduce the resentment  toward victor’s justice among Japa nese na-
tionalists and ease the ambivalence among the majority of Japa nese citi-
zens. But the resentment and ambivalence runs deeper, for the ele ments of 
victor’s justice in the Tokyo Trial  were reinforced by the failure to prosecute 
atrocities that the Allied powers had committed against Japan.
Beyond Victim Consciousness: Doubling Japan’s Identity 
as Perpetrator and Victim
 Needless to say, Japan was a perpetrator in relation to South  Korea and 
China. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of Japa nese civilians 
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suff ered from the fi re bombings and the atomic bombings, and atrocities 
 were also committed against Japa nese civilians fl eeing Manchukuo and 
other former colonies. Nearly six hundred thousand Japa nese soldiers  were 
also forced to work at  labor camps in Siberia  after the end of the Asia- Pacifi c 
War, and approximately sixty thousand died in the camps.62 Nonrecogni-
tion of  these Japa nese casualties breeds a sense of injustice among Japa nese 
citizens. In 2007, for example, DPJ member Matsubara angrily reacted to 
US House of Representatives House Resolution 121, wherein American 
politicians asked the Japa nese government to apologize to former comfort 
 women. Matsubara argued, “Th e United States has never apologized for the 
atomic bombings and fi re bombings of Tokyo, killing innocent civilians 
systematically. But they ask us to apologize to former comfort  women. Is 
this not a contradiction?” 63
Importantly, historians and educators in South  Korea and China be-
gan to recognize Japan’s victimhood. A History to Open the  Future, for ex-
ample, included extensive descriptions of Japa nese victims of the atomic 
bombings and other atrocities. Th is inclusion was a signifi cant departure 
from mainstream history textbooks used in South  Korea and China— none 
of the South Korean history textbooks prior to the 2000s had mentioned 
the atomic bombings, while some Chinese history textbooks had begun in-
cluding only very short references to the events in the mid-1990s.64 Th e joint 
history textbook proj ect therefore off ered an impor tant corrective to the 
nationalist commemorations in South  Korea and China. Yao Bao, a history 
professor at Shanghai International Studies University, underscored the ne-
cessity of such a corrective: “When the victim accuses the perpetrator, the 
former should be careful not to exaggerate the latter’s guilt. . . .  Many per-
petrators are si mul ta neously victims.  Th ose perpetrators sometimes suff er 
from more serious damages than some members of the victim country. . . . 
From the victim country’s perspective, this may serve justice. But, from the 
humanitarian perspective, members of the victim country should extend pity 
and empathy to the perpetrators to a certain extent.” 65
Th is recognition of Japan’s victimhood was perhaps most clearly ex-
pressed by Park Yu Ha, a professor of Japa nese studies at Sejong University. 
In her 2005 book, For Reconciliation, she critically examined the nature of 
solidarity between Japa nese and South Korean NGOs over vari ous issues, 
such as apology and compensation for South Korean victims and JSHTR’s 
history textbook. Park’s inquiry was motivated by her uneasiness with the 
way Japa nese NGOs “turned a blind eye to Korean nationalism when co-
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operating with South Korean NGOs” and questioned  whether Japa nese 
NGOs in eff ect “helped Korean nationalism escalate and added fuel to the 
confl ict by single- mindedly demanding Japan should apologize.” 66 Specifi -
cally, she criticized the South Korean nationalist commemoration that 
dehumanized the Japa nese other and pointed out the importance of recog-
nizing how Japan, too, had suff ered during the Asia- Pacifi c War:
Th e Soviet Army used more than 500,000 Japa nese soldiers as forced 
laborers in Siberia  after they had entered war with Japan at the fi nal stage 
of World War II. Th e United States carried out the large- scale aerial 
bombing of Tokyo and killed 100,000  people over a single night. But 
 these acts by the Allied powers  were never offi  cially prosecuted. In this 
regard, it is not surprising that many Japa nese still believe that the 
Tokyo Trial was simply victor’s justice, and that Japan was a victim 
unfairly punished. A true critique must be based on universal values 
and therefore requires South Koreans to understand  those feelings 
on Japan’s part.67
 Here, I agree with Park that it is crucial for relevant po liti cal actors in the 
history prob lem, especially  those in South  Korea and China, to fully ac-
knowledge the problematic nature of the historical judgment of the trial. 
Such acknowledgement is likely to ease ambivalence  toward the trial among 
Japa nese citizens and help them become more willing to accept Japan’s fair 
share of war responsibility.
Of course, recognition of Japan’s victimhood is a double- edged sword. 
On the one hand, it pres ents the risk of allowing Japan to evade its war 
responsibility. Many Japa nese citizens actually did indulge in their own 
victimhood to discount the suff ering that they infl icted on foreign  others. 
On the other hand, recognition of Japan’s victimhood has the potential to 
not only help Japa nese citizens lower their ambivalence  toward the Tokyo 
Trial, but also allow them to mobilize their victim identity as a power ful 
psychological mechanism to generalize their experience and fully empathize 
with foreign victims. As former Hiroshima City mayor Hiraoka Takashi ob-
served, the commemoration of the atomic bombings expresses the “ human, 
primordial outcry” (ningenteki na kongenteki na sakebi) against the nation- 
state threatening to control commemorations in nationalist terms.68
Indeed, the history of Japa nese commemoration of the atomic bomb-
ings demonstrates the potential of victim identity to facilitate cosmopolitan 
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commemoration of foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. At the very 
beginning,  people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had the tendency to dwell 
on their own victimhood, and their attempts to commemorate the atomic 
bombings expressed an imperfect, self- serving kind of cosmopolitanism. But, 
at the same time, their commemorations already contained the seeds of 
genuine cosmopolitanism. A case in point was the “epitaph dispute” that 
occurred in 1952, when Radhabinod Pal, a former judge at the Tokyo Trial, 
visited the newly founded monument in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial 
Park. Th e epitaph of the monument read, “Let all the souls  here rest in peace; 
for we  shall not repeat the evil.” 69  After his visit, Pal remarked that while 
“we” apparently referred to the Japa nese, the evil by  those who had dropped 
the atomic bomb— Americans— was yet to be atoned. In response, Hiro-
shima City mayor Hamai Shinzō and the epitaph author, Saiga Tadayo-
shi, argued that “we” should include anyone praying in front of the mon-
ument, and therefore refer to the  whole of humanity, in promising to 
renounce war and strive for world peace.70 As Hamai  later recounted, Pal 
then agreed with him about the intention of the epitaph. According to 
Hamai, Pal stated, “I was just worried that Japa nese citizens accepted the 
atrocious act by the United States, as Indians accepted vio lence and crimes 
by the British. But, if the evil refers to war, and if the epitaph expresses 
determination not to wage war again, that is a wonderful message.”71 
Th us, both Hamai and Pal agreed that both Japan’s aggression and the 
atomic bombings by the United States  were morally wrong.72 Th is univer-
salistic impulse  later allowed Japa nese A- bomb victims to spearhead the 
eff orts to commemorate South Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings.
Moreover, at its best, the commemoration of the atomic bombings 
articulates cosmopolitanism with world peace by rejecting war itself. As po-
liti cal scientist Fujiwara Kiichi argued, “Memory of the Holocaust raises a 
question about responsibility for standing up against murderers and de-
stroyers. Memory of Hiroshima ethically questions war and demands abso-
lute peace. Th e two episodes of war time vio lence thus left two diff er ent 
lessons: responsibility for fi ghting a war and responsibility for eliminating a 
war.”73 Th e commemoration of the atomic bombings thus embraces the 
ethics of no war, as opposed to just war, by recognizing that even perpetra-
tors can suff er  because they are also  humans. In this res pect, the commemo-
ration of the atomic bombings is radically cosmopolitan and demands that 
any critical reassessment of the Tokyo Trial ultimately question the very 
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existence of a war tribunal itself. Th is is why sociologist Ueno Chizuko, 
speaking at the symposium on “Hiroshima from the Feminist Perspective” 
in 2001, cautioned against being trapped by the concept of war crime: 
“When we defi ne what a war crime is, we si mul ta neously defi ne what is not 
a war crime. . . .  I am concerned that prosecution of war crimes can justify 
some wars as  legal.”74 For Ueno, the commemoration of the atomic bomb-
ings embodied the radical moral commitment to defi ne war itself as a crime.
In summary, the failure of the Tokyo Trial to prosecute war crimes of 
the Allied powers contributed to the history prob lem. While nonrecogni-
tion of Japa nese victims prompted many Japa nese citizens to reclaim their 
own victimhood, this diverted their attention from foreign victims of 
 Japan’s past wrongdoings and suppressed the potential of Japan’s victim-
hood as a common denominator for extending empathy and solidarity to 
foreign  others. In turn, the lack of recognition of Japa nese victimhood at 
the trial facilitated nationalist commemorations in South  Korea and 
China by depriving citizens in the two countries of opportunities to no-
tice the complexity of the Asia- Pacifi c War, empathize with Japa nese vic-
tims, and understand why Japa nese citizens refused to see their country as 
the absolute perpetrator.
Beyond the Government- Centered View of War Responsibility
Addressing only the aforementioned two prob lems in the Tokyo Trial— 
failing to collectively distribute war responsibility among the imperial pow-
ers that participated in the Asia- Pacifi c War, and subjecting the Allied 
powers to the same standard of criminal justice and thereby recognize 
 Japan’s victimhood—is, however, insuffi  cient to move the relevant po liti cal 
actors  toward resolving the history prob lem. Another major prob lem with 
the trial was the government- centered view of war responsibility that inhib-
ited the active participation of Japa nese citizens in discussion of Japan’s re-
sponsibility for foreign victims. By not indicting Emperor Hirohito, the 
symbol of the Japa nese nation, the trial legitimated the historical view that 
only a small number of government leaders  were responsible for Japan’s 
wrongful acts.75 Although some of the Allied powers, such as Australia,  were 
initially keen to prosecute Hirohito, SCAP was opposed to it  because it 
wanted to exploit the emperor’s symbolic authority to stabilize Japa nese 
society while implementing reforms during the Occupation. In the end, 
the Allied powers agreed to suspend prosecution of the emperor and, as a 
result, the judges, prosecutors, and defendants framed trial proceedings to 
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shield the emperor from war responsibility.76  Here, exemption of the em-
peror from war responsibility had an impor tant symbolic ramifi cation: the 
innocence of the Japa nese  people, victimized by militarist leaders, was pro-
jected onto the innocent body of the emperor as a symbol of the Japa nese 
nation.77
Th is government- centered view of Japan’s war responsibility persisted 
throughout the entire postwar period. When South  Korea and China criti-
cized Japa nese prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, they tended 
to target the Class A war criminals rather than Japa nese citizens. Th is dis-
tinction between the guilty government and the innocent Japa nese  people 
facilitated normalization of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries in 
the short run, but it also ended up preventing the majority of Japa nese citi-
zens from critically refl ecting on their own share of war responsibility. In 
real ity, government offi  cials had the power to start the war, but many Japa-
nese citizens  were also complicit in Japan’s aggression, albeit to diff er ent de-
grees,  because they supported the government one way or another.
What is needed  here is a concerted eff ort to carefully investigate 
and delineate shares of war responsibility among diff er ent groups of 
the Japa nese, ranging from government offi  cials to ordinary citizens. As 
Ienaga Saburō emphasized, “Documenting war responsibilities of ordi-
nary Japa nese citizens by making precise distinctions between diff er ent 
types of participation . . .  is indispensable for preventing confusion and 
distortion in discussion of war responsibility.”78 Even though prewar Japan 
was not fully demo cratic, the Japa nese government could not have carried 
out its imperial aggression without support from the majority of Japa nese 
citizens. In this res pect, the promoters of the Asian  Women’s Fund took the 
right direction when they tried to justify the call for atonement money by 
stating, “Japan is not a country owned solely by the government but a 
country created by  every citizen who inherits the past, lives in the pres ent, 
and envisions the  future.”79
Th e very fate of the Asian  Women’s Fund, however, shows how diffi  -
cult it is to go beyond the government- centered view of Japan’s war respon-
sibility. By collecting atonement money equally and voluntarily from all 
groups of Japa nese citizens, the promoters ended up obscuring  whether  those 
who had a larger share of responsibility— contractors who had recruited 
comfort  women, military offi  cials who had helped manage the comfort 
 women system, and soldiers who had used comfort stations— contributed 
atonement money. In a way, the promoters unwittingly reproduced the 
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slogan of “repentance by all one hundred million” (ichioku sōzange). Th is 
 slogan was originally advocated by Higashikuninomiya Naruhiko, the fi rst 
postwar prime minister, who argued, “Of course, the government made pol-
icy  mistakes, but the declining morality among citizens also contributed [to 
the defeat]. . . .  I believe repentance by all Japa nese citizens is the fi rst step in 
reconstructing our country.”80 Such a slogan was problematic  because it dis-
tributed responsibility for Japan’s past wrongdoings equally among Japa nese 
citizens, shielding relevant actors from their share of guilt.
In turn, NGOs supporting former comfort  women continued to regard 
the Japa nese government as the sole author of the military comfort  women 
system. Take, for example, the  Women’s International War Crimes Tribu-
nal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery in December 2000. Th is tribunal was 
or ga nized by the Vio lence Against  Women in War Network Japan in coop-
eration with NGOs from six Asian countries: the Korean Council for the 
 Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery (South  Korea), the Asian Cen-
ter for  Women’s  Human Rights (the Philippines), the Shanghai Comfort 
 Women Research Center (China), the Taipei Fund for  Women’s Relief and 
Welfare (Taiwan), the Military Comfort  Women Compensation Commit-
tee (North  Korea), and the Indonesian  Women’s Federation (Indonesia). Th e 
tribunal comprised four judges, from the United States, Argentina, Brit-
ain, and  Kenya. During the fi ve- day tribunal, former comfort  women and 
Japa nese soldiers  were called upon to give testimony. Th e tribunal judged 
Emperor Hirohito, Tōjō Hideki, and other Japa nese government leaders 
guilty of crimes against humanity such as rape and sexual slavery. Th e tribu-
nal also called for the Japa nese government to off er sincere apologies and 
compensation to former comfort  women, fully investigate historical facts 
about the comfort- women system, and establish memorials, museums, and 
educational programs, among other  things.81 Although the tribunal was an 
impor tant achievement in exposing Japan’s past wrongdoings, it ended up 
reinforcing the government- centered view of war responsibility  because it 
did not question Japa nese citizens’ responsibility in the war crimes, not to 
mention local Korean complicity.82
Th e government- centered view of war responsibility persists  because the 
national government continues to play a central role in organ izing commem-
orations and other social activities for citizens. For example,  after his visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine caused an international controversy in 2001, Koi-
zumi created the Commission on Memorial and Other Facilities for Mourn-
ing War Dead and Praying for Peace (Tsuitō Heiwa Kinen no tameno 
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Kinenhitō Shisetsu no Arikata wo Kangaeru Konshinkai) to explore “pos-
si ble memorials and facilities where anyone can pray for war dead and peace 
without causing any controversy.”83 In its fi nal report, the commission rec-
ommended the creation of a new, nonreligious site of commemoration 
separate from both the Yasukuni Shrine and Chidorigafuchi National 
Cemetery, and argued that such a nonreligious site should permit  people to 
pray for both military and civilian war dead, as well as for both Japa nese 
and foreign victims of the past wars in which Japan had been involved.84 As 
critics pointed out, however, such a new site of commemoration, no  matter 
how cosmopolitan it may be, would reproduce the government- centered war 
commemoration: “A new national memorial is expected to be non- religious, 
but its essence would be exactly the same as the Yasukuni Shrine’s. Th e cre-
ation of a new memorial by the government means that meaning of ‘life 
and death’  will continue to be defi ned by the government.”85  Here, the crit-
ics articulated the exact opposite of government- centered commemoration— 
namely, individual- based commemoration, where individuals as  human 
beings would take the initiative to commemorate war dead, irrespective of 
nationality, as well as in de pen dent of governments. Th is may be the ulti-
mate form of cosmopolitan commemoration, but such individual- based 
commemoration risks denying the historical fact that government leaders 
did bear the largest share of war responsibility. Moreover, East Asia’s his-
tory prob lem continues to be centered on Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, 
defi ned by the Japa nese government. It is therefore neither desirable nor 
pos si ble to make a complete break with the government- centered view of 
Japan’s war responsibility.
Th us, for relevant po liti cal actors in the history prob lem to go beyond 
the government- centered view of Japan’s war responsibility, they have to walk 
a fi ne line, distributing war responsibility among citizens without obscur-
ing each citizen’s fair share. But walking this fi ne line is extremely diffi  cult, 
and the failure to do so prevented Japa nese citizens, especially  those who 
had lived through the war, from discussing how they contributed to the 
actions of the prewar Japa nese government. Since a large number of Japa-
nese citizens did not accept their share of war responsibility, the mobilizing 
structures for cosmopolitan commemoration never became large enough 
to institutionalize a high level of cosmopolitanism in Japan’s offi  cial com-
memoration. But if they had done so, they could have contributed not 
only to making Japan’s offi  cial commemoration more cosmopolitan but also 
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to convincing South  Korea and China of the depth and breadth of cosmo-
politan contrition on Japan’s part.
The Role of the United States in the History Prob lem
Th e critical examination of the government- centered view of war responsi-
bility also helps clarify the role of the United States in East Asia’s history 
prob lem. During the Occupation, the US government preferred attributing 
Japan’s war responsibility to only a small number of government leaders, 
while absolving both the emperor and the  people. SCAP also censored 
criticisms of the Tokyo Trial not only by Japa nese nationalists but also by 
leftist intellectuals who questioned the trial’s failure to prosecute Japan’s 
colonial rule of  Korea and Taiwan.86 More importantly, the US Cold War 
policy had signifi cant infl uence on the trajectory of the history prob lem. 
First, SCAP permitted Japan’s “amnesia” of its past wrongdoings by priori-
tizing reconstruction and rearmament of Japan over demilitarization and 
democ ratization, as well as by allowing former war criminals to return to 
power. Second, Japan and South  Korea normalized their relations in the 
1960s partly  because the US government pressed the two countries  toward 
greater cooperation given its geopo liti cal and economic needs at the height 
of the Vietnam War. Similarly, Japan was able to normalize its relations with 
China only  after the US government changed its policies  toward China and 
Taiwan in the early 1970s.87 Most recently, the US government put pres-
sure on Abe to refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, seek friendlier re-
lations with South  Korea and China, and reinterpret Article 9 of the consti-
tution to expand the scope of overseas deployment of the SDF. Th us, the 
history prob lem in “East Asia” is transnational to the extent that it includes 
the United States as a relevant po liti cal actor.88
Th e indirect but deep involvement of the United States in the history 
prob lem poses a formidable obstacle to any attempt to critically reassess the 
historical judgment of the Tokyo Trial. Th is is  because such a reassessment 
would challenge the American commemoration of the “good war,” wherein 
the good United States triumphed over the evil Japa nese empire. Th is good- 
war commemoration— coterminous with the Tokyo Trial historical view— 
was foundational to American identity as a champion of justice, democracy, 
and freedom throughout the entire postwar period. In a way, the A- bomb 
poet Kurihara Sadako foresaw the crucial role of the United States in the 
history prob lem. Although Kurihara’s famous 1976 poem opens with the 
150     Chapter 5
question, “When we say ‘Hiroshima,’ / do  people answer,  gently, / ‘Ah, 
Hiroshima’?,” the fi rst  thing readers hear— before the “anger” spit out by 
Asia’s dead and her voiceless masses—is “Pearl Harbor,” by the American 
voice.89
Indeed, for the sake of building their alliance, the governments of 
Japan and the United States treated the attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
atomic bombings as if they cancelled each other out.  After returning from 
the United States in October 1975, for example, Prime Minister Miki Takeo 
emphasized the “forward- looking” (mirai shikō) nature of his meeting with 
US president Gerald Ford and argued that it was unnecessary to “bring up 
the past, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombing of Hi-
roshima.”90 Moreover, when JCP member Yoshioka Yoshinori argued that 
Japan should apologize to the United States on the fi ftieth anniversary of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Kaifu Toshiki’s government rejected the necessity of 
such apology  because “apology for the attack on Pearl Harbor has never been 
an issue in Japan’s relations with the United States.”91 In turn, when President 
George H. W. Bush and President Bill Clinton justifi ed the atomic bomb-
ings and rejected the necessity of off ering apologies to A- bomb victims, the 
Japa nese government remained  silent, even though the JSP and the JCP de-
manded an offi  cial protest against the US presidents.92 As long as the Japa-
nese and US governments refuse to fully confront the atrocities that they 
committed against each other, they are likely to perpetuate their respective 
nationalist commemorations: the attack on Pearl Harbor is justifi ed as part 
of the war to defend Japan against the West, while the atomic bombings are 
justifi ed to avenge Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and to save American lives.
Nevertheless, the disjunction between the Japa nese and American na-
tionalist commemorations did not develop into a history prob lem  because 
the two countries avoided interfering with each other’s domestic commem-
orations. In the mid-1990s, however, the United States began to criticize 
Japa nese commemorations of Japan’s past wrongdoings against South  Korea 
and China, for a growing number of Asian Americans became interested 
and involved in East Asia’s history prob lem.93 Korean and Chinese Ameri-
cans, in par tic u lar, actively commemorated Korean and Chinese victims and 
shared with other Americans their critical attitudes  toward Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration. For example, Korean Americans created the Washington 
Co ali tion for Comfort  Women Issues in 1992 to lobby American politicians 
to press the Japa nese government with regard to apologies and compensa-
tion for former comfort  women.94 Chinese Americans also played a major 
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role in launching Th e Global Alliance for Preserving the History of WWII 
in Asia in 1994 to promote commemorations of Japan’s war time atrocities 
and lobby politicians in the United States, Canada, and other countries.95
Typically, American citizens criticized Japan’s offi  cial commemoration 
by asserting their moral superiority. Take, for example, the exchange between 
Iris Chang and Saitō Kunihiko, Japan’s ambassador to the United States, 
on the PBS NewsHour program moderated by Elizabeth Farnsworth in 
December 1998.  After criticizing the Japa nese government for failing to 
apologize to Chinese victims of Japan’s past aggression, Chang said, “What 
I’m curious to know is can the ambassador, himself, say  today on national 
TV live that he personally is profoundly sorry for the rape of Nanking and 
other war crimes against China, and the Japa nese responsibility for it?” 
Saitō responded, “Well, we do recognize that acts of cruelty and vio lence 
 were committed by members of the Japa nese military and we are very sorry 
for that. . . .  As to the incident in Nanking, we do recognize that  really 
unfortunate  things happened, acts of vio lence  were committed by members 
of the Japa nese military.” Th en, Farnsworth asked Chang, “Did you hear an 
apology?” thus authorizing the Chinese American writer to determine the 
worth of Saito’s statement. Chang replied, “I  don’t know. Did you hear an 
apology? I  didn’t  really hear the word ‘apology’ that was made.”96 Th e forego-
ing exchange illustrated not simply a lack of decisive apology on Japan’s part. 
It also exposed the assumption, shared by Farnsworth and Chang, that 
Americans had the moral authority to judge the worth of Japan’s offi  cial 
commemoration on behalf of Chinese victims.
Th is assumption about the moral authority of the United States is co-
terminous with the US refusal to apologize to victims of the atomic bomb-
ings by justifying the act as a means to end the war and save “half a million 
American lives.”97 Th is justifi cation is deeply anchored in the nationalist 
logic of commemoration that disregards how foreign  others— the  people in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki— suff ered. By refusing to confront the real  human 
consequences of the atomic bombings, American nationalist commemora-
tion eliminates the moral ambiguity of the bombings and protects the moral 
authority of the United States. Even though this nationalist commemora-
tion has been challenged by critically minded American historians, it is still 
widespread among politicians and citizens in the United States.98
As Tzvetan Todorov pointed out, “Revisiting historical episodes in 
which one’s own group was neither 100  percent heroic nor the complete vic-
tim would be an act of higher moral value for writers of historical narratives. 
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No moral benefi t can accrue from always identifying with the ‘right side’ of 
history; it can only arise when writing history makes the writer more aware 
of the weakness and wrong turns of his or her own community.”99 In this 
regard, Korean and Chinese Americans are prone to falling into the trap of 
nationalist commemoration  because they can easily combine the “100  percent 
heroic” American narrative of the Asia- Pacifi c War with the Korean and 
Chinese narratives of “the complete victim.” For example, following the 
2007 US House of Representatives House Resolution 121, Korean Ameri-
cans and their supporters lobbied state legislatures in New York, New Jer-
sey, and Illinois to adopt similar resolutions to condemn Japan for violating 
 women’s  human rights through military comfort stations. Th ey also helped 
create memorials for comfort  women in New York and New Jersey as well 
as erect a statue of a thirteen- year- old comfort  woman— the same as the 
one in front of the Japa nese embassy in Seoul—in California in July 
2013.100 Even though  these resolutions and memorials express cosmopoli-
tan commemoration based on  human rights, they also risk doubling the logic 
of nationalism; that is, they commemorate Korean comfort  women as com-
plete victims from the American perspective, which assumes the United 
States to be the complete hero and moral authority, while ignoring atroci-
ties that it committed against Japa nese civilians. Similarly, the WWII Pa-
cifi c War Memorial Hall, which opened in San Francisco in August 2015, 
appears to adopt a doubly nationalist commemoration, focusing on the 
suff ering of Chinese victims and the heroism of American and Chinese 
soldiers.101 But, if Korean and Chinese Americans criticize Japan without 
critically refl ecting on their own nationalism vis- à- vis the prob lems of the 
Tokyo Trial, they may very well add fuel to nationalist commemorations 
on all sides in East Asia, making the history prob lem intractable.
In short,  there are both negative and positive aspects in the growing 
involvement of the United States in East Asia’s history prob lem. On the one 
hand, it may well make the prob lem even more protracted.  Every time 
politicians and citizens in the United States call on Japan to apologize to 
victims of its past wrongdoings, they risk reinforcing resentment and am-
bivalence  toward the Tokyo Trial among Japa nese nationalists and citi-
zens, thereby discouraging them from confronting Japan’s past wrongdo-
ings against South  Korea and China. On the other hand, if the American 
commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War moves in the direction suggested 
by Todorov, it  will not only ease the ambivalence among Japa nese citizens 
and encourage them to fully commemorate the suff ering of South Korean 
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and Chinese victims; it  will also set an example for the Japa nese govern-
ment to follow in confronting its “weakness and wrong turns” of the past. 
Th us, if the United States participates in the history prob lem in a self- 
critical and cosmopolitan manner, it can greatly help the governments and 
citizens in Japan, South  Korea, and China to disentangle their nationalist 
commemorations from the Tokyo Trial and, instead, adopt more cosmo-
politan commemorations  toward each other.
 Toward a Critical Reassessment of the Tokyo Trial
Simply put, East Asia’s history prob lem developed  because the Tokyo Trial, 
a common reference point for relevant po liti cal actors in the fi eld, was deeply 
problematic. As historian Alexis Dudden observed, the fundamental prob-
lem with any military tribunal is that “a  legal order for a ‘correct’ history 
must silence other histories in order to declare the necessary guilt.”102 While 
the trial certainly played a crucial role in exposing Japan’s war crimes across 
the Asia- Pacifi c, the Tokyo Judgment was essentially a nationalist commem-
oration on the part of the Allied powers. Its problematic nature gave the 
Japa nese government and citizens an excuse to discount their past wrong-
doings and evade their war responsibility, while providing South  Korea and 
China with a justifi cation to blame Japan entirely for the history prob lem.
Th us, a critical reassessment of the Tokyo Trial is the key to challeng-
ing nationalist commemorations and resolving the history prob lem. First, 
ele ments of victor’s justice in the trial need to be critiqued in such a way 
that the responsibility for the Asia- Pacifi c War  will be collectively and fairly 
distributed between Japan and the Allied powers in light of the world- 
historical context of imperialism and colonialism in the fi rst half of the 
twentieth  century. Th is critique  will decrease the ambivalence that many 
Japa nese citizens feel  toward Japan’s war crimes and help them commemo-
rate Japan’s past wrongdoings more decisively. Second, war crimes of the 
Allied powers vis- à- vis Japan’s victimhood need to be recognized. Such rec-
ognition  will not only alleviate the sense of injustice among Japa nese citi-
zens but also allow them to draw on their own victimhood to empathize 
with South Korean and Chinese victims in a universalistic manner. In 
turn, recognition of Japan’s victimhood  will help South Korean and Chi-
nese citizens better understand Japa nese commemorations of the war. Th ird, 
the trial’s government- centered view of Japan’s past aggression needs to be 
challenged to clarify each Japa nese citizen’s share of war responsibility. Th is 
has the potential to make cosmopolitan contrition truly nationwide. Fi nally, 
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a critical reassessment of the Tokyo Judgment along  these lines can be fa-
cilitated by the greater involvement of the United States as a relevant po liti-
cal actor in the fi eld of the history prob lem.
Th is critical reassessment is impossible without historians capable of 
challenging nationalist commemorations, including the Tokyo Judgment it-
self. As historian Sven Saaler pointed out, “Th e writing of history is revision, 
since historians continually re- evaluate sources in order to revise existing 
theories or pres ent new information or perspectives.”103 In this regard, his-
torians in Japan, South  Korea, and China have a crucial role to play in the 
history prob lem  because they can generate an East Asian version of the 
“historians’ debate” (Historikerstreit). As critical theorist Jürgen Habermas 
argued, such a controversy among historians “only refl ects the structure of 
open socie ties. It provides an opportunity to clarify one’s own identity- 
forming traditions in their ambivalences. Th is is precisely what is needed . . . 
for the development of a historical consciousness that is equally incompat-
ible with closed images of history that have a secondary quasi- natu ral char-
acter and with all forms of conventional, that is, uniformly and pre- refl exively 
shared identity.”104 While Habermas made  these observations on the histori-
ans’ debate that took place in West Germany in the 1980s, his observations 
captured the essence of historians’ debates anywhere. Indeed, a similar debate 
began in East Asia at the transnational level in the form of joint historical 
research and education proj ects. Th e emergence of  these transnational proj-
ects created the possibility of problematizing nationalist biases in the “histori-
cal consciousness” of relevant po liti cal actors in the fi eld. Chapter 6, then, 
turns to a critical examination of this possibility and explores how historians 
may be able to contribute to resolving the history prob lem.
155
CHAPTER 6
The Role of Historians in the History Prob lem
At fi rst glance, historians may not look like the best candidates for facilitat-
ing a resolution of the history prob lem. Th is is  because historians have 
traditionally used the nation as a primary unit of analy sis, helping to natu-
ralize it as a primordial entity. Th ey have also created professional associa-
tions and delimited their membership along national borders, consistent 
with the nationalist logic of self- determination; for example, when Japa nese 
historians write about the history of Japan, they often talk among them-
selves without consulting with foreign historians who study Japan. Th is na-
tionally bounded content focus and membership reinforces the logic of na-
tionalism that divides the world into discrete nations. Th us, even though 
historians are not necessarily supporters of nationalism, they have partici-
pated in nation- building as authoritative narrators of national history.1
But, at the same time, historians have regularly criticized nationalists 
for their tendency to simplify the past in order to create national myths and 
identity.2 Historians are acutely aware that historical evidence is often in-
complete to the extent that facts and interpretations of historical events are 
inevitably and inherently subject to controversy and  future revisions. While 
nationalists often resort to emotionally charged commemoration to trans-
form  these open- ended historical controversies into immutable historical 
truths as foundations of national identity, historians contest such national-
ist commemoration by exposing factual errors and unwarranted interpreta-
tions in light of available research.
In fact, over the last few de cades, historians have become more critical 
of nationalism in the methodological sense, breaking away from the nation-
ally bounded content focus and professional membership. Take, for example, 
156     Chapter 6
the recent growth of global and transnational historiography.3 Historians 
working in this new genre focus on economic, po liti cal, social, and cul-
tural interactions that traverse national borders, challenging the idea of 
nation as a discrete primordial entity. Historian Eric Hobsbawm even sug-
gested that any historiography should entail a global and transnational 
perspective: “Historians, however microcosmic, must be for universalism, 
not out of loyalty to an ideal to which many of us remain attached but 
 because it is the necessary condition for understanding the history of human-
ity, including that of any special section of humanity. For all  human collec-
tivities necessarily are and have been part of a larger and more complex 
world.” 4 Moreover, the norm has emerged that historians as well as history 
teachers should collaborate across national borders in writing history of past 
international confl icts, as evinced by the growing number of joint historical 
research and education proj ects in East Asia and other parts of the world.5 
 Th ese joint proj ects represent the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism 
in historiography, which shifts a unit of analy sis from the nation to trans-
national interaction while incorporating foreign perspectives into histori-
cal narratives.
In this chapter, then, I critically examine the potential for historians 
in problematizing nationalism and promoting cosmopolitanism in the poli-
tics of war commemoration. In recent years, the presence of historians in 
the history prob lem has increased, given that generations who did not expe-
rience the Asia- Pacifi c War became the majority in Japan, South  Korea, and 
China— they learn about the war mostly from history lessons in school. In 
theory, then, historians who participate in joint historical research and edu-
cation proj ects have the capacity to help  these generations disentangle 
nationalist commemorations from the problematic historical judgment of 
the Tokyo Trial and move  toward more cosmopolitan commemoration. 
But, at the same time, their  actual infl uence on the relevant po liti cal actors 
in the fi eld has yet to be systematically examined. To what extent did histo-
rians succeed in shifting governmental and public commemorations from 
nationalism to cosmopolitanism? What barriers did they encounter in try-
ing to infl uence the dynamic and trajectory of the history prob lem?
Historians as Epistemically Oriented Rooted Cosmopolitans
To answer  these questions, it is fi rst necessary to understand the unique 
potentials of historians to act as “epistemically oriented rooted cosmopoli-
tans.” 6 Typically, rooted cosmopolitans are  those based in a single country but 
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endowed with openness to foreign  others.7 Th ey include immigrants whose 
biographies and social ties crisscross multiple nation- states, and activists who 
mobilize advocacy networks to address  human rights violations in vari ous 
parts of the world.8  Th ese rooted cosmopolitans show that openness to for-
eign  others is not merely an individual attribute but also a collective property 
sustained by transnational networks. As sociologist Craig Calhoun put it, 
cosmopolitanism is not “simply a  free- fl oating cultural taste, personal atti-
tude, or ethical choice” but is instead always embedded in specifi c networks 
of actors.9 According to this defi nition, historians, too, qualify as rooted cos-
mopolitans  because they develop transnational social networks by organ izing 
conferences and other professional activities to exchange methods, standards 
of excellence, and training programs, which are open to all nationalities.10
More importantly, historians are epistemically oriented rooted cosmo-
politans. Historians participate in the politics of war commemoration in 
the capacity of what sociologist John Meyer called “ Others,”  those who are 
defi ned as disinterested  bearers of “truths” and authorized to act as con sul-
tants for other po liti cal actors pursuing self- interests.11 In this res pect, 
historians form “epistemic communities” with regard to the history prob-
lem, that is, knowledge- based networks of “professionals with recognized ex-
pertise and competence in a par tic u lar domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy- relevant knowledge within that domain or issue- area.”12 Put an-
other way, historians are regarded as experts in providing reliable data and 
authoritative interpretations for relevant po liti cal actors in the fi eld of the 
history prob lem to justify their commemorative positions.
Th eir epistemic orientations distinguish historians from other types of 
rooted cosmopolitans in the history prob lem. Perhaps the most vis i ble type 
of rooted cosmopolitan is advocacy- oriented: members of Japa nese NGOs 
supporting South Korean A- bomb victims, former comfort  women, and 
other victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th ey extended solidarities across 
national borders, shared information and resources at the transnational level, 
and coordinated their actions to press the Japa nese government to adopt the 
cosmopolitan logic of commemoration.  Th ese advocacy- oriented rooted cos-
mopolitans, however, unwittingly intensifi ed the history prob lem  because 
they sacrifi ced historical accuracy for po liti cal expediency. Many NGOs 
in Japan and South  Korea, for example, categorically defi ned the comfort 
stations as rape centers and the military comfort- women system as sexual 
slavery by following the UN special rapporteurs. As anthropologist  C. 
Sarah Soh critically observed, such a categorical defi nition is “a po liti cal act 
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in support of the redress movement” and a “partisan prejudice” that elimi-
nates complexities of the system that operated diff er ent types of comfort 
stations and depended on Korean cooperation.13 Th e advocacy- oriented 
rooted cosmopolitans in Japan thus ended up perpetuating nationalist 
commemoration in South  Korea while galvanizing Japa nese nationalists 
to reject the claims by former comfort  women as fabrications.
In contrast, historians acting as epistemically oriented rooted cosmo-
politans have the potential to generate a diff er ent eff ect on the history prob-
lem. As historian Kosuge Nobuko pointed out, “Th e method of history, to 
interrogate historical materials (shiryō hihan), is best suited for correcting 
misunderstandings and distortions of the past. . . .  By interrogating histori-
cal materials and conducting empirical research, historians cannot but 
become  humble and accept scholarly asceticism [against indulging in ma-
nipulation of data and distortion of descriptions].”14 Historians are there-
fore capable of critically refl ecting on nationalist commemorations and pre-
venting historical inaccuracies and problematic interpretations from fueling 
the history prob lem. Indeed, joint historical research and education proj ects 
by historians in Japan, South  Korea, and China have shown their potential to 
generate mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations and promote the 
cosmopolitan logic of historical research.
Nevertheless, not all joint proj ects are equally eff ective in critiquing na-
tionalist commemorations. Th e pro cesses and outcomes of the governmen-
tal and nongovernmental joint proj ects show that the latter tend to be more 
successful in promoting the logic of cosmopolitanism.15 Th e nongovernmen-
tal joint proj ects, most notably the History to Open the  Future proj ect, 
allowed historians from Japan, South  Korea, and China to criticize each 
other’s nationalist biases. Th ey not only incorporated dialogues with for-
eign historians more eff ectively into the pro cess of historical research but 
also shifted content focus from the nation to the interaction of nations.
Th e governmental joint proj ects, by contrast, appeared to have diffi  -
culty facilitating mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations. In 
fact, the Japan- South  Korea Joint Proj ect was severely constrained by Japan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, which had long resisted revisiting the 1965 
Basic Treaty between Japan and South  Korea. Th e ministry feared that any 
reinterpretation of historical events mentioned in the treaty, such as Japan’s 
1910 annexation of  Korea, would pave the way for new compensation claims. 
One offi  cial in the ministry was reported to have said, “ Th ere is no room 
for a joint historical research proj ect to reinterpret the 1965 Basic Treaty. 
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Since reinterpretation of the 1965 Basic Treaty could lead to reigniting the 
prob lem of compensation, the possibility of scholarly agreement between 
Japa nese and South Korean sides is extremely small.”16 Similar constraints 
 were also found in the Japan- China Joint Proj ect, where Chinese historians 
 were restricted by their government in publishing the results of the joint 
proj ect.
I argue that the diff erences between the nongovernmental and govern-
mental proj ects derive from the diff er ent frames of identifi cation that they 
support. In general, two diff er ent frames of identifi cation are available for 
participants in a joint proj ect. Th e fi rst is a nationally bounded frame, such 
as “Japa nese,” “South Korean,” and “Chinese.” Th e second is a nationally 
unbounded frame, that is, “historian.”17 Th e nongovernmental proj ects fore-
grounded the nationally unbounded frame of identifi cation— the historian 
who is concerned about the escalation of the history prob lem— and this 
framing allowed the participants to suspend their national identifi cations 
to a signifi cant extent. Th e governmental proj ects, however, foregrounded 
the nationally bounded frame and positioned participants as representatives 
of their countries. For example, the Japa nese participants in the Japan- South 
 Korea and Japan- China Joint Proj ects  were selected by the Japa nese govern-
ment without consultation with professional associations of historians, and 
 these joint proj ects  were all managed by foreign ministries of respective 
governments.18 Th is kind of structural constraint made it diffi  cult for the 
participants to be open to foreign perspectives and dialogically transform 
their original positions.
Th e diff er ent pro cesses and outcomes of the nongovernmental and 
governmental proj ects also appear to depend on the dispositions of 
 participants—on the degree to which they  were already open  toward foreign 
 others. For example, the Japa nese participants in the History to Open the 
 Future proj ect included many left- leaning historians, such as Kasahara 
Tokushi, who had actively engaged in the social movement against conser-
vative politicians and NGOs. Th e History to Open the  Future proj ect was, 
in some re spects, an outgrowth of the existing transnational network of 
advocacy- oriented NGOs that had pressed the Japa nese government re-
garding apology and compensation for foreign victims of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings. Th e dispositions of participants can also partially explain 
the strug gle of the Japan- South  Korea Joint Proj ect, to which the Japa-
nese government appointed Furuta Hiroshi, a history professor at Tsukuba 
University known for his belief in the Japa nese  people’s superiority over 
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Koreans.19 In turn, the Korean side included Lee Man Yeol, a chair of the 
National History Committee, who insisted that “any research on  Korea 
must presuppose love for  Korea. . . .  Only with very strong love for  Korea, 
Japa nese historians can begin to understand Korean history correctly.”20 
 Th ese two historians with strong nationalist dispositions sat on the same sub-
committee and contributed to spreading distrust among other participants. 
Th e dispositions of participants therefore constitute another mechanism that 
can  either facilitate or forestall mutual criticism of nationalist commemora-
tions  because they situationally infl uence interactional dynamics among his-
torians. In short, due to the more open dispositions of participants, nongov-
ernmental proj ects tended to be more successful than their governmental 
counter parts in incorporating foreign perspectives according to the logic 
of cosmopolitanism.
Nevertheless, nongovernmental proj ects have limitations, given their 
overlap with advocacy- oriented activities. Take, for example, the History to 
Open the  Future proj ect. Overall, the Japa nese participants in this trilat-
eral proj ect refused to shy away from criticizing nationalist biases in South 
Korean and Chinese versions of history, and the South Korean and Chinese 
participants  were willing to include descriptions of Japan’s victimhood and 
question offi  cial versions of history promoted by their own governments. Th e 
Japa nese participants nonetheless sacrifi ced scholarly rigor for advocacy when 
they agreed to the fi rst sentence in A History to Open the  Future’s chapter 3, 
section 2.1, on the Second Sino- Japanese War: “On July 7, 1937, the Japa-
nese military started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in the vicinity of 
Beijing.” Th is sentence came  under heavy criticism from the community of 
Japa nese historians who, based on available evidence, had concluded that 
the Japa nese military had not plotted the incident.21 Some Japa nese histori-
ans also thought that A History to Open the  Future as a  whole was academi-
cally disappointing, and  others saw it with suspicion  because many of the 
Japa nese participants  were left- leaning and previously involved in advocacy 
activities for foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings.22
In fact, one of the Japa nese participants, Saitō Kazuharu, was very much 
aware of the danger of “facile border- crossing (an’ ina ekkyō), a failure to criti-
cally examine the nature of dialogue and solidarity, [which] may lead the 
joint history textbook to disseminate wrong understandings.”23 Put another 
way, the danger was that if the Japa nese side simply expressed “facile” soli-
darity with the South Korean and Chinese sides and allowed problematic 
historical facts and interpretations, “the ultimate mission for the joint his-
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tory textbook proj ect . . .  to overcome narrow- minded nationalism” on all 
sides would be compromised.24 In turn, the potential of governmental joint 
proj ects to facilitate mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations can-
not be dismissed too hastily, for it was the Japan- China Joint Proj ect that 
ended up resolving the confl ict regarding the description of the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident: in its fi nal report, both Japa nese and Chinese historians 
agreed that the  battle between the Japa nese and Chinese militaries at the 
Marco Polo Bridge was started accidentally. Th is prompted Saitō to acknowl-
edge that “on this point [regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident], the 
governmental joint proj ect overcame the obstacle that the nongovernmen-
tal joint proj ect could not.”25
Mutual Criticism of Nationalist Commemorations
Observing  these joint proj ects in East Asia, Falk Pingel, a member of the 
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany, of-
fered the following refl ection: “In East Asia, only Japa nese textbooks are 
accused, while South Korean and Chinese textbooks are exempted from criti-
cal discussion. Reform is one- sidedly demanded on the Japa nese side, and it 
seems impossible to establish open relationships for mutual criticism and 
critical self- refl ections on one’s own history.”26 Pingel’s observation serves 
as an impor tant reminder that facile solidarity on Japan’s part could defeat 
the very purpose of any joint proj ect—to problematize all relevant nation-
alist commemorations— but it also underestimates how much historians in 
Japan, South  Korea, and China already engaged in mutual criticism of na-
tionalist biases. For example, Kasahara Tokushi, one of the Japa nese par-
ticipants in the History to Open the  Future proj ect, has been vocal about 
factual errors and nationalist commemorations in history textbooks used in 
China. While Kasahara acknowledged that Japa nese citizens failed to com-
memorate the Nanjing Massacre adequately, he also urged the Chinese side 
to “reconstruct ‘their aff ective and somatic memory’ from the higher per-
spective of  human history,” to pursue more scholarly rigor and move away 
from po liti cally and ideologically motivated historical interpretations.27
Chinese historians also began to establish a critical distance between 
themselves and the Chinese government’s offi  cial commemoration of the 
Asia- Pacifi c War. For example,  after the fi rst edition of A History to Open 
the  Future was published in 2005, the Chinese participants received many 
criticisms from inside China for not specifying three hundred thousand as 
the number of Nanjing Massacre victims. Nevertheless, they maintained that 
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the estimated number of dead varied according to diff er ent sources.28 As 
Cheng Zhaoqi and Zhang Lianhong, both of whom had participated in the 
trilateral proj ect, explained, historical research on the massacre has become 
less emotional in recent years, and Chinese historians have increasingly 
 recognized that more evidence is needed to estimate the number of dead 
accurately.29
 Th ese changes in attitude among Chinese historians  were confi rmed 
by Bu Ping, the director of the Center for Modern History within the Chi-
nese Acad emy of Social Sciences, who had participated in both the History 
to Open the  Future proj ect and other bilateral historical research proj ects. 
At an international symposium in Tokyo in April 2008, Bu observed, “Pre-
viously, Chinese historians conducted China- centered research and their 
knowledge of historical materials and research available outside China was 
inadequate. But this situation is changing. . . .  Although many Chinese be-
lieve shared historical understanding and reconciliation are impossible, we 
must make an eff ort [to achieve them].”30 Moreover,  after the 2010 fi nal 
report of the Japan- China Joint Proj ect was criticized for not stating “more 
than 300,000” as the defi nitive number of victims of the Nanjing Massa-
cre, Bu defended the report as the result of “the attitude to base [interpre-
tation] strictly on historical materials,” emphasized the importance of “pool-
ing archival materials and information” between the Chinese and Japa nese 
sides, and reiterated his belief that a “historical view can, and should, tran-
scend national borders.”31
Similarly, at the eighth Forum on Historical Views and Peace in East 
Asia, held in Tokyo in November 2009, Cao Yi, a researcher at the Museum 
of the Chinese  People’s War of Re sis tance against Japa nese Aggression, ob-
served that the Chinese commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War began to 
go beyond “anger and other feelings associated with being the victim,” given 
the recent eff orts to systematically collect data on Japan’s war time atroci-
ties.32 He then went on to suggest, “China should transcend the facile com-
memoration of the war motivated by anger  toward the aggressor and by the 
interests of the Chinese  people. It  will be more rational, though painful, to 
adopt geo graph i cally wider and temporarily longer perspectives in reexam-
ining the history, the real ity of Sino- Japanese relations, and the war and its 
commemoration. But this is exactly what we should aim for.”33  Th ese state-
ments from Cao, as well as Bu, Cheng, and Zhang, show that Chinese his-
torians have recently gained greater freedom to conduct research, despite 
the Chinese government’s patriotic education and censorship.
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In South  Korea, too, NGOs that participated in the History to Open 
the  Future proj ect or ga nized a forum in November 2005 to critically refl ect 
on the textbook that they had just produced. At the forum, vari ous partici-
pants pointed out that the textbook might have overemphasized Japan’s im-
perialist aggression, leading South Korean students to believe that Japan is 
an evil country, and that it could have also included more descriptions of 
Japa nese  people’s suff ering during the war as well as positive aspects of Japa-
nese history.34
In fact, a small but growing number of South Korean historians be-
gan to counterpose their critical refl ections to nationalist commemora-
tions in their country. In April 2002, the South Korean monthly journal 
Con temporary Criticism published three essays critically examining South 
Korean nationalism with regard to Japa nese history textbooks. Ji Su 
Geol criticized ethnic- nationalist biases in research on modern and con-
temporary Korean history, while Yun Hae Dong advocated that the na-
tional history textbook should be replaced with a new system allowing 
the production of multiple history textbooks. Th e journal editor Lim Jie 
Hyeon, a history professor at Hanyang University, was perhaps most crit-
ical: “Th e South Korean government’s national history textbook and 
JSHTR’s history textbook clash with each other  because they emphasize 
ethnic identities of South  Korea and Japan, respectively. On the episte-
mological dimension, they are rooted in the same soil— namely, ethnic 
nationalism.”35
As a member of the Conference of Japa nese and South Korean Histo-
rians (Nikkan Rekishika Kaigi), Lim was also troubled by the tendency to 
draw the line between victims and perpetrators along national borders. For 
him, the task of historians was to articulate “an approach that challenges 
dichotomous thinking, ‘Our ethnic group (minzoku) is the victim, and the 
other ethnic group is the perpetrator.’ ”36 Lim therefore insisted, “Th e asym-
metry in historical experience of imperialism and colonialism should not 
be used simply to criticize the nationalist historiography of Japan while help-
ing to legitimate the nationalist historiography of South  Korea. . . .  Decon-
struction of nationalist historiography cannot be confi ned within a single 
country but needs to be carried out si mul ta neously within East Asia as a 
 whole.”37 Another conference member, Ahn Byung Jik, a professor of his-
tory at Seoul National University, was also concerned that “the South Ko-
rean memory of Japan’s colonial rule is too rigid and self- contained. A 
prerequisite for reconciliation [between South  Korea and Japan] is to open 
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up the memory. . . .  For the purpose of reconciliation, it is not helpful to 
force one par tic u lar historical view.”38
Some South Korean historians even tried to critically refl ect on the is-
sue of comfort  women, perhaps the most explosive ele ment in the South 
Korean nationalist commemoration. One of them was Lee Yong Hoon, a 
professor of economic history at Seoul National University. He was a long-
time critic of the South Korean government’s history textbooks, which had 
contained many overblown sentences, such as “Imperial Japan oppressed and 
exploited our  people in a thoroughly atrocious fashion that has no compa-
rable examples in world history.”39 During a tele vi sion debate in September 
2004, Lee stated that no historical evidence had been found to support the 
widely held belief that the Japa nese military drafted Korean  women as 
“volunteer corps” to serve in comfort stations. He also argued that South 
Koreans should criticize not only Japan but also Koreans who helped the 
Japa nese military to recruit comfort  women, and Korean soldiers who 
used comfort stations.40  After the tele vi sion debate, the Korean Council for 
the  Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan condemned Lee 
for “making statements that only the most extreme right- wing person in 
Japan is capable of making” and demanded his public apology to former 
comfort  women and his voluntary resignation from the university. A sim-
ilar controversy erupted in December 2006, when Ahn Byung Jik also 
stated on tele vi sion that no historical evidence existed for the forcible re-
cruitment of Korean  women, and that Koreans played an impor tant role in 
recruiting comfort  women. He also revealed that he had left the Korean 
Council’s publication proj ect collecting the testimonies of former comfort 
 women  because he had felt that other proj ect members had been “more 
interested in fi ghting against Japan than in learning about the historical 
facts.” 41 Just like Lee, Ahn was subjected to heavy criticism from NGOs 
and citizens in South  Korea.
Although  these episodes demonstrated that the issue of comfort  women 
was still highly charged with nationalist sentiments in South  Korea, they 
also showed that it had become pos si ble to raise critical questions about the 
South Korean nationalist commemoration that depicted Japan as solely and 
entirely guilty for making the Korean  people suff er while accepting Korean 
victims’ testimonies as objective historical truths. In fact, the sixth volume 
of the Korean Council’s publication proj ect in 2004 dropped the title “Forc-
ibly Dragged Away Korean Military Comfort  Women.” Th e publication 
team deci ded to forgo the prevailing one- dimensional repre sen ta tion of 
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Korean comfort  women as forcibly drafted, in  favor of historical descrip-
tions that highlighted the complexity of the comfort- women system, its 
multiple methods of recruitment, and diff er ent types of comfort stations.42
Limited Infl uence of Historians on Governments and Citizens
Th us, historians in Japan, South  Korea, and China have begun to engage in 
mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations. But how much historians 
can actually infl uence the governments and citizens in the three countries 
is another  matter. In this res pect, Bu Ping made an astute observation when 
he defended the Chinese side’s decision not to publish some of the papers 
and memos that the Japan- China Joint Proj ect had produced. Bu argued, 
“Th e history prob lem between China and Japan has three dimensions: po-
liti cal judgment, popu lar sentiment, and scholarly research. . . .  Th ese three 
dimensions are partially overlapped, though never perfectly. If a prob lem 
happens on one dimension, that would aff ect the other two dimensions. Th at 
is, if we want to overcome one dimension of the history prob lem, we have 
to take into consideration the other two.” 43 Put another way, even when 
historians— epistemically oriented rooted cosmopolitans— mobilize mutual 
criticism of nationalist commemorations, their criticism does not directly 
translate into changes in governmental and public commemorations,  because 
the latter two have their own dynamics. Th us, while historians in East Asia 
have produced a variety of joint research reports and common teaching ma-
terials, they have had only a limited impact on commemorations of the 
Asia- Pacifi c War in their respective countries.
I argue that this limited impact of the “historians’ debate” on the his-
tory prob lem stems from at least four institutional  factors. Th e fi rst  factor is 
the absence of institutional mechanisms that authorize historians’ critical 
refl ections to infl uence governmental commemorations. As Hatano Sumio, 
a historian of international relations who participated in the Japan- China 
Joint Proj ect, observed, “Th e fi rst objective of the proj ect, from the Japa nese 
government’s perspective, was to delegate the history prob lem to experts 
and ‘depoliticize’ it, so that it  will not interfere with Japan’s relations with 
China regarding such impor tant issues as trade, investment, natu ral re-
sources, and food security.” 44 Similarly, another participant, Kawashima 
Shin, a historian of modern and con temporary China, thought that joint 
proj ects by historians would have only a “very limited contribution to 
resolving the history prob lem  because their objective is mainly to pre-
vent politicization of the prob lem.” 45 Since governmental joint proj ects 
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are “depoliticized”— ceremonially treated as “venting mechanisms” for 
the history prob lem— they are unlikely to transform the existing offi  cial 
commemorations.
At the same time, the role of historians can be politicized in spite of 
the rhe toric of depoliticization. When Prime Minister Abe Shinzō tried to 
defend his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, he insisted that 
it was not politicians but historians who should decide on the interpretation 
of Japan’s acts in the Asia- Pacifi c War: “Politicians must be  humble (kenkyo) 
about the issue of historical view. Governments must not determine a par-
tic u lar historical view as a correct one. Th is issue is up to historians.” 46 
Similarly, when revisiting the 1993 Kōno Statement that apologized for the 
military comfort- women system, Abe’s cabinet secretary, Suga Yoshihide, 
stated, “Our cabinet members agree that this issue [of comfort  women] 
should not be turned into a po liti cal and diplomatic prob lem . . .  and I hope 
that more scholarly research  will accumulate.” 47 Abe, Suga, and other con-
servative politicians, however,  were most likely to welcome only the kind of 
historical research that would discount Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th us, 
when the Cabinet Offi  ce established a fi ve- member commission to examine 
how the Kōno Statement had been created, Hata Ikuhiko, known for his con-
servative orientation, was appointed as the only historian.48 Hata’s appoint-
ment was in eff ect po liti cal, to support the position of Abe’s government, in 
the guise of “disinterested expert.” 49  Here, historians are not  really “depo-
liticized” but are part and parcel of the politics of war commemoration, ex-
ploited by politicians in power who seek to legitimate their commemorative 
position as “rational.” 
Th e second  factor is the existence of mass media as a mechanism that 
mediates the infl uence of historians’ debate on public commemorations. 
As historian Tessa Morris- Suzuki pointed out, “ Today, more than ever, we 
learn about the past from a multiplicity of media,” such as newspapers, tele-
vi sion programs, and movies.50 Indeed, the majority of citizens in Japan, 
South  Korea, and China are likely to learn most of the “facts” about the Asia- 
Pacifi c War from media rather than from historians and their scholarly 
output. But media companies constantly put spin on historians’ debate, given 
the po liti cal orientations of their readers and viewers. For example, when 
Murayama’s government was preparing the Asian  Women’s Fund in August 
1994, Asahi shinbun reported that the government planned to provide for-
mer comfort  women with one- time “sympathy money” (mimaikin) collected 
from Japa nese citizens, as well as published reactions from supporters of 
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former comfort  women criticizing the government for trying to evade its 
responsibility. According to Wada Haruki, one of the promoters of the fund, 
this news report downplayed the extent of intended “atonement” (rather 
than “sympathy”) within Murayama’s government, undermined the on-
going eff orts by some cabinet members to push for government compensa-
tion, and created distrust between the government and former comfort 
 women and their supporters.51 In South  Korea, too, mass media rarely pre-
sented information and interpretations that would contradict the ste reo type of 
unapologetic Japan.52 Similarly, Chinese mass media lashed out against JSH-
TR’s history textbook in 2001 but failed to report that only 0.039  percent of 
ju nior high schools  adopted the textbook.53 Th e escalation of East Asia’s his-
tory prob lem thus owed no small part to the mass media in the three countries 
that circulated sensational but misleading and even distorted information 
about Japan’s past wrongdoings and the Japa nese government’s actions.54
Th e third  factor is the weak institutional boundary of history as an 
academic profession. As sociologists Andrew Abbott and Th omas Gieryn 
illustrated, any “experts,” ranging from nuclear physicists to historians, con-
stantly engage in “boundary work” to distinguish themselves from “non- 
experts” and defend their “jurisdictions,” that is, their cognitive authority 
over certain kinds of activities.55 Such boundary work may include the es-
tablishment of professional associations, codifi cation of standard training 
programs, and legitimation of certain methods of collecting and analyzing 
data. History, however, is one of the fi elds in the humanities and social sci-
ences where the distinction between experts and non- experts is highly am-
biguous; for example, many local historical socie ties are or ga nized by ama-
teur historians, and  there is a long tradition of memoirs that  people narrate 
as historians of their own lives. Ultimately, as historian James Banner put 
it, “all  humans [are] acting as historians when chronicling and understand-
ing their own biographies, evaluating the meaning of the pasts they think 
relevant to their lives.”56 Since narrative is constitutive of repre sen ta tion of 
the past, the distinction between professional and amateur historians, both 
of whom use narrative, is more continuous than discrete.57 Th is makes his-
tory a most demo cratic discipline in the humanities and social sciences, but 
it also prevents professional historians from eff ectively intervening in the 
history prob lem by correcting factual inaccuracies and unwarranted in-
terpretations contained in offi  cial and public commemorations.
Th e weak authority of historians in Japan manifested most clearly in 
the way that the nationalist commemorations of comfort  women and the 
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Nanjing Massacre escalated in the 1990s. Th e Korean Council for the 
 Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, for example, claimed 
that the Japa nese government forcibly drafted Korean “female volunteer 
corps” into the military comfort  women system, with two hundred thou-
sand Korean  women forced into such work. But even the most sympathetic 
Japa nese historians, including Yoshimi Yoshiaki, as well as some South Ko-
rean historians, disagreed with the Korean Council’s claim.  Th ese histori-
ans pointed out that female corps and comfort  women had been recruited 
separately, recruiters had included Koreans, and the estimated number of 
Korean comfort  women was excessive.58  Th ese Japa nese historians also sug-
gested that testimonies should be carefully evaluated, as some former com-
fort  women had changed details of their testimonies over time. But the 
Korean Council refused to change its claims and even denounced seven 
former comfort  women who received atonement money, medical and wel-
fare relief, and a letter of the Japa nese prime minister’s apology from the Asian 
 Women’s Fund. Th e president of the Korean Council, Yun Jeong Ok, even 
argued, “By receiving the money that does not accompany the admission of 
guilt, the victims [the seven former comfort  women] admitted that they had 
volunteered to become prostitutes.”59
In the case of the Nanjing Massacre, too, Iris Chang’s Th e Rape of Nan-
king galvanized the American public, especially Chinese Americans. But Japa-
nese and American historians who specialized in modern and con temporary 
Chinese history criticized Chang’s book for its numerous inaccuracies and 
careless  handling of historical evidence. David Kennedy, a professor of his-
tory at Stanford University, doubted the validity of Chang’s claim that the 
massacre had been a systematic genocidal program comparable to the 
 Holocaust, while Joshua Fogel, a professor of history at the University of 
California– Santa Barbara, criticized Chang’s book for failing to carefully 
consider the credibility of the interviews and documents that she presented 
as “historical evidence,” as well as for misrepresenting the massacre as com-
pletely forgotten by Japa nese citizens.60 Kasahara Tokushi also requested 
Chang, face- to- face, to be more careful about interpreting available archi-
val materials.61
Despite vari ous prob lems in Chang’s book, the left- leaning publishing 
com pany Kashiwa Shobō planned to translate it into Japa nese  because the 
com pany believed that details of the Nanjing Massacre should be more 
widely known in Japan. When Kashiwa Shobō asked Chang to correct vari-
ous errors and inaccuracies in her book, however, she agreed to make only 
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about a dozen small revisions. Moreover, Chang refused Kashiwa Shobō’s 
proposal to pair the Japa nese edition of her book with an anthology of com-
mentaries critically evaluating the evidence and arguments presented in the 
book.62 In the end, Kashiwa Shobō gave up the Japa nese translation of Th e 
Rape of Nanking  because the com pany feared that the book’s serious fl aws 
would only give Japa nese nationalists more ammunition to discredit the 
Nanjing Massacre as a fabrication.63 Instead, Kashiwa Shobō published Th ir-
teen Lies by Deniers of the Nanjing Massacre (Nankin Daigyakusatsu hiteiron 
jūsan no uso)— written by a group of prominent history professors who spe-
cialized in research on Japan’s war time atrocities in China, such as Fujiwara 
Akira, Kasahara Tokushi, and Yoshida Yutaka—as a “counterpoint to the 
Nanjing Massacre denial in Japan revived by many factual errors in Iris 
Chang’s book.” But Chang never retracted her claim that at least three hun-
dred thousand Chinese had been massacred inside the city walls of Nanjing 
as part of Japan’s genocidal program.
Conservative NGOs in Japan, most notably JSHTR, seized upon  these 
problematic claims made by the Korean Council, Chang, and other advo-
cates of South Korean and Chinese victims. Th ey invoked their own, equally 
problematic version of objective truth to justify the Asia- Pacifi c War as a he-
roic act of self- defense. In fact, they even challenged professional historians 
who defended the historical facticity of the comfort- women system and the 
Nanjing Massacre. In par tic u lar, one of the JSHTR’s members, Fujioka No-
bukatsu, declared that “the age of experts is over” and argued, “Ordinary 
 people have misunderstood that only historians, experts of history, can un-
derstand how to interpret the history. But history is an academic discipline 
examining facts that are the closest to ordinary  people’s common sense and, 
therefore, ordinary  people are allowed to evaluate historical research in light 
of their common sense. . . .  Even amateurs can refute historians’ distorted 
arguments if they use their sound reason.” 64
Th us, with regard to comfort  women and the Nanjing Massacre, non- 
historians brushed aside questions raised by professional historians. Yun 
Jeong Ok was not a professional historian but a professor of En glish. Nei-
ther was Iris Chang a professional historian but a journalist. Two of the 
founding members of JSHTR, Fujioka Nobukatsu and Nishio Kanji,  were 
not professional historians,  either. Th ey  were both university professors, but 
they specialized in curriculum studies and German lit er a ture, respectively. 
Another JSHTR member, Higashinakano Shūdō, was also a university 
professor, but his specialty was Japa nese intellectual history. Above all, 
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Kobayashi Yoshinori, at one point the most popu lar JSHTR member 
 because of his Sensōron comic book series, was a cartoonist who had ma-
jored in French lit er a ture in college. Nevertheless, the problematic factual 
claims made by Yun, Chang, and the JSHTR members overwhelmed the 
cautious and refl ective voices of Japa nese historians who had dedicated 
their  careers to studying Japan’s past wrongdoings.
 After all, the ambiguous distinction between professional and amateur 
historians is only part of a larger, more fundamental prob lem of the rela-
tionship between historiography and commemoration as two overlapping 
modes of representing the past— this is the fourth institutional  factor that 
limits the infl uence of historians.65 For a long time historians and scholars 
of collective memory have debated on the relationship between “history” and 
“memory.” At fi rst, many historians and sociologists drew a sharp distinc-
tion between the two by defi ning history as “rational” and “objective” vis- à- 
vis memory as “irrational” and “subjective.” More and more historians, how-
ever, began to realize a variety of epistemological (and po liti cal) limits of 
their scholarship, given controversies over historical repre sen ta tions of the 
Holocaust, postmodernist challenges to “objective historical facts,” growing 
awareness of the existence of “subaltern history,” and ac cep tance of oral his-
tory and other new methods.66 As a result, most historians and scholars of 
collective memory now accept historiography and commemoration as sim-
ply two diff er ent modes of narrating the past, where one has no epistemo-
logical superiority over the other.
In this res pect, historiography and commemoration form what Paul 
Ricoeur called a truly “open dialectic,”  because their opposition can never 
be transcended into a synthesis of higher truth about the past.67 Put another 
way, they form a dialogical, symbiotic relationship, where they mutually con-
stitute and transform each other. As historian Aleida Assmann explained, 
“Historical scholarship depends on memory not only for oral testimony and 
experience, but also for criteria of meaning and relevance; on the other hand, 
memory depends on historical scholarship for verifi cation, substantiation, 
and falsifi cation.” 68 It is therefore diffi  cult for professional historians to 
invoke their cognitive authority to bring closure to the history prob lem 
 because politicians and citizens have their own memories whose criteria of 
epistemological validity are diff er ent from  those of the historians. Worse, 
historians are likely to be overwhelmed by memories of traumatic events, 
such as war time atrocities, as in East Asia’s history prob lem, for commemo-
rations of traumatic events tend to be so emotionally charged that  people 
Role of Historians in the History Prob lem     171
can often over- identify with victims and become unable to notice incon-
sistencies, omissions, and contradictions in available evidence.69
Th e diffi  culty that historians face is further compounded by the hetero-
geneity of historiography vis- à- vis commemoration. As the term “historians’ 
debate” suggests, controversy, not consensus, is the norm for historians. When 
diff er ent historians maintain competing interpretations of the same historical 
event,  these interpretations can be used by competing groups of po liti cal 
actors to legitimate their preferred commemorative positions. In such a sit-
uation, historians are unable to arbitrate competing commemorations. On 
the contrary, they are likely to exacerbate the competition by lending credi-
bility to each of the commemorative positions.
East Asia’s History Education Prob lem
Furthermore, the limited eff ect of historians’ debate on governmental and 
public commemorations is aggravated by two characteristics of history edu-
cation in East Asia that prevent younger generations from developing the 
competencies to critically refl ect on the history prob lem. Th e fi rst is the heavy 
focus on memorization. Since entrance exams for secondary and higher ed-
ucation are extremely competitive and based mostly on multiple- choice 
questions, Japa nese, South Korean, and Chinese students are required to ab-
sorb large amounts of knowledge from elementary through high school. As 
a result, history education at primary and secondary levels forces students 
to memorize dates of impor tant historical events and names of prominent 
historical fi gures in preparation for exams. Such memorization- based his-
tory education tends to create the impression that history is a fi eld with 
clear, distinct answers, appropriate for multiple- choice questions, mislead-
ing students to accept a certain version of the past as an objective truth. 
Students are thus deprived of opportunities to develop the cognitive skills 
necessary to weigh confl icting historical evidence and adjudicate between 
competing interpretations— the very cognitive skills required to deal with 
the history prob lem.70
Especially in Japan,  these shortcomings in history education are mag-
nifi ed by the limited coverage of modern and con temporary history in 
primary and secondary education. Japa nese history textbooks devote con-
siderable space to ancient history prior to the 1868 Meiji Restoration but pro-
vide only brief coverage of the twentieth  century when Japan committed 
aggression and atrocities against South  Korea and China. Lessons on the 
twentieth  century are also typically off ered at the end of the school year, 
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when both teachers and students are busy preparing for graduation ceremo-
nies and entrance exams, ensuring students get only quick and superfi cial 
exposure to the historical period. In fact, the Japa nese government deliber-
ately limited the teaching of modern Japa nese history in schools precisely 
 because the historical period was central to the history prob lem. In August 
2005, for example, Machimura Nobutaka, then minister of foreign aff airs 
and former minister of education, admitted that the Ministry of Education 
advised schools to minimize the teaching of modern Japa nese history so as to 
prevent some “Marxist- Leninist teachers”— JTU members in particular— 
from inculcating in students self- hatred  toward Japan.71
Machimura’s position, however, not only refl ected the LDP’s longstand-
ing aversion to the JTU, but also pointed out an impor tant prob lem with 
the pedagogical tendency among history teachers in Japan. For JTU teach-
ers, “Never send our  children to the battlefi eld again!” was their most impor-
tant slogan, consistent with the Tokyo Trial historical view that allowed no 
justifi cation for Japan’s past aggression.72 Accordingly, JTU teachers strongly 
criticized the conservative government for promoting the nationalist com-
memoration that presented Japan’s past aggression as a heroic act of self- 
defense. At the same time, JTU teachers, and Japa nese teachers in general, 
 were trained in the existing Japa nese education system, where history edu-
cation was anchored in memorization. As a result, they did not always 
provide their own students with the kind of history education that would 
encourage critical evaluation of historical evidence and interpretations. 
Although education reforms during the Occupation changed the emphasis 
in history education from emperor- centered nationalism to pacifi sm, the basic 
structure of history education in Japan— the emphasis on memorization— 
did not change.
Postwar history education in Japan was therefore torn between two 
diametrically opposing forces: the conservative government promoted na-
tionalist commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War, whereas JTU teachers 
promoted the Tokyo Trial historical view that judged Japan as solely and 
entirely guilty of the war. To preempt controversies over how to teach 
modern Japa nese history, the Ministry of Education deci ded to reduce the 
coverage of the twentieth  century in history textbooks and emphasize the 
chronological, empiricist approaches in history curriculum.73 Since history 
education in Japan continues to downplay the modern period and empha-
size memorization, the majority of Japa nese citizens are ill- prepared to en-
gage in constructive debates on the Asia- Pacifi c War among themselves or 
with South Korean and Chinese citizens.
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Th e situation of history education is not much diff er ent in South  Korea 
and China,  either. Since South Korean students have to amass large amounts 
of knowledge to compete for admissions to universities, history education 
in the country is focused on memorization.74 Similarly, while school curri-
cula in China are heterogeneous across provinces and rapidly changing in 
recent de cades, Chinese history lessons also heavi ly focus on memorization 
of historical events, as well as emphasize their moral- ideological implica-
tions.75 Th e education systems in Japan, South  Korea, and China thus share 
the tendency to pres ent students with versions of the past as objective truths, 
rather than as provisionally settled interpretations open to  future revision. 
As educational researcher Edward Vickers cautioned, “Th e prospects for 
implementing a pedagogy that truly encourages a critical approach to the 
past are likely to remain poor” in East Asia.76 If younger generations in 
the three countries continue to be taught memorization- based history les-
sons, the history prob lem  will retain the risk of escalating into an intracta-
ble confl ict over incommensurable versions of the past.
Ultimately, however, the fundamental prob lem with history education 
in East Asia is not the focus on memorization per se, but the ability of the 
governments to control the content of history lessons via textbook inspec-
tion. In Japan, South  Korea, and China, teachers can use only history text-
books that are approved by their ministries of education.  Under  these 
textbook- inspection systems, textbook writers and publishers have the 
formal freedom to decide on the structures and contents of their history 
textbooks. Given the legally binding curricular guidelines, however, 
many textbook writers and publishers are forced to exercise self- censorship.77 
 After all, the governments have the power to require revisions according 
to the curricular guidelines and thereby exert signifi cant control— almost 
censorship— over history textbooks.78 As a result, history textbooks deci-
sively infl uence citizens’ historical views, as Ienaga Saburō recognized: “No 
bestseller can beat a textbook. You can stop reading other books if you do 
not like them. But you have to read a textbook,  whether you like it or not, in 
order to gradu ate from school. For this reason, I think that a textbook is a 
more eff ective means than a public- security law for the government to in-
fl uence the minds of citizens.”79
Specifi cally, the Japa nese government has insisted that history textbooks 
include only “facts,” not interpretations or disputes.80 Take, for example, 
the government’s counterargument against Ienaga’s lawsuit. At the Tokyo 
High Court in 1980, the government accused Ienaga of “making no distinc-
tion between history and history education. . . .  At the level of compulsory 
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education, history education does not reach the level of specialized scholar-
ship. Its aim is to provide students with basic historical knowledge that 
Japa nese citizens should possess. . . .  History textbooks should be written 
based on doctrines widely accepted in academia . . .  and textbook writers 
should take into consideration developmental stages of students.”81 Th e gov-
ernment thus argued that historians’ debate should not be imported into 
history education  because the latter’s ultimate goal is to educate members 
of the Japa nese nation, not to train historians.
Th e government’s counterargument, however, suff ered from two seri-
ous prob lems. First, as Tōyama Shigeki, a history professor who supported 
Ienaga, pointed out, “Foundational historical questions, which require 
comprehension of complexly intertwined historical facts, necessarily lead 
historians to exercise their own historical judgments. With res pect to  these 
questions, disagreement among diff er ent doctrines is especially strong.”82 
Put another way, if history textbooks are to include only descriptions of the 
past where historiographical debates are already settled, they cannot but 
become short  because they are unable to provide details of impor tant his-
torical events, many of which are still contested— indeed, Japa nese his-
tory textbooks are very thin. By demanding that students be taught only 
already established historical facts, the government kept Japa nese citizens 
from developing the competencies to interpret the diffi  cult past critically 
and in de pen dently.
Th e second and more serious prob lem is that the Japa nese government 
assumed that students are not mature enough to work through confl icting 
interpretations. Again, Tōyama argued in defense of Ienaga:
We should not make  children and adolescents fear disagreement. We 
would like students to know that they can examine and refi ne their own 
ideas by having dialogues with other  people who have diff er ent ideas. If 
 there are only citizens who uncritically obey the government’s decisions, 
democracy  will be destroyed. Th e Ministry of Education argues that stu-
dents in elementary, ju nior high, and high schools have no competence 
to make their own judgments. But this argument is based on the wrong 
understanding. If we carefully prepare teaching materials, students  will 
show the astonishing ability to form their own judgments.83
Tōyama thus criticized the artifi cial separation between history and history 
education as the government’s attempt to deploy history education to pro-
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duce obedient citizens. Nagahara Keiji, another history professor and 
supporter of Ienaga, even more forcefully criticized the separation as remi-
niscent of the prewar system that had promoted “patriotic- spiritualistic his-
tory education by decoupling history education from history.”84
Even though Ienaga’s lawsuits helped increase descriptions of Japan’s 
past wrongdoings in history textbooks, they ultimately failed to eliminate 
the system of textbook inspection itself. Moreover, by resorting to law-
suits, Ienaga and his supporters created the paradoxical situation wherein 
historians are forced to give up their professional authority to adjudicate 
competing historical judgments among themselves, and instead allow judges, 
who are not experts of history, to write offi  cial history in the form of judicial 
judgments. Ienaga was indeed aware of this paradoxical situation and the 
negative implications that his lawsuits created. Th is is why,  after the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in August 1997, Ienaga stated, “I hope that the textbook- 
lawsuit movement  will develop to eventually abolish the system of textbook 
inspection itself. I  really hope that the next generation  will do it.”85  Here, 
Ienaga’s long strug gle and lasting hope is also relevant to historians and edu-
cators in South  Korea and China, where the writing of textbooks is even 
more heavi ly regulated by the governments.
Given their power to defi ne and impose legitimate versions of the past, 
then, the governments in East Asia remain the most impor tant actors driv-
ing the dynamic and trajectory of the history prob lem, despite the growing 
role of mass media in recent de cades.86 So long as the governments in Japan, 
South  Korea, and China control history textbooks via their curricular 
guidelines and inspection systems, offi  cially approved history textbooks con-
tinue to teach nation- centered histories: history textbooks in Japan provide 
descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings only in minimal amounts, whereas 
history textbooks in South  Korea and China promote patriotism based on 
legacies of anti- Japanese re sis tance. In the meantime, since none of the teach-
ing materials produced by nongovernmental joint proj ects have been able 
to pass governmental inspection, they are used in schools only as informal 
supplemental materials, thus failing to fully import historians’ critical re-
fl ections into history education. In short, as Kosuge Nobuko observed, “One 
of the most urgent tasks in the pro cess of resolving the history prob lem and 
moving  toward reconciliation is ‘to historicize history (rekishi no rekishika).’ 
Th e prob lem in East Asia is the politics that does not permit the historiciza-
tion of history and the plurality of historical interpretations, that is, the poli-
tics that supports and reproduces ste reo types about former enemies.”87
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From Historians’ Debate to Cosmopolitan Commemoration
In theory, historians have the potential to infl uence the dynamic and tra-
jectory of East Asia’s history prob lem for two reasons. One is their unique 
status in the fi eld of the history prob lem. Even though historians can en-
gage in advocacy activities and act like any other po liti cal actors in the fi eld, 
they mostly act as “disinterested  others” who provide historical materials for 
other po liti cal actors to articulate their commemorative positions. Another 
reason is the demographic shift in the region. Since  those who  were born 
 after the Asia- Pacifi c War are now the majority in Japan, South  Korea, and 
China, their commemorations cannot but draw on evidence and interpre-
tations put forward by historians. At this historical juncture, an increasing 
number of historians engage in joint research and education proj ects, form-
ing a transnational epistemic community as an infrastructure of cosmopoli-
tanism: they incorporate foreign perspectives into historical narratives and 
focus on transnational interaction as a unit of analy sis. Th is growing histo-
rians’ debate at the transnational level pres ents the potential to problema-
tize nationalist commemorations in Japan, South  Korea, and China and 
move other po liti cal actors in the fi eld  toward more cosmopolitan positions.
In practice, however, the cosmopolitan potential of the historians’ de-
bate is constrained in vari ous ways. First of all, no institutionalized channels 
exist for joint proj ects by historians to eff ectively infl uence offi  cial commem-
orations in Japan, South  Korea, and China. Furthermore, the ability of his-
torians to eff ectively infl uence the governments and citizens is undermined 
by two other  factors. One is that scholarly output of historians is almost al-
ways mediated by mass media willing to sacrifi ce accuracy for sensational-
ism. Another is that the coexistence of historiography and commemoration 
as two overlapping and equally legitimate modes of narrating the past grants 
historians only weak authority over non- historians. Especially in East Asia’s 
history prob lem, which is concerned with extremely complex and emotion-
ally charged historical events, historians themselves are embroiled in contro-
versies over evidence and interpretations, and their historiographies can be 
easily brushed aside by nationalist commemorations. Th e potential for histo-
rians as rooted cosmopolitans is further curtailed by the disconnect between 
their debate and history education, engineered by national governments 
 eager to deploy history lessons as moral education for their citizens.
Th us, the cosmopolitan potential of the historians’ debate to help citi-
zens critically refl ect on their nationalist commemorations has not been fully 
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realized in East Asia. As a result, Japan, South  Korea, and China remain 
trapped in the history prob lem. George Santayana’s aphorism, “Th e one who 
does not remember history is bound to live through it again,” is justly 
famous, but remembering the Asia- Pacifi c War according to the logic of 
nationalism  will likely contribute to repeating a similar tragedy in the 
 future. To ensure that citizens in the three countries  will not “live through 
it again,” is  there any way to eff ectively deploy historians’ critical refl ections 
to shift commemorative positions of relevant po liti cal actors in a more cos-
mopolitan direction? Th e next chapter examines this question.
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Can East Asia’s history prob lem ever be resolved, and if so, how? Th is is the 
question that I set out to answer in this book. In light of the fi eld analy sis 
of the history prob lem, my answer is cautiously affi  rmative— yes, it can be 
resolved if the governments and citizens in Japan, South  Korea, and China 
fi nd a way to unleash the potential of the historians’ debate to promote the 
cosmopolitan logic of commemoration. My affi  rmative answer is cautious 
 because nationalist commemorations, focusing on the suff ering of conation-
als without suffi  cient regard for foreign  others, persist in the region, over-
whelm historians’ critical refl ections, and threaten to prolong the history 
prob lem. My answer is also affi  rmative, however,  because the region has 
witnessed the emergence of cosmopolitan commemoration based on the 
transnational network of concerned citizens, NGOs, and historians and 
educators who have come to recognize the suff ering of victims of the Asia- 
Pacifi c War irrespective of nationality. Indeed, the logic of cosmopolitan-
ism has gained signifi cant ground in the fi eld of the history prob lem, to the 
extent that it is now  adopted in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration.
To be sure, nationalism remains the dominant logic of commemora-
tion. Th is per sis tent dominance traces back to the immediate postwar period 
(1945–1964), when conservative politicians and NGOs in Japan acquired 
robust mobilizing structures through the LDP and the Japan Bereaved 
Families Association, and monopolized po liti cal opportunities to shape 
Japan’s offi  cial commemoration according to the logic of nationalism. Con-
servative politicians and NGOs continued to enjoy robust mobilizing 
structures during the next period (1965–1988), but their po liti cal opportu-
nities decreased, mainly  because the governments and citizens in South 
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 Korea and China began to put pressure on the Japa nese government. Concur-
rently, mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemoration expanded 
through the development of the transnational network of Japa nese NGOs and 
foreign victims. Th en, during the po liti cally turbulent post– Cold War period 
(1989–1996) that saw the LDP’s temporary loss of power, non- LDP prime 
ministers, such as Hosokawa and Murayama, seized both domestic and inter-
national po liti cal opportunities to move Japan’s offi  cial commemoration in a 
more cosmopolitan direction.
Th e LDP came back to power during the most recent period (1997–
2015) and joined forces with JSHTR and other conservative NGOs to reas-
sert nationalist commemoration. In the meantime, the power of the JSP, the 
JTU, and other longstanding mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan com-
memoration declined signifi cantly. Nevertheless, the LDP could not make 
full use of the domestic po liti cal opportunities to reinvigorate nationalism 
in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, not only  because of the path dependence 
of cosmopolitanism institutionalized during the previous period, but also 
 because of the decreasing po liti cal opportunities at the international level. 
South  Korea and China continued to criticize nationalist commemoration 
in Japan, and the norm emerged to expect national governments to promote 
joint historical research proj ects and other policies consistent with the logic 
of cosmopolitanism. As a result, even LDP prime ministers had to compro-
mise their nationalist defi ance with cosmopolitan contrition in order to 
maintain Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China. Despite the per sis-
tence of nationalist commemoration, the dynamic and trajectory of the fi eld 
points to the continuing growth of cosmopolitan commemoration. Th is is 
why I am cautiously positive about a pos si ble resolution of East Asia’s his-
tory prob lem.
But exactly how can cosmopolitan commemoration contribute to re-
solving the history prob lem and reconciling Japan with South  Korea and 
China? First of all, I argue that cosmopolitan commemoration can help re-
solve the history prob lem if it is mutual, and that such mutual cosmopoli-
tan commemoration is already embodied by the joint historical research and 
education proj ects. Although the existing joint proj ects are far from perfect, 
they have shown the potential to promote mutual criticism of nationalist 
commemorations and allow citizens in Japan, South  Korea, and China to 
reciprocate cosmopolitan commemoration, wherein perpetrators and victims 
recognize humanity in each other, by  going beyond the logic of national-
ism that dehumanizes the foreign other. In this concluding chapter, I fi rst 
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clarify what mutual cosmopolitan commemoration  will entail and how it 
can help resolve the history prob lem. I then explore what concrete mea-
sures can be taken to eff ectively mobilize joint historical research and educa-
tion proj ects— historians’ debate at the transnational scale—to facilitate 
mutual cosmopolitan commemoration and eventual reconciliation in 
East Asia.
Rethinking the Role of Apology in Reconciliation
As social psychologist Herbert Kelman observed, former enemies can move 
 toward reconciliation if they manage to revise their previously incompati-
ble identities, but this “revision in the group’s identity and the associated 
narrative is pos si ble only if the core of the identity remains intact.”1 Kelman 
and other social psychologists also suggested that one of the most eff ective 
ways to make perpetrators fully accept their guilt and responsibility is for 
the other parties to affi  rm the perpetrators’ humanity, especially when the 
perpetrators, too, suff ered in the intergroup confl icts  under consideration.2 
For better or for worse, being si mul ta neously perpetrator and victim has 
become part and parcel of Japa nese identity. Th is means that Japa nese 
citizens  will likely commemorate the suff ering of South Korean and Chi-
nese victims more extensively if their own dual identity as both perpetrator 
and victim can remain intact. Put another way, while Japan needs to em-
brace a greater degree of contrition fi rst, South  Korea and China  will have 
to meet Japan halfway. Th is cosmopolitan commemoration on the part of 
South  Korea and China has the potential to move Japan to fully accept its 
war responsibility  because  doing so  will no longer threaten the core of Japan’s 
dual identity.  Here, cosmopolitan commemoration needs to be envisioned 
as a collective endeavor.
To reciprocate cosmopolitan commemoration  toward Japan, however, 
the governments and citizens in South  Korea and China face a very diffi  cult 
task: to work through negative emotions of anger, hatred, and vengefulness 
entangled in their commemorations of Japan’s past wrongdoings. As Paul 
Ricoeur observed, “ Th ere can be an institution of amnesty, which does not 
mean amnesia. I would say that  there is no symmetry between the duty to 
remember and the duty to forget,  because the duty to remember is a duty 
to teach, whereas the duty to forget is a duty to go beyond anger and ha-
tred.”3 While Japan has the duty to remember the suff ering of South Ko-
rean and Chinese victims and teach it to younger generations, South  Korea 
and China can be said to have the duty to forgive, not by forgetting, but by 
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overcoming hostile emotions  toward Japan and recognizing Japa nese  people’s 
humanity.4 Park Yu Ha suggested that such forgiveness is necessary not only 
for perpetrators but also for victims to be freed from past traumas, and that 
“this kind of forgiveness does not amount to the forgetting and concealment 
of the past but points to the new relationship [between perpetrators and vic-
tims] that enables a deeper gaze into history.”5 In essence, reconciliation 
presupposes reciprocity.6
“Amnesty,” however, is usually granted in cases of domestic confl icts, 
such as civil war and vio lence against ethnic minorities, rather than in cases 
of international confl icts. Since Japan, South  Korea, and China do not form 
a single polity, Ricoeur’s observation on amnesty can be simply imported 
meta phor ically into the history prob lem in East Asia. Alternatively, amnesty 
can be understood in the performative sense of creating the real ity it pur-
ports to describe. Th at is, reconciliation in the context of East Asia is not 
merely about restoring impaired relations; rather, it involves a performative 
act to create new relations and thereby build the transnational polity to 
come.7 In fact, given the rate of increase in economic, po liti cal, and social 
interactions between Japan, South  Korea, and China, the governments and 
citizens in the three countries  will need more channels of communication 
and mechanisms of coordination if they want to cope eff ectively with emerg-
ing transnational prob lems, such as environmental pollution. Th e extent to 
which the governments and citizens in South  Korea and China are willing 
to grant Japan amnesty thus holds the key to reconciliation and the pos si ble 
formation of the transnational polity bringing the three countries together.
To performatively facilitate reconciliation in East Asia, I suggest that 
apology on Japan’s part is crucial. Th is is not only  because Japan bears the 
largest share of responsibility for the history prob lem but also  because apol-
ogy is a performative speech act par excellence, aimed at reestablishing a tem-
porarily strained social relationship between members who belong to the 
same moral community.8 Japan’s apology to South  Korea and China would 
therefore exemplify the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration that recog-
nizes common humanity in foreign  others by  going beyond the logic of 
nationalism that would reject the necessity of remembering past wrongs 
infl icted on them.
Apology in the context of East Asia’s history prob lem, however, is 
extremely challenging  because it necessarily involves “po liti cal apology,” a 
subset of what sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis called “Many to One apology,” 
wherein the government (a collective actor) apologizes to an individual that 
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it victimized through its past action.9 According to po liti cal scientists and 
phi los o phers, even though instances of po liti cal apologies have multiplied 
in recent de cades, as redress movements based on  human rights have prolif-
erated around the world, they are far more likely to fail than succeed.10 Th is 
diffi  culty of po liti cal apology has been demonstrated by the recent history 
of Japan’s relations with South  Korea and China. As Norma Field and 
 Jennifer Lind documented, in so many instances, the apologies off ered by 
the Japa nese government escalated the history prob lem rather than helped 
relevant po liti cal actors move  toward mutual cosmopolitan commemora-
tion.11 Th is is primarily  because no common understanding of the past ex-
ists to coordinate interactions between the Japa nese government and South 
Korean and Chinese victims; for example, “historical facts” about Japan’s 
past wrongdoings, such as comfort  women and the Nanjing Massacre, are 
still highly contested. A satisfactory apology is pos si ble only if the perpe-
trator government and the individual victims agree on what wrong was 
committed— apology is fi rst and foremost commemorative  because it pre-
supposes acknowl edgment of a past wrong. Since such agreement is lacking, 
the Japa nese government has been unable to script an apology capable of 
satisfying the victims.12
In addition, it is diffi  cult for a Japa nese prime minister to anthropo-
morphize the government as a unifi ed actor, given that the government is 
fundamentally fractured by multiple ministries and co ali tion partners. For 
example, the apologies by Japa nese prime ministers in the 1990s  were fre-
quently met with opposition and even backlash from conservative LDP 
members in their cabinets. As a result, the Japa nese government failed to 
achieve the status of unifi ed actorhood, a precondition for an unequivocal 
po liti cal apology. Even if a prime minister succeeds in unifying the govern-
ment, however, he or she  will still face another diffi  cult challenge: to make 
his or her apology emotionally satisfactory to victims. Especially with re-
gard to traumatic events, victims often seek emotional closure, no  matter 
how provisional it may be. And yet, no Japa nese prime minister has ever of-
fered an emotional apology by mobilizing his facial and bodily expressions or 
by holding a face- to- face meeting with victims. In fact, a po liti cal apology, 
typically delivered to the general public, tends to be impersonal and there-
fore unsuitable for bringing emotional closure to victims.
 Here, the diffi  culty on the part of the government is compounded by 
the heterogeneity of audiences, ranging from foreign victims and their sup-
porters to conservative constituencies inside Japan. Th is heterogeneity has 
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made the Japa nese government’s apology vulnerable to denunciations from 
opposing sides. On the one hand, South Korean and Chinese victims of 
Japan’s past wrongdoings, as well as their Japa nese and international support-
ers, rejected the government’s apology as inadequate  because it was not ac-
companied by compensation. On the other hand, conservative politicians 
and NGOs criticized the government for giving in to foreign pressure even 
when  there was nothing to apologize for. Contradictory reactions from the 
opposing audiences then bounced off  each other in the public sphere, creat-
ing unexpected dynamics that damaged the relationship that the govern-
ment’s apology originally intended to repair. Th e unexpected dynamics  were 
also exacerbated by tele vi sion, radio, and other forms of mass communica-
tion that mediated po liti cal apologies.13 Particularly in the transnational con-
text, mass media plays a crucial role in infl uencing audiences’ perceptions 
 because the majority of victims and their supporters are likely to hear the 
perpetrator government’s apology through media coverage.
Perhaps the most serious challenge in a po liti cal apology is the issue of 
compensation. As sociologist John Torpey observed, “Despite frequent claims 
that reparations would be good for all concerned, both perpetrators and vic-
tims, reparations politics makes claims on behalf of victims and is hence 
unavoidably partisan.”14 Indeed, the South Korean and Chinese demands 
for compensation for war- related damages triggered the vicious circle of mu-
tually reinforcing nationalist commemorations  because they reproduced 
the binary, partisan opposition between innocent South Korean and Chi-
nese victims and the evil Japa nese government.
Nevertheless, for the Japa nese government’s apology to be convincing, 
it needs to be supported by compensation and other forms of material evi-
dence. In fact, the primary function of compensation is to reinforce the 
sincerity of apology that a perpetrator tries to communicate to victims.15 
Take, for example, Avi Primor, an Israeli diplomat who was involved in the 
Remembrance, Responsibility, and  Future Fund that the German govern-
ment set up to fi nancially compensate former forced laborers and other 
victims of Nazi Germany. When interviewed by Funabashi Yōichi, Primor 
emphasized the symbolic function of monetary compensation as follows:
At the fundamental level, the aim of this fund is not simply to compen-
sate victims of forced  labor. Let’s say that  there was a Rus sian who was 
captured by Nazi Germany and forced to work  under incredibly inhu-
mane conditions for fi ve years. Now, he could receive fi fteen thousand 
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Deutsche marks, approximately fi ve to six thousand U.S. dollars, from 
the Fund. Is this all he could get for fi ve years of forced  labor? Every-
body would think it’s so  little. . . .  But this is  really not about fi nancial 
compensation but about symbolic recognition— that’s the crucial  thing.16
Th e Japa nese government, however, has failed to support its apologies with 
suffi  cient material evidence. Even though the government off ered relief for 
South Korean A- bomb victims and former comfort  women, it refused to call 
it “compensation” (hoshō), thus compromising its function to symbolize rec-
ognition. To be sure, the government fi  nally agreed to provide one billion 
Japa nese yen for former comfort  women in South  Korea in December 2015,17 
but it has also actively diminished another form of material evidence— 
descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks—by tightening 
the textbook- inspection criteria between the late 1990s and 2015.18
Given  these diffi  culties surrounding a po liti cal apology in the transna-
tional context, the Japa nese government needs to do extensive preparation 
 behind the stage if it hopes to off er an apology capable of satisfying South 
Korean and Chinese victims. To say the least, such backstage preparation 
requires agreement among diff er ent offi  cials and ministries, as well as 
communication with multiple audiences and comprehension of their com-
memorative positions. But such backstage preparation has been lacking. Th e 
Japa nese government, for example, was unwilling to collect information on 
how former comfort  women and their supporters would react to the Asian 
 Women’s Fund. As Totsuka Etsurō, a  lawyer who provided  legal support for 
former comfort  women, recounted, “ Th ere was no prior, preliminary talk 
between the Japa nese government and victims. Th e Japa nese government 
unilaterally deci ded on a solution . . .  and asked victims to accept it. . . .  Th e 
government did not know how the victims would react  because it had failed 
to listen to them carefully.”19 Without extensive communication with vic-
tims, the government may well aggravate the suff ering of victims. As Kim 
Pu Ja, a professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and longtime sup-
porter of former comfort  woman, observed, “From the perspective of the 
Asian  Women’s Fund, foreign victims are passive objects that should accept 
Japan’s concerns and opinions— their agency (shutaisei) is ignored. Is this 
not a reenactment of colonial relations?”20 Only with extensive background 
preparation can the Japa nese government ever expect to deliver an apology 
that  will fully recognize the suff ering of victims.
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Indeed, any successful apology requires the victim’s participation: a po-
liti cal apology, publicly off ered, can be completed only when it is publicly 
accepted. As po liti cal scientist Victor Cha suggested, “Historical reconcili-
ation is a two- way street. A necessary (but not suffi  cient) condition is the 
proff ering of formal acts of contrition and evidence of attitudinal changes 
on the part of the aggressor. Such acts, however, produce no reconciliation 
without a willingness on the part of the victim to accept the apology and 
move on.”21  Here, reconciliation, initiated by apologies, is necessarily mu-
tual and interactive.22 But this would require an enormous amount of work 
involving an enormous number of relevant po liti cal actors, ranging from gov-
ernment offi  cials to victims and their supporters in Japan, South  Korea, 
and China. I therefore suggest that the critics of the Japa nese government 
need be more conscious of the diffi  culties inherent in po liti cal apologies and 
their fundamentally pro cessual nature—as po liti cal phi los o pher Nick Smith 
pointed out, apologies are only “beginnings not conclusions” in the ardu-
ous pursuit of eventual reconciliation between perpetrators and victims.23
 After all, Japan has been asked to set a moral example for other coun-
tries, to apologize for its past wrongdoings that include the colonial rule of 
 Korea. Th is is no ordinary task, as recognized by observers of East Asia’s 
history prob lem. For example, Kim Bong Jin, a South Korean professor at 
the City University of Northern Kyūshū, praised the 1995 Murayama 
Statement as being “groundbreaking as the fi rst ever offi  cial apology for 
colonialism in the world,” even though he criticized the lack of adequate 
follow-up actions on the part of the Japa nese government.24 Park Yu Ha 
also called for Japan’s apology for its colonial rule of  Korea in the performa-
tive spirit: “If Japan volunteers to take responsibility for the prob lems that 
it caused as a former imperial power, Japan can show a good example to the 
Western countries that have not considered apologizing for their colonial 
rule.”25 Similarly, Ōnuma Yasuaki urged Japa nese citizens to take on this 
extraordinary task: “Japan should not refuse to apologize to  people in Asia 
 because the Western countries have not. Instead, Japan should accomplish 
the diffi  cult task of apology and atonement and, then, quietly question the 
Western countries  whether they  will do the same.”26
When discussing “Japan’s apology,” however, it is critical to avoid lim-
iting the subject to the Japa nese government. East Asia’s history prob lem per-
sists partly  because the government- centered view of war responsibility has 
prevented Japa nese citizens from examining their share of responsibility for 
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Japan’s past wrongdoings. In this res pect, older generations of Japa nese citi-
zens who participated in the Asia- Pacifi c War owe apologies to foreign vic-
tims. If a large number of them had examined and accepted their share of 
war responsibility, they could have put more pressure on the government to 
incorporate cosmopolitanism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration, and the 
governments and citizens in South  Korea and China could have been more 
receptive to Japan’s apology.
However, most of the older generations, partial authors of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings, have passed away and shifted the burden of the history prob-
lem to younger generations of Japa nese citizens who  were born  after the war’s 
end. What kind of responsibility do  these younger generations have for 
 Japan’s past wrongdoings? Do they also owe apologies to foreign victims?
Commemorative Responsibility for the  Future: 
A Pragmatist Position and Its Policy Implications
I argue that younger generations of Japa nese citizens, including myself, do 
have commemorative responsibility, to fully acknowledge Japan’s past wrong-
doings and press our government to off er a satisfactory apology, even though 
we did not commit  those acts.  Here, I justify commemorative responsibil-
ity of younger generations based on pragmatist philosophy. As John Dewey 
stated, a pragmatist approach to the past means that “past events cannot be 
separated from the living pres ent and retain meaning. Th e true starting point 
of history is always some pres ent situation with its prob lems.”27 Ultimately, 
the past should not be commemorated for its own sake but for the sake of 
the  future, immanent in pres ent prob lem- situations confronting citizens. In 
short, younger generations of Japa nese citizens do not have commemorative 
responsibility  because they have inherited war guilt but  because the “pres-
ent situation”— the per sis tence of the history prob lem— demands commem-
oration of Japan’s past wrongdoings.
I therefore reject the essentialist position on commemorative responsi-
bility advanced by Ienaga Saburō, who insisted that younger generations of 
Japa nese citizens “automatically inherit responsibility for the war from their 
preceding generations by virtue of the Japa nese nation’s continuity.”28 Th is 
essentialist position anchors commemorative responsibility in an extreme 
version of ethnic nationalism that presumes an almost metaphysical form 
of inborn national guilt. Ienaga’s argument for such a deeply ethnic- 
nationalist argument is ironic, given his own history of criticizing the Japa-
nese nationalist commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War. But, at the same 
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time, the essentialist position does have a valid point. Seo Gyeong Sik, a Ko-
rean resident in Japan and law professor at Tokyo University of Economics, 
justifi ed ethnic inheritance of war responsibility as follows: “Some Japa nese 
ask why they have to be blamed for crimes that their grand fathers commit-
ted, but it is the Japa nese  people themselves that defend the ethnic- nationalist 
logic to defi ne the Japa nese in terms of blood.”29 Seo thus pointed out a self- 
contradiction among younger generations of Japa nese citizens who refuse 
to inherit Japan’s war responsibility while uncritically accepting the jus san-
guinis princi ple of Japa nese citizenship that has marginalized Korean resi-
dents in Japan and repressed memories of Japan’s colonial rule of  Korea. Seo’s 
point is well  taken, but he still accepted the idea of inborn national guilt à la 
Ienaga and reproduced the logic of Japa nese nationalism from which Korean 
residents continue to suff er.
In this regard, the pragmatist position is similar to a civic- nationalist 
position articulated by po liti cal scientists Ōnuma Yasuaki, Kwak Jun- Hyeok, 
and Melissa Nobles. Th ey argued that even though younger generations do 
not inherit guilt, they inherit commemorative responsibility as part of their 
civic duties as citizens of a country that committed wrongs.30 For Ōnuma, 
younger generations cannot but inherit both positive and negative legacies 
from their pre de ces sors, so long as they are citizens of the country; that is, 
younger generations of Japa nese citizens inherited Japan’s postwar economic 
prosperity as well as commemorative responsibility for its past wrongdoings. 
But the pragmatist position is much more  future  oriented than the civic- 
nationalist position  because it conceives of commemorative responsibility 
among younger generations as driven by what kind of  future relations they 
want to establish with their foreign neighbors as much as by what wrongs 
their pre de ces sors committed in the past. To be sure, this  future orientation 
may be misleading at fi rst, as former diplomat Tōgō Kazuhiko warned: 
“When the perpetrator speaks of ‘ future orientation (mirai shikō),’ the vic-
tim can hear it as ‘let’s forget the past.’ ”31 But the pragmatist position does 
not justify forgetting the past for the sake of the  future but demands the 
exact opposite, to remember the past for resolving the pres ent situation with 
the history prob lem and thereby striving for a diff er ent  future.
Th e pragmatist position thus overlaps partially with an ethical position 
advocated by Takahashi Tetsuya, one of the best- known leftist intellectuals 
in Japan. Takahashi argued that younger generations of Japa nese citizens 
have an ethical responsibility to respond to the call from the Asian other. 
Since the Japa nese self is constituted in relation to the Asian other, “it is 
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impossible to speak of ‘We the Japa nese’ without facing the Asian victim.”32 
Takahashi then elevated the Asian other’s demand on commemoration of 
Japan’s past wrongdoings to the level of the absolute and sacralized the 
other’s prerogative to off er forgiveness by drawing on Jacques Derrida’s ar-
gument: “One cannot, or should not, forgive;  there is only forgiveness, if 
 there is any, where  there is the unforgivable. Th at is to say that forgiveness 
must announce itself as impossibility itself.”33  Here, Takahashi anchored 
commemorative responsibility among younger generations in the ethics of 
self- other relations, wherein the Japa nese self must unconditionally respond 
to the Asian other’s call, and the other’s forgiveness constitutes the condi-
tion of both possibility and impossibility of reconciliation.
I am sympathetic to Takahashi’s ethical position, and I do agree with 
him that “the real key to disentangling the history prob lem is the question 
of how to meet the other, how to create the self- other relation.”34 But, at the 
same time, I think that his position is deeply problematic  because it makes 
the other absolute and prioritizes the other over the self. Such ethical ex-
tremism risks providing complete moral immunity for the other even when 
he or she adopts the nationalist logic and refuses to reciprocate recognition 
of humanity to the self. Th e ethical position also ignores the fact that the 
relationship between the self and the other is fundamentally interactive and 
often mutually transformative, which renders the contents of commemora-
tion, the terms of apology, and the conditions of reconciliation immanent 
within interactions among relevant actors.
Th e pragmatist position, by contrast, fully incorporates the interactive 
and immanent characteristics of self- other relations in concrete historical sit-
uations.35 Put another way, the pragmatist position does not prescribe spe-
cifi c conditions of reconciliation a priori— these conditions should be left 
to relevant actors to work out through their mutually transformative inter-
actions. Perhaps the only condition that the pragmatist position demands 
is that, as critical theorist Axel Honneth noted,  these interactions should 
be grounded in the taking of the attitude of the other, that is, in the recip-
rocation of recognition of each other’s humanity.36 Th e pragmatist posi-
tion therefore serves as a principled justifi cation for mutual cosmopolitan 
commemoration as the key to resolving the history prob lem in East Asia.
But what concrete mea sures can be taken to facilitate mutual cosmo-
politan commemoration among younger generations in Japan, South  Korea, 
and China? So far, po liti cal scientists have made several policy recommen-
dations. To name but a few: po liti cal leaders in the three countries should 
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refrain from opportunistically exploiting the history prob lem to mobilize 
public support for their regimes; the Japa nese government should institu-
tionalize contrition consistently across diff er ent domains, ranging from of-
fi cial rhe toric to education; the Japa nese government’s greater contrition, 
when it is expressed in good faith, should be reciprocated by the South 
Korean and Chinese governments; and the three governments should 
continue to support joint historical research and education proj ects.37
While all of  these recommendations are impor tant, I would like to em-
phasize the last one  because the historical judgment of the Tokyo Trial 
served as a focal point of the history prob lem during the entire postwar pe-
riod. On the one hand, Japa nese nationalists articulate their commemora-
tive position— Japan fought a just war for self- defense and liberation of 
Asia—by rejecting the Tokyo Judgment as victor’s justice. On the other 
hand, South Korean and Chinese nationalists blame Japan entirely for the 
history prob lem, consistent with the trial that judged Japan as solely and 
entirely guilty of the war. Th e majority of Japa nese citizens, however, fall 
between the two extreme positions taken by nationalists in Japan as well as 
in South  Korea and China. Th ey rather believe that “reconciliation  will not 
be achieved by the complete rejection of Japan’s past as an unmitigated di-
saster or by defending Japa nese colonialism, aggressions, and the Pacifi c War 
as completely justifi able actions,” as Tōgō Kazuhiko and historian Hasegawa 
Tsuyoshi observed.38 Th us, many Japa nese citizens, unlike Japa nese nation-
alists, readily acknowledge Japan’s war crimes, but they are also troubled by 
the failure of the Tokyo Trial to prosecute war crimes committed against 
Japan, unlike South Korean and Chinese nationalists.  Here, to reinforce 
cosmopolitan commemoration among the majority of Japa nese citizens, 
historians in East Asia can, and should, continue their joint proj ects, to pool 
historical materials across national borders, reexamine the Tokyo Judg-
ment, and problematize nationalist commemorations in light of newer and 
stronger evidence.
But simply carry ing on with the existing joint proj ects  will not help 
resolve the history prob lem,  because historians’ debate is currently discon-
nected from governmental and public commemorations. To allow histo-
rians to eff ectively intervene in the history prob lem, I recommend the 
following changes pertaining to historical research and history education 
in East Asia.
First, the governments of Japan, South  Korea, and China should in-
crease their support for joint historical research, for governmental support 
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is crucial for  these joint proj ects to have any meaningful impact on the his-
tory prob lem. For example, joint historical research and textbook proj ects 
contributed to Germany’s reconciliation with France and Poland  because 
they had both po liti cal and orga nizational support from the governments 
involved. Importantly, even though governmental support is essential, the 
governments do not always need to provide fi nancial and  human resources 
for joint historical research proj ects. A case in point is the Conference of 
Japa nese and South Korean Historians. Th is conference was established in 
2001 in response to the joint report by the Japa nese and South Korean 
governments that had recommended the expansion of joint historical re-
search. While the conference has been held annually since then, it has 
been or ga nized by Japa nese and South Korean historians in de pen dent of 
the governments.39 Th us, an expression of support by the governments 
could alone stimulate and legitimate joint historical research proj ects. Indi-
rect governmental support of this sort could prob ably better facilitate 
cosmopolitanism among participants  because the governments would 
not be able to constrain joint historical research proj ects by controlling 
the se lection of participants and foregrounding the national frame of 
identifi cation.40
But a crucial question is  whether politicians in East Asia are ready to 
incorporate outcomes of joint research proj ects by historians— even ones that 
contradict their own commemorative positions— into offi  cial commemora-
tions. At pres ent, politicians are not ready, opting to ignore historians’ critical 
refl ections. In fact, LDP politicians recently became more vocal in criticiz-
ing historians who studied Japan’s past wrongdoings, prompting a group of 
historians in the United States and Eu rope to issue a statement of solidarity 
to stop “government manipulation, censorship, and private intimidation” 
and call upon the Japa nese and other governments to “defend the freedom 
of historical inquiry.” 41 In this regard, it is useful to refl ect on the remarks 
that Richard von Weizsäcker made in summer 1995 when he toured in Japan. 
In one of his public lectures, Weizsäcker asked his Japa nese audience, “Does 
the task of interpreting the past belong to historians alone? Or are we, po-
liti cal and intellectual leaders of Germany and Japan, also responsible for 
taking part in the task? I’m convinced that we are.” 42 Of course, politicians 
lack professional skills to interpret the past in lieu of historians, but they do 
have an essential part in the history prob lem  because they have the power 
to institutionally support historians’ debate. Th is governmental support is 
especially pivotal in East Asia, where the governments have traditionally 
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dominated the civil socie ties.43 A resolution of the history prob lem depends 
on courageous politicians who dare to subject the existing offi  cial com-
memorations to critical refl ections off ered by the transnational network 
of historians.
Second, I recommend that joint historical research proj ects be rethought 
in multilateral settings. Except for the History to Open the  Future proj ect 
and a few other proj ects, joint historical research in East Asia has been or-
ga nized in terms of Japan– South  Korea and Japan- China bilateral relations. 
As historian Yang Daqing argued, however, “Institutionally, participation 
in multilateral research or dialogue can be a valuable opportunity for so-
cialization into international norms and practices on writing history. . . .  Th e 
permanent solution to the history prob lem, if  there is one, is the cultivation 
of a global citizenship. Th is requires an understanding of history based on 
humanist princi ples and values.” 44 In this res pect, multilateral collabora-
tion is likely to be most eff ective if American historians are included,  because 
the United States has a signifi cant stake in international relations in the re-
gion.45 As Shin Gi- Wook pointed out, “Th e United States not only has a 
responsibility for helping resolve the disputes but also has a clear interest in 
ensuring that the peace and prosperity of a region so vital to its  future is not 
undermined by controversies rooted in the past.” 46 Since the United States 
is one of the relevant po liti cal actors in the history prob lem, historians’ de-
bate in East Asia  will benefi t from participation by American historians who 
are willing to subject their country’s nationalist commemoration to critical 
refl ections.
Th ird, I recommend that historians engage with the public more 
 actively. Professional historians in Japan  were overwhelmed by JSHTR 
members and other “populists,” not only  because the bound aries between 
historiography and commemoration are ambiguous, but also  because 
many professional historians in Japan and elsewhere tend to confi ne their 
work to scholarly communities. No  matter how historical research on Japan’s 
past wrongdoings makes pro gress, it is unlikely to reshape public commem-
orations without more historians sharing their fi ndings with citizens. In a 
way, professional historians have the civic duty to help concerned citizens 
understand historical events that  shaped the world in which they live.
At the same time, it is impor tant to note that historians cannot, and 
should not, dictate how the governments and citizens commemorate the 
Asia- Pacifi c War. To begin with, historians disagree with each other over the 
reliability of evidence and the validity of interpretations: this fundamentally 
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provisional nature of “historical facts” vis- à- vis a lack of consensus disables 
historians from presenting the governments and citizens with “the correct 
way” of remembering the past. Perhaps more importantly,  human beings 
cannot replace commemoration with historiography  because the former is 
the only way to assign meaning to the past and appropriate it as the basis of 
collective identity. Th e best historians can do for the governments and citi-
zens, therefore, is foreground the importance of careful examination of his-
torical evidence and interpretations and thereby keep commemorations open 
to critical refl ections and continuous revisions.47
In turn, as Paul Ricoeur emphasized, “In the fi nal analy sis, the con-
viction of the citizen alone justifi es . . .  the intellectual honesty of the his-
torian in archives.” 48 It is therefore crucial to increase “historical liter-
acy” among citizens.  Here, I suggest that this historical literacy should 
emphasize a set of competencies for taking a refl ective stance on one’s own 
commemorative position by critically examining available evidence and 
interpretations à la an amateur historian. As Tessa Morris- Suzuki pointed 
out, the crucial question is, “How can one mount an eff ective critique of 
the Society for History Textbook Reform [JSHTR] without reverting to a 
 simple positivism which seeks to replace the Society’s ‘incorrect’ narrative 
of the national past with an authoritative, but still dubious, ‘correct’ alterna-
tive?” 49 Th us, I recommend that history education in Japan, South  Korea, 
and China be reformed in such a way that younger generations can not only 
learn history according to the cosmopolitan logic, but also acquire cogni-
tive skills to critically evaluate evidence and construct interpretations by 
working through disagreements.
Once the existing memorization- based approach to history is replaced 
with a more dialogic one, younger generations of the three countries  will be-
come more capable of taking critical distance from nationalist commemora-
tions than previous generations. As Tsuchiya Takeshi, a professor of social 
studies at Aichi University of Education, suggested,  these cognitive skills are 
needed more than ever in an increasingly global world, especially in the region 
of East Asia marred with a diffi  cult transnational past: “In a transnational, 
multicultural society that transcends the framework of the nation- state, his-
tory education must evaluate the ability ‘to interpret history and propose 
a   future by taking into consideration the foreign other’s perspective.’ . . . 
Th us, as history education becomes more and more transnational, it  will 
become crucial not to demand one correct answer but to create evaluation 
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criteria for the ability to consider multiple perspectives . . .  and to revise and 
deepen one’s idea through dialogues with  others.”50
Th is “dialogic historical literacy” may look unrealistic in East Asia, 
where the governments deploy education systems as vehicles of nation- 
building.51 Yet, ongoing education reforms in Japan, South  Korea, and 
China are conducive to such historical literacy. In Japan, the government 
has begun to shift the curricular focus away from memorization to prob lem 
solving since the late 1990s by revising the Course of Study to increase the 
weight of prob lem- solving learning activities to prepare younger generations 
for a complex, constantly changing global world.52 Similar education reforms 
have been carried out in South  Korea and China as well. As part of this on-
going education reform at the regional level, history education can be made 
more prob lem- solving oriented à la pragmatism, so as to help students de-
velop the cognitive and communicative skills necessary for debating histori-
cal interpretations with foreigners in a constructive manner. Ultimately, an 
ideal education reform  will abolish the textbook- inspection pro cess itself 
and fully expose students to multiple historical interpretations and confl ict-
ing evidence.
In addition to better historical literacy, younger generations of Japa nese 
citizens need to acquire more knowledge of modern Japa nese history, includ-
ing Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th is is urgent  because the current structure 
of Japa nese history education, which downplays the modern period, has cre-
ated a vacuum of historical knowledge in younger generations: JSHTR and 
other conservative NGOs exploited this vacuum to persuade young Japa-
nese citizens to accept their nationalist commemoration as a correct version 
of history. To prevent the nationalist commemoration from further encroach-
ing on the hearts and minds of young Japa nese citizens, history education 
in Japan needs to expand the coverage of the modern period.
To this end, I recommend that younger generations of Japa nese citi-
zens learn about not only the comfort  women, the Nanjing Massacre, and 
other well- known atrocities in East Asia’s history prob lem but also about 
lesser- known but no less impor tant ones. Take, for example, Koreans who 
moved to Sakhalin during Japan’s colonial rule.  After the Soviet Union oc-
cupied Sakhalin, they could not return to  Korea  because the agreement be-
tween the Japa nese and Soviet governments allowed only Japa nese citizens 
to leave Sakhalin.53 Th e tragedy of  these Koreans who could not be re united 
with their families  after the war can remind Japa nese citizens of the legacy 
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of Japan’s imperialist past to the full extent. Another impor tant tragedy is 
the  Battle of Okinawa, which claimed more than ninety thousand civilian 
lives: Okinawa residents  were treated as “second- class” Japa nese and, dur-
ing the  battle,  were killed not only by the Allied powers but also by Japa-
nese troops.54  After the war ended, Okinawa continued to be occupied by 
the United States  until May 1972, and  today, the prefecture dispropor-
tionately shoulders the US military bases in Japan. Without reference to the 
modern history of Okinawa, it is impossible to understand the postwar 
trajectory of US- Japan alliance, including the recent reinterpretation of Ar-
ticle 9 of the constitution that expanded the scope of the SDF’s overseas de-
ployment. Th us, looking at the war from the perspectives of marginalized 
groups can help younger generations comprehend the real extent of Japan’s 
past wrongdoings as well as the ramifi cations of the Asia- Pacifi c War on 
current international relations.
Th e key to fostering this kind of “cosmopolitan historical literacy” is 
the continuation and improvement of joint historical research and education 
proj ects: historians and history teachers should lead by example. To be sure, 
the existing proj ects, including the History to Open the  Future proj ect, 
have encountered many logistical and academic prob lems, as noted by 
many Japa nese participants in the symposium on Eu ro pean and East Asian 
joint history textbook proj ects held in Tokyo in 2007. However, German 
and French participants reminded them that the Eu ro pean proj ects made 
pro gress over time through many  trials and errors.55 A case in point is the 
Joint German- Polish Textbook Commission, founded by the West German 
and Polish UNESCO Commissions in 1972. West German and Polish his-
torians discussed vari ous events and episodes in history of German- Polish 
relations, including Nazi occupation and Polish re sis tance movements, and 
issued recommendations for history and geography textbooks in 1976.56 Al-
though  these recommendations initially drew strong criticisms from West 
German nationalists, most of them  were eventually incorporated into sec-
tions on Poland in West German textbooks.
Indeed, joint historical research and education proj ects are supported 
by the worldwide trend in education systems that legitimate cosmopolitan 
schemas, which take humanity, rather than nationality, as a primary frame 
of reference through  human rights education and emphasis on world citi-
zenship.57 Summarizing results of  these recent comparative studies, sociolo-
gist John Meyer observed that more and more education systems defi ne the 
person as someone who “should be able to function as a supra- national citi-
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zen, and refl ect from a more universal point of view on local and national 
history. In other words, the individual student is to become a member of a 
newly- developing identity called ‘humanity.’ ”58 Th is institutional trend has 
forced the Japa nese and other governments to reshape education systems as 
vehicles of “cosmopolitan nation- building.”59 Th is means that national his-
tory persists as a school subject, but it can be taught legitimately only if it is 
accompanied by cosmopolitan perspectives. As suggested by one of the par-
ticipants in the Japan– South  Korea joint history textbook symposium, “If 
teachers cannot avoid making lessons centered on the history of their own 
country, it is impor tant for them to link their history to universality and 
cosmopolitanism, so that they can relativize and objectify their history to go 
beyond prejudices.” 60
Realizing this kind of cosmopolitan education  will take a lot of time 
and eff ort, but it  will off er a most fundamental solution to the history 
prob lem by prompting younger generations in Japan, South  Korea, and 
China to remember the Asia- Pacifi c War newly and diff erently, according 
to the logic of cosmopolitanism. As the UNESCO Constitution states, 
“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the 
defences of peace must be constructed.” 61 While this may sound too ideal-
istic at fi rst, mutual cosmopolitan commemoration has already emerged 
through the joint historical research and education proj ects. Th e question 
is  whether the governments and citizens in the three countries are willing 
to further it.
Final Refl ections
In a way, this book is a response to a famous passage in the speech that Rich-
ard von Weizsäcker delivered on the fortieth anniversary of the end of 
World War II: “Anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the pres-
ent. Whoever refuses to remember the inhumanity is prone to new risks of 
infection.” 62 When  people inside and outside Japan criticize the Japa nese 
government for failing to adequately commemorate Japan’s past wrongdo-
ings, they often quote this passage in order to denounce the per sis tence of 
nationalism in Japan’s offi  cial commemoration and urge Japa nese citizens 
to fully commemorate the suff ering of foreign victims. Th is denunciation 
is at the core of the orthodox explanation of the history prob lem that 
blames Japan alone, consistent with the Tokyo Judgment that held Japan as 
solely and entirely guilty. Yet critics rarely probe into three questions buried 
within Weizsäcker’s speech: Which inhumanity should be remembered, how 
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should it be remembered, and precisely how  will remembrance of the past 
inhumanity prevent “ future infection”?
Simply put, I have argued that the inhumanities on all sides in the Asia- 
Pacifi c War need to be commemorated. Th is commemoration of the inhu-
manities also needs to be mutually cosmopolitan, aided by a critical reas-
sessment of the Tokyo Trial. Since the history prob lem is fundamentally 
relational, its solution also calls for a relational approach. Such mutual cos-
mopolitan commemoration has the potential to prevent “ future infection” 
by bringing the governments and citizens of Japan, South  Korea, and China 
together within the horizon of common humanity that transcends the logic 
of nationalism. As Shin Gi- Wook insisted, “It cannot and should not be 
expected that Northeast Asia  will simply repeat or emulate Western Eu rope. 
Th e regions have distinctive histories, experiences, and memories and per-
haps even diff er ent cultural modes of reconciliation. Accordingly, we must 
search for a Northeast Asian method or strategy.” 63  Here, I put forward mu-
tual cosmopolitan commemoration, supported by historians’ critical refl ec-
tions, as a most promising and distinctly East Asian solution.
Of course, it is no easy task to further mutual cosmopolitan commem-
oration in East Asia. To say the least, the prospect of mutual cosmopolitan 
commemoration  faces three formidable challenges  today. Th e fi rst is the 
growing tension over Dokdo/Takeshima and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
For many South Koreans and Chinese,  these territorial disputes are inti-
mately tied with their commemorations of Japan’s past wrongdoings. If 
nationalist sentiments in the two countries intensify over the disputed is-
lands, they  will feed into the history prob lem and diminish the possibility 
of mutual cosmopolitan commemoration in the region. Moreover, this in-
tersection of the history prob lem and the territorial disputes can become 
diplomatically more troubling if Japan deploys the SDF for the purpose 
of collective defense and its military operations extend to the territories of 
South  Korea and China.
Th e second challenge is how to increase cosmopolitanism in Japan’s of-
fi cial commemoration without galvanizing Japa nese conservatives, who 
continue to dominate Japa nese politics. Jennifer Lind recommended that 
“perpetrator countries wishing to reconcile with former adversaries should 
search for a  middle ground that is contrite enough to placate former adver-
saries abroad, but not so much that it triggers backlash from nationalists at 
home.” 64 But this balancing act is easier said than done  because a compro-
mise of nationalism and cosmopolitanism is characterized by what social 
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theorists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Th évenot called “the monstrosity of 
composite setups,” where “the coexistence of objects of diff er ent natures 
makes several groupings equally pos si ble and creates uncertainty about the 
nature of the test  under way.” 65 Th at is, the compromise tends to trigger con-
troversy  because respective proponents of the competing logics could al-
ways contest the compromise by criticizing it for failing to conform ade-
quately to one logic or another. Japan  will need to institutionalize a greater 
degree of cosmopolitanism in its offi  cial commemoration, but that  will risk 
prompting Japa nese conservatives to boost their nationalist commemoration, 
which in turn  will likely invite denunciations from South  Korea and China.
Th e third challenge is the entry of new actors to the fi eld of the history 
prob lem. Such entry  will change interactional dynamics, co ali tions, and 
power relations among the existing actors. Th e growing involvement of the 
United States has already introduced greater complexity into the dynamic 
and trajectory of the history prob lem. Nationalist commemoration practiced 
by Korean and Chinese Americans can galvanize Japa nese nationalists, 
though more communication between Japan and the United States may help 
critically reassess the Tokyo Trial as a root cause of the history prob lem. More 
importantly, North  Korea’s entry to the fi eld— whether by itself or as part 
of unifi ed  Korea— will be a game changer  because Japan has not made any 
settlement with North  Korea with regard to its past colonial rule and war-
time atrocities. Th us, it remains fundamentally open- ended  whether and 
how relevant po liti cal actors of East Asia’s history prob lem  will be able to 
facilitate mutual cosmopolitan commemoration and eventually move  toward 
reconciliation.
Having put forward my argument, I fully acknowledge that observers 
of the history prob lem, including myself, can never remain neutral. In fact, 
social scientists who off er empirical observations are part and parcel of the 
history prob lem  because they provide policymakers, NGOs, and concerned 
citizens with languages and rationales for justifying their commemorative 
positions and framing their preferred solutions. In this regard, I pres ent my 
own so cio log i cal analy sis, too, on pragmatist grounds: the goal of this book 
is not to impose on the public a certain version of the history prob lem in 
the name of social science, but to empower the public, as social theorist 
Bruno Latour insisted by following John Dewey— namely, to help “modify 
the repre sen ta tion the public has of itself fast enough so that we can be 
sure that the greatest number of objections have been made to this repre-
sen ta tion.” 66 Such a timely and candid dialogue between social scientists 
198     Conclusion
and citizens is the key to collectively improving our “objective” understand-
ing of the situation.
Put another way, my main goal has been to illustrate the incipient de-
velopment of mutual cosmopolitan commemoration, facilitated by the trans-
national network of historians engaging in mutual criticism of nationalist 
commemorations. My purpose in  doing so is to help the participants in the 
history prob lem become more refl exive and critical of their own activities 
and, if they wish, put into use my so cio log i cal analy sis. Alternatively, they 
can object to my analy sis and renew the search for a better understanding 
and solution of the history prob lem.  Either way, I share a goal with genera-
tions of concerned citizens in East Asia and around the world who have 
grappled with the history prob lem—to let war dead fi  nally rest in peace 
and create a more peaceful world, where  people  will answer,  gently, “Ah, 
Hiroshima.”
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